# Directorate of Distance Education UNIVERSITY OF JAMMU JAMMU



## SELF LEARNING MATERIAL M. A. POLITICAL SCIENCE

**SEMESTER - II** 

#### **COURSE NO.: POL-204**

#### **COMPARATIVE POLITICS**

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### 1.1 Comparative Politics: Meaning, Evolution, Scope & Trends

- Prof. Baljit Singh

#### Structure

- 1.1.0 Objectives
- 1.1.1 Introduction
- 1.1.2 Evolution of Comparative Politics
- 1.1.3 Meaning and & Distinction
  - 1.1.3.1 Comparative Politics and Comparative Governments
  - 1.1.3.2 Moving towards Comparative Politics
- 1.1.4 Scope and Trends of Comparative Politics
- 1.1.5 Comparative Politics in Contemporary Scenario
- 1.1.6 Let us Sum Up
- 1.1.7 Suggested Readings

#### 1.1.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to:

- understand evolution of comparative politics;
- know the meaning of comparative politics;

- understand the distinction between comparative governments and comparative politics;
- comprehend the scope and trends of comparative politics, i.e. what does comparative politics compare;
- understand the contemporary scenarios and developments in comparative politics.

#### 1.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The comparative study of government and politics can be traced back to writings of Aristotle because he compared and contrasted various political systems for the better understanding of political phenomena across the countries. Aristotle is considered as the first scholar, who made the use of comparative method to understand the political happenings in the Greek City-States. Since then the comparative government has become an essential component of the discipline of political science.

Comparative politics is one of the three main sub-fields of political science (along with political theory and international relations) focusing on internal political structures, actors, and processes, and analyzing them empirically by describing, explaining, and predicting their variety (similarities and differences) across political systems-be it national political systems, regional, municipal, or even supra-national political systems. This can be done through the intensive analysis of few cases or with large-scale extensive analysis of many cases, and can be either synchronic or diachronic. Comparative politics uses both quantitative and qualitative data. Increasingly, according to Daniele Caramani the analysis of domestic politics is challenged by the growing geographical scope and interdependence between regions and countries through globalization bringing comparative politics and international relations closer (Daniele Caramani 2008). Comparative politics was born out of diversity. There would be no comparative politics without of diversity of political systems and their features. The literature up to the 1950s assumed that there would be a convergence towards the model of the major western liberal democracies. But it is on the contrary the fact that no convergence occurred, there has been divergence that led to the actual development of comparative politics.

#### 1.1.2 EVOLUTION OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

The discipline of comparative politics includes three different traditions (Van Biezen and Caramani 2006). The **first tradition** is oriented towards the study of single countries. This reflects the understanding of comparative politics in its formative years in the US, where it mainly meant the study of political system outside the US, often in isolation from another and involving little, if any comparison. For long comparative politics especially in the Anglo-Saxon world-has meant the study of foreign countries. The second tradition is methodological and is principally concerned with establishing rules and standards of comparative analysis. This tradition addresses the question of how comparative analyses should be carried out in order to enhance their potential for the descriptive accumulation of comparative information, explanation and prediction. This strand is concerned with rigorous conceptual, logical and statistical techniques of analysis, involving also issues of measurement and case selection. The **third tradition** of comparative politics is analytical, in that it combines empirical substance and method. The body of literature in this tradition is primarily concerned with the identification and explanation of differences and similarities between countries and their institutions, actors, and processes through systematic comparison using cases of a common phenomenon. Its principal goal is to be explanatory. It aims to go beyond merely ideographic descriptions and ultimately aspires to arrive at the identification of law like explanations (Daniele Caramani 2008).

# 1.1.3 MEANING & DISTINCTION BETWEEN COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT AND COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Comparative Politics involves conscious comparisons in studying political experience, institutions, behaviour and processes of the major systems of government, in a comprehensive manner so as to include even informal and extra-constitutional agencies. It is concerned with significant regularities, similarities and differences in the patterns of political institutions and in the working of political institutions and in the patterns of political behaviour. In simple words, we can say comparative politics involves a comparative study of various political systems. It involves a comprehensive, realistic and systematic study of the various processes of politics found in different systems with a view to enrich the knowledge of politics and for developing a scientific political theory.

Politics is continuous, timeless ever changing and a universal activity having its key manifestation in the making of a decision to face and solve a predicament. It connotes a kind of activity, a form of human behaviour. David Easton treats it as an action for the authoritative allocation of values. Harold Laswell and Robert Dahl describe it as a "special case in exercise of power" and Jean Blondel lays emphasis on the point of "decision making". As a subject of study, Politics has been popularly defined as "the struggle for power through which binding and authoritative values are made and implemented". Accordingly comparative politics can be described as the subject that seeks to compare the political systems with a view to understand and describe the nature of politics and to build a scientific theory of politics.

Some popular definitions of comparative politics which are given here would indicate the meaning various scholars attributed to comparative politics. For instance, M. Curtis suggests that "comparative politics is concerned with significant regularities, similarities and differences in the working of political institutions and political behaviour." According to E. A. Freeman, "Comparative politics is comparative analysis of the various forms of government and diverse political institutions." Jean Blondel defines comparative politics "as the study of patterns of national governments in the contemporary world." The term patterns of government refer to three parts of study (i) government structure (ii) behaviour and (iii) the laws. According to Roy C Macridis and Robert ward, Government is not the sole concern of students of comparative politics. Comparative politics, no doubt, has to be concerned with the government structure, but at the same time it has to take note of: (1) society, historical heritage and geographic and resource endowed, its social and economic organisations; its ideologies and its political system and (2) its parties, interests and leadership, etc.

#### 1.1.3.1 COMPARATIVE POLITICS AND COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENTS

Generally the term comparative government and comparative politics are being used interchangeably but there is difference between the comparative government and comparative politics. In order to understand the distinction between the comparative government and comparative politics, it is required to understand the meaning of both. The subject matter of comparative government and politics has always been rather ambiguous. Comparative government can be defined in the preliminary

fashion as the study of the patterns of national governments in the contemporary world. It would also be simplistic to suggest that the study of comparative government is and must be, the study of government on a comparative basis. Roy C. Macridis points out, the expression "comparative government" signifies the study of the legal instrumentalities of government and of political processes conceived as a result of the interaction between the properly constituted organs of government, namely the electorate, the legislature, the administration and courts (Ray: 2006).

The study of comparative government cannot therefore primarily be based on a vertical comparison between all types of governments. It has to rely on what might be termed a horizontal study of national governments. This can take one of two, and only two forms. One consists in looking at national government throughout time, by having recourse to history. This is for some purpose a very attractive means of dealing with the problem and it was indeed the main way in which national governments were studied for a long period. The analysis can be given a dynamic dimension and the real influence of certain happenings may be traced more accurately. But, if used on its own, such an analysis runs into insuperable methodological difficulties: the further away one moves from the contemporary world, the more acute become the problem of data collection and of comparable data collection. Descriptions of a sequence of events can be made adequately; but the systematic examination of the structure and behaviour of government can scarcely begin. The study of government, like the study of other social problems, is rooted in history as evidence can be drawn only from the past, but analysis over time are only a tool or means by which contemporary governments can be described or understood.

We are left with only one approach to the study of comparative government: it consists of studying national governments across national boundaries, among the politics of the contemporary world. This approach is far from new: the first political scientist who began systematically to compile information from and to draw comparison among governments of the world was the Greek Philosopher Aristotle. Since Aristotle, not only political scientists but also lawyers and historians have used techniques of this kind to understand problems of government. Thus, as Blondel pointed out, while vertical studies of all types of government will develop and are already beginning to constitute the true overall field of political science, perhaps the most important single branch of the study will remain the analysis of national governments on comparative basis (Blondel: 1969).

Comparative government can thus be defined in a preliminary fashion as the study of patterns of national governments in the contemporary world. But the scope of the study needs to be examined more closely. In doing so we shall encounter two problems, one of which requires careful consideration as it is related to the nature of political activity. The first problem is one of boundary. When we say that comparative government is concerned with the study of government, we need to know, at least in broad terms, what we understand by governmental action. This question has naturally been the subject of numerous controversies among political scientists: some have a legalistic approach and relate government to the activities of the state; some have more substantive approach and suggest that the study of comparative government is the examination of the ways in which values are allocated in an authoritative fashion in the community. Government is the machinery by which the values are allocated, if necessary by using compulsion: what is therefore important is to examine the three stages of the operation by which the values are allocated. First, we must see the way in which the values come to be formulated and government is made aware of them. **Second**, we must see how the machinery of government digests and transforms these values into decisions applicable to the whole community. Third, we must see how these decisions are implemented down the line of governmental command (Blondel: 1969).

The study of comparative government is thus complex because it is concerned with norms and with structures and with the extent to which norms and structures are natural or imposed. But a further difficulty arises because norms whether natural or imposed, are related to structures in a number of ways. This arises largely as a result of the part played by imitation: because structures which are adopted in a country and seem particularly valuable or successful, they are imitated in another country. British and American institutions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the Soviet one party system towards the middle of twentieth century have been imitated elsewhere, often in a distorted fashion and in widely different forms, with the result that it becomes impossible to analyze together countries which adopted similar structure and we are

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confronted with norms, structures and behaviour and with a peculiar inertconnection between the three levels at which the political system develops (Blondel: 1969).

Thus the study of comparative government is fraught with problems of a particularly difficult kind and it is not surprising that, for generations, concentration should have been on the polities which were most open, where variables were most easy to operationalize and where the congruence between norms, institutions and behaviour was apparently greatest. For the generations, the study of comparative government has been the study of politics in liberal societies and has been coextensive with the analysis of constitutional rule. Modern political scientists have, at last, moved out of the vicious circle; but the move was at the expanse of much precision and logical rigour (Blondel: 1969).

#### 1.1.3.2 Moving towards Comparative Politics

The term comparative politics is now favoured in place of comparative government. The use of the term may not be mere semantic variation, as Richard Snyder calls it. It delineates an area of concern and a methodological orientation that differs from the traditional approach. It indicates that the scheme is not only focused on formal governmental institutions or political organizations but true to one of the dominant trends in contemporary political science, emphasizes informal factors, the dynamic nature of the political process, the role of the interest groups, and the impact of the society and culture on politics. Comparative politics now offers to study political process and institutions in a totally comparative fashion for the purpose of answering common problems and questions (Roy 2006). The shift from government to politics was indeed most welcome as a device designed to change the focus from institutions to processes, and was considered a realistic advance upon the earlier system. As a field of enquiry, comparative politics today signifies a genuinely comparative analysis of political structures, processes and behaviour within and across nations. Its central concern is politics and it deals with the distribution of power, wealth and skills in a political community. In a larger sense, it is concerned with the control of human behaviour in the process of distributing and redistributing these valued processes.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

| ,      | Write a brief note on evolution of comparative politics.                        |
|--------|---|
|        |   |
|        |   |
| Ι      | Discuss the Meaning of comparative politics                                     |
| _      |   |
| _<br>T | Define comparative politics and explain the features\characteristics of compara |
|        | politics.   |

#### 1.1.4 NATURE AND SCOPE OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

Comparative politics as a method of study is as old as the empirical study of politics itself. Today, even those scholars who only conduct research on a single polity drawn into the sub-discipline of comparative politics. As soon as they move beyond pure description and start using a vocabulary based diversities and comprehensive systems of classification, they turn themselves into students of comparative politics.

So, even those students of political science who study a single dimension of politics may not be able to escape the tentacles of comparison, no matter how hard they try. Trying to understand one aspect of a country's politics could be misleading without some effort at placing it 'in comparative perspective'. Even in the study of international relations we are not restricting ourselves to study only present-day world

system, but within that single case ambiguous 'trans-national' polities, such as the European Union (EU), other regional and functional 'regimes', and a myriad of non-governmental organizations.

However, comparative politics compares political systems mainly at the national level. The classical cases of comparative politics are national political systems. They are still the most important political units in the contemporary world. However, national political systems are not the only cases that comparative politics analyses. On the other hand, non-national political systems can be compared: sub-national regional political systems or supra-national units such as (1) regions (Western Europe, Central-Eastern Europe, North America, Latin America, and so on), (2) political systems of empires (Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian, Chinese, Roman, etc), (3) international organizations (European Union, NAFTA, etc), and finally the types of political systems rather than geographic units (a comparison between the democratic and authoritarian regimes in terms of, say, economic performance.

On the other hand, comparative politics compares single elements of components of the political systems rather than the whole system. The scholars of comparative politics compare the structures of parliament of different countries or regional governments, they compare policies, the finances of parties and trade unions, the presence or not of direct democracy institutions, electoral laws, and so on (Daniele Caramani 2008: 6). Comparative politics encompasses everything from a substantial from a substantial point of view, it has no substantial specificity, but rather methodological one resting on comparison and its status as a discipline has been questioned, especially in recent literature (Verba 1985; Dalton 1991; Keman 1 993a). Yet, there is specificity, and this is the focus on internal or domestic political processes. There is substantial specificity which resides in the empirical analysis of internal structures, actors and processes (Daniele Caramani 2008).

Comparative politics prior to the behavioural was typically a discipline that compared few cases. It used to believe that the world would converge towards the Anglo-Saxon model of democracy and that, consequently, these were cases that comparative political scientists should concentrate upon. The number of cases was

therefore limited to the US, Britain, France, and a few other cases such as Canada, sometimes Australia and New Zealand, as well as failed democracies of Germany and Italy. Obviously, with such a limited number of cases the employment of statistical research methods was extremely problematic and consequently did not develop. The behavioural revolution involved the widening of cases, that is, much greater numbers. Besides this, the behavioural revolution also shifted the focus of analysis from institutions to the processes and political actors.

For the purpose of comparative government and comparative politics, which has been a dynamic discipline all through, the emergence of these third world countries and their entry into the community of nations has proved to be of great significance. First, as Erickson has stated, it has greatly enlarged the empirical range of the field of comparative politics in the post-second world war period (Erickson: 1963). Second, it has helped to engender a desire for going much beyond common sense propositions and common sense testing procedures. Third, it has helped to produce the present emphasis on the social setting of politics and on agencies mediating between the social and the political, such as political groups and agencies of political socialization since, in these political systems, there is very little differentiation between the social and the political. Fourth, as Macridis pointed out, by expediting the efforts towards the studies of these clusters of countries as 'areas', it has promoted the inter-disciplinary involvement of modern comparative politics. The novelty of this inter-disciplinary approach lies not so much in its systematic orientation or in the development of analytical concepts for comparison, but rather in the sophistication with which it relates the political process in, the particular system to the ideological, cultural and social context (Macridis: 1963). Fifth, according to Rustow, it has sharpened the edge of the comparative method, and has facilitated the adoption of cross-cultural, crosspolity comparisons of the political systems of the world and the application of rigorous research frames, and it has helped to realize the possibility of a global study of comparative politics based on the entire body of available evidence (Rustow: 1963).

### 1.1.5 COMPARATIVE POLITICS IN CONTEMPORARY SCENARIO

The discipline of comparative politics is built on the idea that 'comparison' is the methodological core of the scientific study of politics (Almond et al. 2004: 31.

Political systems exist within the framework of sovereign states; for this reason comparison is understood to be comparison between countries (i. e. sovereign states). The principle that comparative politics compares countries is so entrenched that major introductions to the discipline (e. g. Almond et al. 2004; Landman 2003) do not find it necessary to explain why that is the case: it is considered self-evident. Similarly, a dominant view in the discipline of international relations is that the international system is a system of sovereign states: they are the basic components of the international system (e.g. Waltz 1979).

Both disciplines have a point. Almost every discipline on earth is the citizen or subject of a state. Whether or not people are provided with basic social values-security, wealth, welfare, freedom, order, justice- strongly depends on the ability of the state to ensure them. Furthermore, states have not withered away because of globalization and other forces. They continue to be overwhelmingly important for the lives of people. It is not attractive to live in a weak or failed state; it can even be mortally dangerous. So states continue to be utterly significant for any kind of political or social analysis (Georg Sorensen 2008).

At the same time, states are constantly in a process of change. Therefore, it is always relevant to ask questions about the current major modalities of statehood, not least because help explain how and why states are able or unable to provide basic social values. During the cold war period, the prevalent distinction was between the advanced capitalist states in the first world, the communist states in the second world, and the remaining states in the third world. With the collapse of most communist states, some use distinction between the rich countries of the North and the poor countries of the South. Although, this is a very precise categorization but another categorization is suggested: first, the advanced capitalist states are in the process of transition from modern to post-modern statehood; second, the weak post colonial states display a serious lack of stateness and they are by no means on a secure path to the development of more substance; third, the modernizing states are different combinations of these three ideal types. Of course, even this categorization can further be refined.

Typology suggested here is not meant to replace any other possible distinction. It will remain relevant-depending on the research question-to differentiate between big and small states, nation-states and non-nation states, old and new states, states from various regions and sub-regions, and so on. But the modalities put forward here help explain how sovereign states have transformed in the context of globalization. So the first recommendation to comparativists is to be aware of the larger context in which political, economic and other processes play out. This is not a very dramatic proposition as awareness of context is nothing new to comparative politics. The add-on here is merely the suggestion of a different distinction between types of state. The second recommendation is to accept that 'international' and 'domestic' are intimately connected and this requires that both elements are taken into the analysis of the development and change of sovereign statehood.

The changes took place in socio-economic context are reflected in the transformation of the institution of sovereignty. In the context of the modern state, sovereignty is closely connected with the golden rule of non-intervention (Jackson 1990). But multi-level governance is quite the opposite of non-intervention; it is systematic intervention in national affairs by supra-national and international institutions. It means something else to be sovereign under conditions of multi-level governance than it did under traditional conditions of national government. In weak states, sovereignty has changes as well. Traditionally, sovereignty means international legal equality: equal rights and duties of member states in the international system. But weak states are highly unequal so they need help from the developed world. A number of weak states are unable to take care of themselves but sovereignty—which they have——assumes that they can. They possess sovereignty without being able to meet its requirements. That is behind new practices of 'humanitarian intervention' and trusteeship. In short, the institution of sovereignty changes to make room for a situation where 'domestic' and 'international' affairs can no longer easily be separated. In nutshell, it can be argued that the sovereign state is alive and doing well. By no means has it been obliterated by forces of globalization. But it has been transformed in ways which closely connect 'domestic' and 'international' affairs. That insight must be taken on board while conducting comparative analysis of political systems.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

| t | Comparative politics now offers to study political process and institutions in a otally comparative fashion for the purpose of answering common problems and questions. Explain. |
|---|--|
|   | How the movement from comparative governments to comparative politics enlarged he understanding of political phenomenon?   |
|   | The discipline of comparative politics is built on the idea that 'comparison' is the methodological core of the scientific study of politics. How do you understand this?        |

#### 1.1.7 LET US SUM UP

Comparative politics involves both a comparative study of the political structures and functions of national political systems of various states and also a comparative study of the political institutions at work with a single state. The former is called horizontal comparative studies and the latter Is called vertical comparative studies. Traditionally under comparative governments emphasis was placed only upon horizontal comparative studies. In contemporary comparative politics, however equal importance is given to both types of comparisons.

With all these features, comparative politics is almost a new science of politics. It has rejected traditional formal character, legal and institutional framework, normative and prescriptive approach and practical nature of comparative governments. Though comparison of political institutions continues to be one of its concerns, comparative politics has a wider scope, analytical approach and scientific theory building as its objective. Explaining the difference between comparative politics and comparative governments, Sidney Verba has remarked that in comparative Politics we "look beyond description to more theoretically relevant problems; look beyond the single case to the comparison of many cases; look beyond the formal institutions of government to political functions and look beyond the countries of western Europe to the new nations of Asia, Africa and Latin America".

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#### 1.2 APPROACHES: SYSTEM, STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL & POLITICAL ECONOMY

- V. Nagendra Rao

#### **STRUCTURE**

- 1.2.0 Objectives
- 1.2.1 Introduction
- 1.2.2 Systems Theory
  - 1.2.2.1 Systems Theory in Comparative Politics
- 1.2.3 Structural Functional Analysis
- 1.2.4 Political Economy Approach
  - 1.2.4.1 National and Comparative Political Economy
  - 1.2.4.2 Political Economy: Multiple Perspectives
- 1.2.5 Let us Sum Up

#### 1.2.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to:

- understand importance of approaches to the study of comparative politics;
- know Systems Theory and its application to Comparative Politics;
- understand the what is structural functional analysis;

• comprehend political economy approach to Comparative Politics and divergence perspectives of political economy.

#### 1.2.1 INTRODUCTION

The subject matter of politics is extremely complex, involving a range of institutions, actors, and ideas that interact on the continuous basis to provide governance for society. The complexity of politics and government is compounded when we attempt to understand several different political systems, and to compare the ways in which these systems function. As comparative politics has moved beyond simple descriptions of individual countries of a few institutions, scholars have required substantial guidance to sort through the huge amount of evidence available, and to focus on the most relevant information. Given the high complexity of political systems and the wide range of variation between them across the world, it is important to develop approaches that are use across them and not simply in single countries. Political theories are the source of these approaches to comparison. According to Peters, at the broadest level, there is the difference between positivist and constructivist approaches to politics, and to social life more broadly. Political theories are the main source of such approaches- the division between positivism and constructivism being the more general distinction. At the less general levels a number of different theories enable the comparative political scientists to impose some analytic meanings on the political phenomena being observed, and to relate that evidence back to a comprehensive understanding of politics (Peters: 2008).

Although, there is an important interaction between theory and empirical research in all areas of the discipline, that interaction is especially important in the field of comparative politics. One of the crucial functions of theory in comparative politics is to link micro and macro behaviour. Much of contemporary political theory functions especially at the micro level, attempting to understand the logic of individual choice. The link between the micro and the macro is crucial for comparative politics, given that one of our primary concerns is explaining the behaviour of political institutions rather than individuals. Certainly variations in individual behaviour and the influence of cultural and social factors on that behaviour are important, but the logic of comparison is primarily having larger structures in play, and to think about how individuals interact within parliaments, parties, or bureaucracies. Indeed one could argue that if a researcher

went too far down the individualist route, then any comparison would become irrelevant, and all the researcher would care about would be the individual's behaviour. Theory is at once the best friend and the worst enemy of the comparative researcher.

Comparative politics seeks to discover regularities and variations of political organization by comparative analysis of historical and contemporary systems. Having isolated these regularities and variations, it seeks to determine the factors which underlie them, in order to discover the properties and conditions of polities of varying types. It then seeks to reduce these observations to a series of interconnected propositions applicable to all these systems in both static and changing conditions.

Political Science and Comparative Politics relate both to theory and to method. Theory refers to sets of systematically related generalizations, and method is procedure or process that involves the techniques and tools utilized in inquiry and for examining, testing, and evaluating theory.

The movement toward the study of all political phenomenon and the need to draw upon the theories and methods of other disciplines gave to comparative politics an allencompas sing orientation. The Second World War heightened interest among scholars in the study of foreign systems, especially systems in Europe and Asia. The decline of empires after the Second World War and turmoil of independence in the Third World influenced scholars to turn their attention from the established to the new nations. The consequences for comparative politics were substantial.

These developments resulted in mushrooming of "approaches" to study various systems – national, regional and global. Approaches enable us in understanding a particular phenomenon. The perspective may encompass micro and macro level of local, regional, national, or international issues. Comparative politics is no more limited to the study of government alone. The discourse of comparative politics has broadened to such an extent that it has emerged as on interdisciplinary study. Elements of society, economy, and other emerging disciplines greatly influenced the subject area of comparative politics in modern times. Some of the important approaches to study in comparative manner are outlined in this lesson. These are Systems Theory, Structural-Functionalism and Political Economy.

#### 1.2.2 SYSTEMS THEORY

The term 'system' refers to a structure of its own, having different parts which are inter-related and inter-dependent, which undergoes various processes to maintain its existence. A system, therefore, implies not only the inter-dependence of parts but also the acceptance of influence from environment and vice versa. Inter-dependence means that when the properties of a component in a system change, all other components and the system as a whole are affected. There are various kinds of systems.

The system theory had its origin the natural sciences. The proponents of the theory sought to find a unifying element which would offer a broader perspective for creative analysis. In the period after the Second World War, this crystallized around the concept of systems, which Von Bertanlanffy, the German biologist, defined as a set of "elements standing in interaction". This concept is based on the idea that objects or elements within a group are in some way related to one another and in turn, interact with one another on the basis of certain identifiable processes. The term 'system' is useful for organizing one's knowledge about many social objects and the use of the 'systems' approach to politics allows one to see the subject in such a way that 'each part of the political canvas does not stand alone but is related to each other part', or that 'the operation of the one part cannot be fully understood without reference to the way in which the whole itself operates'.

Political systems analysis attempts to delineate the fields of political science and political action, to give them coherence and order, to define their properties and guide research, as well as to integrate relevant findings. It seeks to isolate the arena of politics as an independent system from the remainder of society. In one sense this has been done by students of politics from the very beginning of political thought.

David Easton is the first major political scientist who has developed a systematic framework on the basis of the systems analysis approach for the study politics instead of merely adapting it from other social sciences like Anthropology, Sociology or Economics. His monumental work *A System Analysis of Political Life* was published in 1965. Following the course of atural Scientists, he set out to develop a theory that would help to explain behavioural reality. He has provided an original set of concepts

for arranging at the level of theory and interpreting political phenomena in a new and helpful way. He has selected the political system as the basic unit of analysis and concentrated on the intra-system behaviour of various systems as principal areas of research. Easton's concept of political life is that of 'a system of behaviour embedded in an environment to the influences of which the political system is itself exposed and in turn reacts". However, Easton clearly distinguishes political system from other systems – physical, biological or economic. Easton defines a political system as "that system of interactions in any society through which binding or authoritative allocations are made and implemented".

According to Easton, the political system must have the capacity to respond to disturbances and thereby to adopt itself to the conditions under which it has to function. Easton emphasised on the adoptive character of the political system, which would be different from its just reacting passively to the environmental influences. The system's capacity to survive depends on its adaptability and demands for adaptability may be the result either of indigenous or exogenous change. Easton is basically concerned with the issue of survival or persistence of the political system. The purpose of an empirical political scientist, according to him, is to study primarily those conditions under which political systems are maintained over a period of time.

David Easton's political system always remains subject to challenges from forces operating in the environment, which it is required to cope with. Easton calls such forces as stresses that constitute the response mechanism of the political system. The stresses are of two kinds-demand stress and support stress. Demand stress may result either from the failure of the system to successfully cope with the information feedback from its original output or from the incapability of the system to deal with the particular range of demands made upon it. It may be termed as 'demand-input' overload. There may be factor of support stress which means that the system may suffer a loss or at least an erosion of the support given to it by the members of the system itself.

According to Easton, the survival of a political system requires certain structural bases that may be in the form of institutional arrangements like electoral machinery and political parties and non-institutional arrangements in the form of political beliefs

and attitudes of the people. Both types of structural bases may be termed objects of support of the system. The objects of the support of the political system are three-political community, regime and authorities. The political community means a group of people living together with willingness to cooperate in solving the problems of their political system. The community continues to exist even though the regime and authorities may change from time to time. The regime or the 'constitutional order' implies written and unwritten rules of the constitution that determine the structure of the political organisation and also the values and norms on which the entire organisation of government is based. Finally, the authorities mean people who are entrusted with the work of allocating values authoritatively. In simple words, they are the rules who convert the inputs into outputs by taking decisions in response to the impact of environmental conditions.

#### 1.2.2.1 Systems Theory in Comparative Politics

AS Ronald Chilcote pointed out, the classification of systems has caught the attention of comparativists range from Aristotle, who conceived societies in terms of monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, to Gabriel Almond, who offered a breakdown of Anglo-American, continental European, totalitarian, and preindustrial systems. Similarly, many scholars provided various typologies to understand contemporary political systems. For instance, F. X. Sutton classify societies into agriculture and industrial systems; James S. Coleman wrote of competitive, semicompetitive, and authoritarian systems, David Apter divided the world into dictatorial, oligarchical, indirectly representative, and directly representative systems. Fred W. Riggs analyzed fused, prismatic, and refracted systems, and S. N. Eisenstadt offered a comprehensive classification of primitive systems, patrimonial empires, nomad or conquest empires, city-states, feudal systems, centralized bureaucratic, autocratic empires, and modern systems; he further divided the modern systems into democratic, autocratic, totalitarian, and underdeveloped categories. Leonard Binder classification contains three types of systems: traditional, conventional, and rational systems. Edward Shills referred to political democracies, tutelary democracies, modernizing oligarchies, totalitarian oligarchies, and traditional oligarchies. Arend Lijphart compared majoritarian and consensus models of democracy.

#### **Classification of Systems**

| Aristotle     | Almond             | Apter                   | Binder       | Coleman         |
|---------------|--------------------|-------------------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Monarchies    | Anglo-American     | Dictatorial             | Traditional  | Competitive     |
| Aristocracies | Continental Europe | Oligarchical            | Conventional | Semicompetitive |
| Democracies   | Totalitarian       | Indirect Representation | Rational     | Authoritarian   |
|               | Preindustrial      | Direct Representation   |              |                 |

Source: Ronald H.Chilcote, Comparative Inquiry in Politics and Political Economy (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2000).

The above examples indicates ways of organizing our understanding about reality and facilitating the use of a variety of classifications rather than relying on a single method. Though the system theory has implanted itself firmly in social sciences, but it has not resolved the doubt and uncertainty that also pervades social science. The obsession of social scientists with theories of systems is largely attributable to the desire to be able to predict accurately and thereby change things for the better.

The framework of system analysis is very important for the comparative analysis of diverse political units. It can also be applicable to the international political studies. Yet, this theory has some drawbacks in its generalization about the diverse political systems. This approach concerned political system as preoccupied with stability, maintenance, persistence, and equilibrium, a tendency derived from biology which could not be applicable to a political system. Hence, the system theory is rooted in conservatism and reaction, which colours most of the studies in Political Science carried out with the help of methodological tools evolved under the general frame-work of the systems theory.

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#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| What is t | he importance of 'approach' to understand political phenomenon? |
|-----------|---|
| State the | reasons for the mushrooming of "approaches" in comparative poli |
|           | e the important elements in David Easton's Systems Theory?      |
|           |   |

#### 1.2.3 STRUCTURALFUNCTIONALANALYSIS

The term *functional analysis* and *structural analysis* have been applied to a great variety of approaches. With their broad use in the social sciences has come discussion of the appropriateness of the use of structure and function and the type of analysis associated with the concepts. The functional approach is used more often than any other method in the study of Western political science. The literature is full of references to the "functions" of political systems and to the relation between structure

and function. This section deals with the theoretical implications of structural functionalism and its relationship to Comparative Politics.

Structural functionalism has a lengthy history in both the social sciences and the biological sciences. Functionalism's history goes back to Aristotle's study of ultimate causes in nature or of actions in relation to their ends, or utility. In modern period, as early as 17th century, Montesquieu's doctrine of separation of powers is based on the notion of functions that are best undertaken separate from each other as a means of ensuring stability and security.

Functionalists tend to view social and political units in more holistic, organic terms. Social practices are said to have a functional role in sustaining the system as a whole. Functionalists equate structure to anatomy and functions to the physiology of organisms.

When only structural categories are used to make political comparisons, the comparative analysis of political systems breaks down as the difference between compared structures increases. For example, the structures between a Western democracy and an African tribe are so very different as to make comparison difficult. However, functions are much more comparable. Although a prime minister and tribal chief are difficult to compare institutionally, they nevertheless serve many similar functions. Although the structures of political rule may be very dissimilar, the functions that political systems perform are universal. Although undeveloped political systems assign numerous functions to a single person or institution, in more developed political systems, the same functions may be performed by many individuals o<sub>i</sub> institutions. One of the primary areas of study in functionalism is the "interplay" between the dynamic functions of a system and the more static structures it designs for itself.

When Gabriel Almost first introduced the structural-functional approach to comparative politics in the 1970s, it represented a vast improvement over the then-prevailing mechanistic theories of David Eaton and others derived largely from international relations. Almond's brilliant innovation was to outline an approach to understanding political systems that took into account not only its structural components — its institutions — but also their functions within the system as a whole. Prior to structural functionalism, scholars had no way of systematically

comparing different political systems beyond a rudimentary, and oftentimes inconclusive, analysis of their institutions.

At its most basic level, the model of structural functionalism posits that a political system is made up of institutions (structures), such as interest groups, political parties, the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, and a bureaucratic machinery. This information is not sufficient, however, to make a meaningful comparison between two political systems. Two countries may share many of the same political institutions, but what distinguishes the two systems are the ways in which these institutions function.

For Almond, a fuller understanding emerges only when one begins to examine how institutions act within the political process. As he described it, interest groups serve to articulate political issues; parties then aggregate and express them in a coherent and meaningful way; government in turn enacts public policies to address them; and bureaucracies finally regulate and adjudicate them.

The political system, as defined by Almond and his associates, was a system of interactions to be profound in all advanced and backward societies which performs the functions of integration and adaptation by means of employment, or threat of employment, of more or less legitimate physical compulsion. Further, they argue that the political system is the legitimate, order-maintaining or transforming system in the society. Any system has three kinds of properties:

- 1) *Comprehensiveness:* that means a political system that includes all set of interactions inputs as well as outputs which affect the use or the threat of use of physical coercion. Inclusion in all sets of interaction is not only just struct4re based on law, like parliaments, executives, legislatives, bureaucracies, and courts, or just the occasional or formally organized units, like parties, interest groups, and the media of communications, but all of the structures in their political aspects, including undifferentiated structures like kinship and lineage, status and caste groups, as well as anomic phenomenon like riots, street demonstrations, and the like.
- 2) Interdependence: that means, a change in one subset of interactions produces changes in all the other subsets, for example, electoral reforms of any country

- affect the feature and nature of party system, the function of parliament and cabinet, of the country.
- 3) Existence of boundaries: the existence of boundaries in the political system means that there are points where other system end the political system begins, for example, the complaints in the market are not to enter into the political system until they break out in an act of violence, or protest, or demonstrations or something else.

Almond focused on such concepts as roles (in his view the interacting units of a political system) and structures (representing the patterns of interaction). He introduced the concept of political culture (embedded in a particular pattern of orientations to political action). His system was elaborated through a set of structures and functions in a conscious effort to avoid the formalities of government institutions in areas where changes are widespread. He revised basic concepts of comparative politics: the political system replaced the state and the legal and institutional apparatus employed by traditional political scientists. In addition, function substituted for power, role for office, and structure for institution. These concepts were incorporated in his thesis that all political systems (advanced and backward nations) have fur universal characteristics: (1) all political systems, including the simplest ones, have political structures; (2) all political systems perform the same kind of functions, these functions may be performed with different frequencies, and by different kinds of structures; (3) all political structures are multi-functional; (4) all political systems are 'mixed' systems in the cultural sense. Almond modelled his system around a framework of inputs (interest articulation, interest aggregation, and political communication), outputs (rule making, rule application, and rule adjudication), and feedback. The inputs represented processes of participation, expression of political interests and demands as articulated by political parties and interest groups. The outputs effectively were government functions corresponding to the traditional use of three separate power in government.

While Almond's structural functional model neatly accounts for what happens within a political system, systems are never entirely self-contained. They exist in a dynamic relationship to other political systems and must continuously adapt to changing

conditions in the larger socio-political context. For this reason, all political systems require efficient feedback mechanisms.

Gabriel Almond and his colleague Bingham Powell, in modifying and expanding the theory of structural functionalism, have added an important set of system functions to their model in recent years. This change acknowledges the crucial role played by political culture in determining the unique characteristics of a political system. These system functions include political socialization, recruitment, and communication. Without understanding these elements of a society, it is difficult, if not impossible, to make an adequate assessment and comparison between two political systems.

Many criticized the structural functional approach for its narrow and biased orientation. The structural functional approach contains within it several inherent biases or normative implications. First, it is by its very nature conservative: it recognizes that a political system's first objective is to ensure its own survival. For this reason, it is not especially responsive to innovations and movements aimed at political change — that is, beyond those that strengthen its adaptiveness and resilience. It also has a democratic and participatory bias insofar as it views citizen input and involvement in the political process as the surest route to political stability and responsiveness.

Functionalism frequently is identified as deterministic or ideological, conservative or restrictive, or simply false. Anthropologist I. C. Jarvie argued that functionalism is limited by "its lack of explanatory power, its unsatisfactoriness as explanation, and the constricting effect of its assumptions about the nature and working of social systems". Sociologist Don Martindale noted four drawbacks to functionalism: the conservative ideological bias and preference for status quo; a lack of methodological clarity; an overemphasis on the role of closed systems in social life; and a failure to deal with social change. Many others pointed out that a concern with consensus may equate Anglo-American democracy with the modern political system, against which all other political systems must be compared without recognition of variations and defects.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

| not s | sufficient.   |
|-------|---|
| Brie  | fly state the history of Structural Functionalism?  |
|       |   |
|       | political system, as defined by Almond, was a system of interactions to be found in all advanced and backward societies. Elaborate. |
|       |   |
|       | at are the three properties identified by Almond that are common to all the ems?  |
|       |   |
|       |   |

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is

#### 1.2.4 POLITICAL ECONOMY APPROACH

Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines political economy as a "social science dealing with the interrelationship of political and economic process". However, in general, there is no consensus among the scholars on what political economy is concerned with. For instance, a political economy approach in Sociology is applied to study the effects of people's involvement in society as members of groups, and how that changes their ability to function. While Political Science employs Political Economy to focus on the interaction between institutions and human behaviour, the way in which the former shapes choices and how the latter change institutional

frameworks. Similarly, Anthropology, History, Economics, Human Geography, Cultural Studies and a whole array of disciplines and interdisciplinary fields employ political economy approach in a variety of ways.

Although political economy is built largely on the insights of politics and economics, it also draws on history, sociology and anthropology to provide an understanding of sociocultural and historical context in which politics and economics are played out. Political economy therefore tends towards and interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and comparative approach to the relationship between the state and the market. Today, there is growing consensus that the separation between the study of politics and economics is an artificial one and the pendulum is swinging toward an integrated approach. Further, political economy is an area of study that permits a variety of ideological perspectives and theoretical paradigms. The academic return to political economy is especially encouraged by the growing interest in interdisciplinary studies.

Recently, important distinctions have been drawn between domestic political economy and the realms of political and economic activity above (regional, international, supranational, global) and below (local, regional, federal) the level of national government, and between the development of the industrialized North and the developing (often underdeveloped) South.

#### 1.2.4.1 NATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ECONOMY

The study of domestic political economy is concerned primarily with the relative balance in a country's economy between state and market forces. Political economists attempting to understand domestic economic policy often study the influence of political institutions (e.g., legislatures, executives, and judiciaries) and the implementation of public policy by bureaucratic agencies. The influence of political and societal actors (e.g., interest groups, political parties, churches, elections, and the media) and ideologies (e.g., democracy, fascism, or communism) also is gauged. Comparative analysis also considers the extent to which international political and economic conditions increasingly blur the line between domestic and foreign policies in different countries. For example, in many countries trade policy no longer reflects strictly domestic

objectives but also takes into account the trade policies of other governments and the directives of international financial institutions.

Many sociologists focus on the impact that policies have on the public and the extent of public support that particular policies enjoy. Likewise, sociologists and some political scientists also are interested in the extent to which policies are generated primarily from above by elites or from below by the public. One such study is so-called "critical political economy," which is rooted in interpretations of the writing of Marx. For many Marxists (and contemporary adherents of varying strands of Marxist thought), government efforts to manage different parts of the economy are presumed to favour the moral order of bourgeois values. As in the case of tax policy, for example, government policies are assumed to support the interests of the rich or elites over those of the masses.

Ultimately, comparative analysts may ask why countries in certain areas of the world play a particularly large role in the international economy. They also examine why "corporatist" partnerships between the state, industry, and labour formed in some states and not in others, why there are major differences in labour and management relations in the more-industrialized countries, what kinds of political and economic structures different countries employ to help their societies adjust to the effects of integration and globalization, and what kinds of institutions in developing countries advance or retard the development process. Comparative political economists also have investigated why some developing countries in Southeast Asia were relatively successful at generating economic growth whereas most African countries were not.

#### 1.2.4.2 POLITICAL ECONOMY: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES

As stated above, political economy meant different things to different writers, and in some cases in mean what is known as economic theory or "pure economics" is indicative that there is no single approach or school of thought within the political economy. Political economy is instead characterized by a large number of contending schools of thought, each of which is distinguished by its distinctive understanding and portrayal of the relationship between politics and economics. Hence, there are

several competing perspectives to political economy, of which three are important in contemporary world: the Liberal and the Marxist.

#### The Liberal Tradition:

The liberal tradition is the **free market** one in which the role of voluntary exchange and market is emphasized both as efficient and morally desirable. The assumption is that free trade and free movement of capital will ensure that investment flows to where it is most profitable to invest. Free trade is crucial, for it permits countries to benefit from their comparative advantages. In other words, each country can exploit its own natural advantages, resources, and endowments, and gain from specialization. The economy is flourished by freely exchangeable currencies and open markets that create a global system of prices, which, like an **invisible hand**, ensures an efficient and equitable distribution of goods and services across the world economy. Order in the global economy is a fairly minimal one. The optimal role of governments and institutions is to ensure the smooth and relatively unfettered operations of markets. It is assumed that governments face a wide range of choices in the world systems and likewise vis-à-vis their own societies and populations.

#### The Marxist Tradition:

The Marxian tradition also sees the world economy as an arena of competition, but not among states. Capitalism is the driving forces in the world economy. Using Marx's language, this means that world-economic relations are best conceived as class struggle between the 'oppressor and the oppressed'. The oppressors or capitalists are thos who own the means of production (trade and industry). The oppressed are the working class. The struggle between the two arises because capitalists seek to increase their profits and this requires them to exploit the working class over more harshly. In international relations this description of 'class relations' within a capitalist system has been applied to describe relations between the **core** (industrialized countries) and **periphery** (developing countries), and the unequal exchange that occurs between the two. **Dependency theorists** describe the ways classes and groups in the 'core' link to the 'periphery'. Underdevelopment and poverty in so many countries in explained as the result of economic, social, and political structures within countries that have been deeply

influenced by their international economic relations. The global capitalist order within which these societies have emerged is, after all, global capitalist order that reflects the interests of those who won the means of production.

To sum up political economy approach, it becomes clear in contrasting various traditions of thinking that each focuses on different actors and driving forces in the world economy, and that each has a different conceptions of what 'order' means and what is necessary to achieve it. Comparing different traditions also highlights three different levels of analysis: the structure of the international system; the nature of a particular government or competition within its institutions; and the role of interest groups and social forces within a country.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 3**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| Political economy therefore tends towards and interdisciplinary, multidisciplinary and comparative approach to the relationship between the state and the market |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| Explain.   |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| How comparative political economy enables one to understand domestic economy?  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
| Briefly state liberal tradition of political economy?  |  |  |
|  |  |  |
|  |  |  |

| What is the specific focus of Marxist political economy? |
|--|
|  |
|  |
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|  |

#### 1.2.5 LETS SUM UP

The field of comparative politics is one in which a variety of different approaches have been undertaken to the material at hand, with varying results. Approaches enables us in deconstructing and understanding a particular phenomenon. The perspective may encompass micro and macro level of local, regional, national, or international issues. In this lesson, we have studies three of the important approaches which are popular among the comparative scientists across the world. These are Systems Theory, Structural-Functionalism and Political Economy approaches. Each one of them studies politics using different tool and compares them with unique perspective. However, there are many approaches which have become popular in recent times such as Constructivism, Institutionalism, Governance Approach, Decision-Making Approach, Game theory, Communication model, Group analysis, Corporatism, etc.

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# 1.3 COMPARATIVE POLITICALANALYSIS: ISSUES AND TRENDS

- V. Nagendra Rao

# **STRUCTURE**

- 1.3.0 Objectives
- 1.3.1 Introduction
- 1.3.2 Comparative Political Analysis: Advantages
- 1.3.3 Comparative Political Analysis: Problems
- 1.3.4 Problem of Disciplinary Boundary
- 1.3.5 Postmodern Critique
  - 1.3.5.1 Challenging the Theory
  - 1.3.5.2 Ethnocentrism
- 1.3.6 Problems Associated with Globalization and Decline of Nation-State
- 1.3.7 Methodological Problems
  - 1.3.7.1 Problem of Cases and Variables
  - 1.3.7.2 Lack of Common Terminology
  - 1.3.7.3 Equivalence Problem
  - 1.3.7.4 Selection Bias
  - 1.3.7.5 Value Bias

# 1.3.8 Let us Sum Up

# 1.3.9 Suggested Readings

#### 1.3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to know:

- Advantages of comparative political analysis;
- Boundary problem associated with comparative politics;
- Postmodern critique on theory and ethnocentrism of comparative politics;
- Problems associated with the globalization and decline of nation-state
- Methodological problems associated with comparative political analysis.

#### 1.3.1 INTRODUCTION

Human thought is based on comparison. However, such a broad sense of the term "comparison" cannot procure an identity for the subfield of Comparative Politics. Only when comparison is applied as a method and is based on the scientific criteria, it can serve as a constituting characteristic of Comparative Politics. Hence, one must understand the difference between comparison and the comparative method. Comparison consists of confronting knowledge of and experience in familiar contexts with unknown contexts. Of course, the interpretation of familiar things can change after having gained experience in other cultural environments.

A systematic comparison is based on explicit rules on what and how to compare. Besides, one of the main prerequisites for the application of the comparative method is to find criteria which permit a systematic comparison. Most of the time, these criteria cannot be derived directly from the observation of individual phenomena. In order to carry out comparisons, criteria need to be established which the phenomena which are to be compared have in common and which can be comparatively recorded. When we wish to compare two phenomena, we need to determine a criterion based on which we can carry out the comparison.

# 1.3.2 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS: ADVANTAGES

Comparison is a useful method to analyse the different political phenomena existing in the world. This not only widens understanding of politics of other countries but also handy to increase appreciation of the advantages and disadvantages of different political systems. Several reasons explain the necessity for comparison. The first strength of a comparative approach is that it enables the "comparativists" to find out, and by implication know more about the places where they would otherwise know little about. Having adequate and relevant background information about foreign governments not only helps to interpret new developments, it also helps with practical political relationships. In international politics, the fact that one is aware that the decision making environment in his domestic terrain is not the same with those of others is enough factor to influence the attitudinal modification in relating with other countries. This explains why many scholars seriously advocate for studying the politics of other countries because it helps us to discover our own ethnocentrism, biases, narrowness, and subjectivity and the means to overcome it.

Moreover, comparison empowers the political scientist with the potential for prediction and control. By this, a validated generalization offers the comparativists the potential for prediction. Thus the ability to predict occurrence based on the relationships between variables and the outcomes that are consistently produced. If we find that parliamentary democracy have greater chances of uniting a highly fragmented society than the presidential system, we easily recommend the parliamentary democracy with multi-party arrangement to other fragmented societies.

In short, the comparative analysis has many advantages, of which three are more important. These are: (1) we cannot understand our own country without a knowledge of others; (2) we cannot understand other countries without a knowledge of their background, institutions and history; and (3) we cannot arrive at valid generalisations about government and politics without the comparative method.

While the comparative approach to political studies has proved useful in the study of politics, it nevertheless has its challenges. Many of the problems identified in the literature presuppose that explanation is the sole function of comparison. The

following section discusses the various problems which are being faced by the scholars in the comparative political analysis or comparative study.

# 1.3.3 COMPARATIVE POLITICAL ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS

There are certain difficulties and disadvantages in comparative analysis as well. Common problem of social sciences is that there are usually too many variables and too few cases. There are more than 200 countries in the world, but unfortunately for us, they are all quite different. It is impossible to compare radically different or completely identical countries. The other problem with the comparative method is that research might be not objective and the researcher deliberately chooses countries to show negative or positive moments to proof his/her point of view.

Roy Macridis, as early as in 1955, questioned the way comparative political analysis had been practised in the past. He argued that comparative politics was parochial since it focused solely on the experiences of Western Europe. The descriptive rather than analytical orientation of comparative analysis also imposed obvious limitations on its wider applicability. Macridis states that comparative analysis that was carried out so far was mostly formalistic and legalistic; it lacks dynamism. Most importantly, he says, it highlighted individual case studies rather than comparisons of two and more societies. Apart from this, some of the other deficiencies or problems associated with Comparative Analysis and listed below.

# 1.3.4 PROBLEM OF DISCIPLINARY BOUNDARY

According to Neera Chandhoke, scholars of Comparative Politics are no longer confident that they can define or delineate either the boundaries, or the scope, or the method of comparative politics. For one, the precise status of the sub-discipline is in doubt. Comparative political analysis by its very nature is heavily dependent upon other subfields of political science, such as political theory, for its approaches, methods and concepts. Consequently, it has not been able to attain the status of, say political philosophy, which has generated its own internal debates, passions and furore over method and issues. A sub-discipline does not have to be foundational, as political philosophy is, but it does need to possess a central core of concepts, definitions and focus. These may have been borrowed from, and adapted from

other fields, but nevertheless they do perform the function of serving as the referent point of inquiry. But in comparative politics there is no longer any central body of literature, any co-ordinating theory, let alone a set of concepts arrived at consensually which can function as a fulcrum for analysis.

The lack of an autonomous status, however relative such autonomy may be, means that comparative politics has not been able to stand on its own feet. But, then, either has it been able to locate itself vis-a-vis other sub-disciplines of political science. In many centres it is regarded as a part of area studies, or as an extension of international politics, or even business studies which is a legacy of American scholars, or slotted into policy research as is the trend in many research institutes. Consequently, it has come to acquire functional properties which change with the switch from field to field.

# 1.3.5 POSTMODERN CRITIQUE

The rise of postmodernism in the 1 960s seriously raised some of the issues which have questioned the content and orientation of comparative politics. The postmodern perspective which questions the universality, grand theories, absolute generalization, has become critical to the orientations rely on the same tendencies.

# 1.3.5.1 CHALLENGING THE 'THEORY'

The postmodernist attack on theory per se affects comparative politics in a fundamental sense. The postmodern critiques charge political theory in the metanarrative mode, with imposing coherence upon otherwise incoherent and incommensurable political phenomena. As Neera Chandhoke pointed out, since grand theory which forms the bedrock of comparison, has become the target of philosophical scepticism, comparative politics is the first casualty of this exercise. This is because large-scale historical comparisons draw their sustenance from metanarratives. These comparisons look for the recurrence of events and sequences across histories and cultures, and are based upon expectations of uniformities and causal regularities. The comparative method in political analysis is attacked because in its search for casual regularities it abstracts events and processes from their multilayered contexts. According to these critics, events are only given meaning in

particular contexts which possess various levels of temporality. Thus, causes cannot be abstracted from their narrative environments, and used to see why analytically similar causes beget different results. Consequently, comparative analysis is charged with reductionism, and with subordinating otherwise complex events to the variables which have been isolated for the purposes of comparison.

#### 1.3.5.2 ETHNOCENTRISM

Since comparative politics is, in principle, based upon the study of other societies and environments, such studies, as political theorists have come to recognise, are particularly vulnerable to charges of imperial biases and ethnocentrism which plagued the study of the 'other'. This is true not only of colonial texts, but also of modernisation theories. Scholars are consequently hesitant to embark upon comparisons of the experience of other countries and other societies, because they are no longer sure whether their own frames of understanding are sensitive enough to the modes by which the people of those societies understand themselves.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| What are the important aspects in Roy Macridis' criticism on comparative po |
|---|
| What are the important aspects in Roy Macridis' criticism on comparative po |
| What are the important aspects in Roy Macridis' criticism on comparative po |
|   |
|   |

| Briefly s | tate the postmodern critique on comparative politics? |
|-----------|---|
| - 5 -     | r   |

# 1.3.6 PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH GLOBALIZATION AND DECLINE OF NATION-STATE

Neera Chandhoke also pointed out the problems associated with the crisis of political institutions, indeed of the nation-state itself. Global flows of capital and technology, cultural practices, consumer seductions, cross-country labour migrations; monitoring of human rights violations; military interventions in the name of famine relief and prevention of ethnic cleansing and genocide as in Somalia, Rwanda, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria and many other third world countries from above, and deep rooted challenges to the very notion of the nation-state by autonomy movements from below, signify that the ideas and the institutions of a 'culturally homogeneous' nation-state which had come to pervade political thinking since the 18th century, are in crisis. Since, it were these very ideas and institutions that have been generally regarded as usual categories of analysis, this, not surprisingly, has led to doubt and hesitations in respect as to what is to be made the object of comparative analysis.

It was usually assumed in the main tenets of political science, that each society generated its own state. It was likewise assumed that the organisation of this state under the principle of self-determination as perfectly legitimate and desirable. Correspondingly, it was assumed that there existed a close correspondence between the practices of societies and those of states. But as we can see today, the histories

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of states and societies have come to acquire distinct and often divergent trajectories resulting in the breakup of nation-state as in former Yugoslavia or the former Soviet Union. The question of abstracting practices and institutions for comparison becomes that much more difficult when all historical givens are being challenged. Comparative politics needs to move outside the state-society correspondence framework, and whether political scientists whose discipline is rooted firmly in the concept of the state can do so, is doubtful.

#### 1.3.7 METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS

Scholars also pointed out some of the problems associated with the very method of comparison itself. The following section will analyse them.

#### 1.3.7.1 PROBLEM OF CASES AND VARIABLES

First, political scientists are unable to control the variables in the cases they study. In other words, in our search for cause-and-effect relationships, we are unable to make true comparisons because each of our cases is quite different. But comparative politics offers very few opportunities to control the variables because the variables are a function of real-world politics. Countries are amazingly diverse in terms of economics, culture, geography, resources, and political structures, and it is difficult to control for these differences. Even in a single-case study, variables change over time. At best, we can control as much as possible for variables that might otherwise distort our conclusions.

This leads us to a second problem. Comparavists are often hampered by a limited number of cases. In the natural sciences, research is often conducted with a huge number of cases—hundreds of stars or thousands of individuals. This breadth allows researchers to select their cases in such a way as to control their variables, and the large number of cases also prevents any single unusual case from distorting the findings. But in comparative politics, we are limited by the number of countries in the world—fewer than 200 at present, most of which did not exist a few centuries ago.

A third problem in comparative politics concerns how we access the cases we do have. Even with the limited number of countries available to study, research is further hindered by the barriers that make countries unique. As you might imagine,

doing research in more than one country is extremely challenging. A researcher may be able to read Russian and travel to Russia frequently, but if he wants to compare communism between the Soviet Union and China, it would be ideal to be able to read Chinese and conduct research in China as well. Few comparativists have the language skills, time, or resources to conduct field research in a number of countries. Almost none, for example, speak both Russian and Chinese. As a result, comparativists often master knowledge of a single country or language and rely on deductive reasoning. This limits the kinds of comparisons they can make. The specialization of comparativists also tends to congregate around those regions that can be easily studied at home and abroad. There are many comparativists who study Europe—not so many who study Indonesia, even though it is the fourth most populous country in the world.

#### 1.3.7.2 Lack of Common Terminology

Difficulties may also arise due to the fact that differences in perceptions and backgrounds may affect the world views of the people. The implication of this situation for comparative politics is that, the 'same' phenomenon can have different meanings in different countries. This makes it difficult to compare "like with like". In comparing political behaviour across countries, we should remember that the meaning of an action depends on the conventions of the country concerned.

#### 1.3.7.3 EQUIVALENCE PROBLEM

The second problem confronting comparison is the equivalence of both their theoretical concepts and the indication for those concepts across multiple contexts. Mayer argues that the contextual relativity of the meaning or the measures of indication constitutes the most serious impediment to the cross-contextual validity of empirically testable explanatory theory". In other words, is it possible to specify concepts and indicators that have shared meanings to allow valid comparisons? For example, does the concept of class apply equally in all societies? Does the idea of "civic culture" mean the same thing in India as it does in France? Three intellectual positions — universalistic positions, the relativist position and the middle position — offer insight into these problems. The Universalist position argues that if theoretical concepts and their indicators are to have any explanatory power, they must be able to travel to all parts of the globe. For example, rationalist,

functionalist and structuralism approaches take such position. The relativist position argues that all meaning is locally determined, and that a general "science" of comparative politics is necessarily limited if not impossible.

Ethnographic, interpretivist, and anthropological approaches tend to take this position. The middle position argues that comparativists must not abandon all their concepts, but should modify them to be more sensitive to the cultural specificities of the context they are studying.

#### 1.3.7.4 SELECTION BIAS

A crucial scientific principle frequently violated by comparative politics is the principle of selection. In comparative politics most often the selection of individuals or units of analysis is not related to the outcome to be explained. Thus, selection bias in comparative politics occurs through the nonrandom choice of countries for comparison, or the deliberate selection by the comparativists. Though selection of countries lies at the heart of comparison, selection without reflection may lead to serious problems of inference. The most blatant form of selection occurs when a study include only those cases that support the theory. A second form of selection bias arises in quantitative studies that rely on historical sources, where the catalyst chooses historical account either intentionally or unintentionally whose description of events fills the particularly theory being tested. Lustic opines that inference drawn from studies using descriptive historical account that "are organized and presented according to the categories and prepositions of theories they are testing will necessary be biased. A third form of selection bias can occur from the time period that are used in the comparison especially for those studies seeking to analyse social behaviours that has a theory of long history, such as warfare, trade, and the emergence of state and regimes. Selecting contemporary time period and drawing inferences about longer term processes is a form of historical selection bias.

#### **1.3.7.5 VALUE BIAS**

The final problem of comparison is one of value bias, a problem which depends upon the perspective from which one sees the world. Over the course of the last century, social science has come to recognize that knowledge is not "value free". Classification,

analysis, and substantive interpretations are all subject to the particular perspective of the researcher. According to Sanders, modern empirical analysis accepts that to some degree "what is observed is in part a consequence of the theoretical position that the analysis adopts in the first place".

#### 1.3.8 LET US SUM UP

This chapter has explained the problems of comparative political analysis. It is necessary for the students and researchers to understand these problems so that they can avoid them and find out a proper solution for an accurate comparative study. Comparative method is definitely the best choice to study and analyze contemporary politics, but we should be aware of the difficulties associated with this method. Comparative method simplifies a complex political reality and makes it more manageable. Comparative politics brings us into contact with political worlds other than our own and expands our political and cultural horizons. Comparative approach to studying of politics also enables us to move beyond mere description, toward explanation and within this method we can talk about comparative politics as a science. But on the other side, we shouldn't forget that any research of comparative method is vulnerable to personal interests and motivations.

#### 1.3.9 SUGGESTED READINGS

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# 1.4 CONSTITUTIONALISM: THEORY & PRACTICE

- V. Nagendra Rao

Freedom of men under government is to have a standing rule to live by, common to every one of that society, and made by the legislative power erected in it.

- John Locke

# **STRUCTURE**

- 1.4.0 Objectives
- 1.4.1 Introduction
- 1.4.2 Defining the term 'Constitutionalism'
- 1.4.3 Usage of Constitutionalism
- 1.4.4 History of Constitutionalism
- 1.4.5 Features of Constitutionalism
- 1.4.6 Constitution and Constitutionalism
- 1.4.7 Constitutionalism in Practice
  - 1.4.7.1 United States
  - 1.4.7.2 United Kingdom
  - 1.4.7.3 India

#### 1.4.8 Constitutionalism in the New Millennium

# 1.4.9 Let us Sum Up

### 1.4.10 Suggested Readings

# 1.4.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to know:

- What is constitutionalism and its historical development;
- Usage and features of Constitutionalism;
- The difference between constitution and constitutionalism;
- How constitutionalism is practiced in general and in the US, UK and India in particular;
- What is the future of constitutionalism in the new millennium.

#### 1.4.1 INTRODUCTION

The idea of constitutionalism is often associated with the political theories of John Locke and the founders of the American republic, that government can and should be legally limited in its powers, and that its authority or legitimacy depends on its observing these limitations. In any democratic country, a constitution is the body of law which is the fundamental law of a politically organized society. The Constitution is the supreme law of the political society. It is higher than and takes precedence over all other laws of the society. All the other laws, to be valid and enforceable, must be in accord with the higher and superior law of the Constitution. An official decision of any governmental institution or office must be in harmony with the Constitution, the supreme law of the political community. The legislature, the executive, and the courts must follow the Constitution. In other words, constitution consist of overarching arrangements that determine the political, legal and social structures by which society is to be governed. Its provisions are therefore considered to be paramount law. If constitution itself is inadequate, the nature of democracy and rule of law within a country is affected.

The structure of modern nations has been shaped with government being divided into executive, legislative and judicial bodies, with the commonly accepted notion that these bodies and their powers must be separated. The separation of powers does not mean these bodies function alone. In fact, they work interdependently, but maintain their autonomy. Other tenets include the idea of limited government and the supremacy of law. Together, these can be termed the concept of constitutionalism. In other words, constitutionalism is the idea that government should be limited in its powers and that its authority depends on its observation of these limitations. A constitution is the legal and moral framework setting out these powers and their limitations. This framework must represent the will of the people, and should therefore have been arrived at through consensus.

# 1.4.2 DEFINING THE TERM "CONSTITUTIONALISM"

Constitutionalism has a variety of meanings. Generally it is considered as "a complex of ideas, attitudes, and patterns of behaviour elaborating the principle that the authority of government derives from and is limited by a body of fundamental law." A political organization is constitutional to the extent that it "contains institutionalized mechanisms of power control for the protection of the interests and liberties of the citizenry, including those that may be in the minority." As David Fellman says, "...the touchstone of constitutionalism is the concept of limited government under a higher law." Constitutionalism, as Robert Albert opines, "... informs how states behave in the international order, how governments treat their constituents, how communities order themselves, how groups relate to individuals, and how citizens interact with each other." According to Greg Russell, "Constitutionalism or rule of law means that the power of leaders and government bodies is limited, and that these limits can be enforced through established procedures. As a body of political or legal doctrine, it refers to government that is, in the first instance, devoted both to the good of the entire community and to the preservation of the rights of individual persons."

Jan-Irk Lane in his study *Constitutions and Political Theory* argues that "Constitutionalism is the political doctrine that claims that political authority should be bound by institutions that restrict the exercise of power. Such institutions offer

rules that bind both the persons in authority as well as the organs or bodies that exercise political authority."

Constitutionalism refers to limited government and is an anti-thesis of arbitrary powers. It recognizes the need for government with powers but at the same time insists that limitation be placed on those powers. Its anti-thesis is despotism. A government which goes beyond its limits loses its authority and legitimacy. Therefore, to preserve the basic freedoms of the individual, and to maintain his dignity and personality, the Constitution needs to be permeated with 'Constitutionalism'. It also requires some inbuilt restrictions on the powers conferred by it on governmental organs. In brief, at its core, constitutionalism embodies following two basic commitments that:-

- A political community should be governed by some basic or fundamental rules which delineate an institutional framework within which other sorts of decisions are made. Such rules serve both an enabling and disabling function. They serve an enabling function by creating institutions to make decisions, conferring powers upon them, and laying down rules for these institutions which allow the decisions to be made. They serve a disabling function by limiting the scope of the powers of institutions, through devices such as the separation of powers, federalism, and bills of rights.
- The framework must be stable to provide an enduring set of expectations regarding the behaviour of political institutions. Commitment to stability is synonymous with legal constitutionalism, that is, with a constitution that is written, supreme, entrenched and justifiable. But here again, there are many political communities for example the United Kingdom, which adhere to the principles of constitutionalism, but whose constitutions lack some of these features.

#### 1.4.3 USAGE OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

There is also a different interpretation and usage of the term *constitutionalism* in political discourse. It has prescriptive and descriptive uses. Gerhard Casper argues that descriptively, it refers chiefly to the historical struggle for constitutional recognition

of the people's right to consent and certain other rights, freedoms, and privileges. Prescriptively, its meaning incorporates those features of government seen as the essential elements of the Constitution. In prescriptive constitutionalism, the concept focuses on "constitutional questions," or differing opinions on what a constitution ought to have in its content. An example of this form of constitutionalism exists in American politics whenever the differing sides of a political debate argue over whether or not the constitution ought to be amended, which the United States Constitution allows to occur. One example of constitutionalism's descriptive use is the origins of the US Bill of Rights. While hardly presenting a "straight-line," the account illustrates the historical struggle to recognize and enshrine constitutional rights and principles in a constitutional order. In contrast to describing what constitutions are, a prescriptive approach addresses what a constitution should be. As presented by Wil Waluchow, constitutionalism embodies "the idea ... that government can and should be legally limited in its powers, and that its authority depends on its observing these limitations."

#### 1.4.4 HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

Historically, the idea of constitutionalism is a product of liberal political ideas, which originated in Western Europe and the United States. Modern liberal political theories found practical expression in the struggle for constitutional government and the earliest, and perhaps greatest, victory for liberalism was achieved in the Britain. The rising commercial class that had supported the Tudor monarchy in the 16<sup>th</sup> century led the revolutionary battle in the 17th and succeeded in establishing the supremacy of Parliament and, eventually, of the House of Commons. What emerged as the distinctive feature of modern constitutionalism was the establishment of effective means of political control whereby the rule of law might be enforced. Modern constitutionalism was born with the political requirement that representative government depended upon the consent of citizen subjects. Moreover, modern constitutional government was intimately linked to economics that those whose taxes fund the government must be represented in that government. Greg Russell further explains that the decline of the king's feudal revenues, the growth of representative institutions and a feeling of national solidarity as opposed to symbolic allegiance to king and court tended to make real and effective the limited character of kingship. However, as can be seen through

provisions in the 1689 Bill of Rights, the English Revolution was fought not just to protect the rights of property, but to establish those liberties which liberals believed essential to human dignity and moral worth.

The rights of man enumerated in the English Bill of Rights gradually were proclaimed beyond the boundaries of England, notably in the American Declaration of Independence of 1776 and in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man in 1789. The 18<sup>th</sup> century witnessed the emergence of constitutional government in the United States and in France, and the 19<sup>th</sup> century saw its extension with varying degrees of success to Germany, Italy, and other nations of the Western world. After the Second World War due to the process of decolonization, many of the Third World saw the emergence of constitutionalism.

Therefore, in other words, it can be argued that the idea of constitutionalism emerged as a defence of the individual's right to life and property and to freedom of religion and speech in the Western Europe and US, in order to secure these rights, constitutional architects emphasized checks on the power of each branch of government, equality under the law, impartial courts and separation of church and state. The exemplary representatives of this tradition include John Milton, Edward Coke, William Blackstone, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Adam Smith, Baron de Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill, John Austin and Isaiah Berlin.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| 1. | How do you define constitutionalism? |
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|    |                                      |
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| Briefly write history of constitutionalism. |  |
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#### 1.4.5 FEATURES OF CONSTITUTIONALISM

The essential features of constitutionalism are discussed as below:-

- 1. **Entrenchment:** One of most important features of constitutionalism is that the norms imposing limits upon government power must be in some way be entrenched, either by law or by way of constitutional convention. Entrenchment not only facilitates a degree of stability over time, it is arguably a requirement of the very possibility of constitutionally limited government. Were a government institution entitled, at its pleasure, to change the very terms of its constitutional limitations, we might begin to question whether there would, in reality, be any such limitations.
- 2. Writtenness: According to some political theories constitutional rules do not exist unless they are in some way enshrined in a written document. Others argue that constitutions can be unwritten, and cite, as an obvious example of this possibility, the constitution of the United Kingdom. Though the UK has nothing resembling the American Constitution and its Bill of Rights, it nevertheless contains a number of written instruments which arguably form a central element of its constitution. Magna Carta (1215 AD) is the earliest document of the British constitution, while others include The Petition of Right (1628) and the Bill of Rights (1689). However, Britain seems largely to have an unwritten constitution, suggesting strongly that writtenness is not a defining feature of constitutionalism.

- 3) Rule of Law: This means refers to the supremacy of law and that society is governed by law and this law applies equally to all persons, including government and state officials. Following basic principles of constitutionalism, common institutional provisions used to maintain the rule of law include the separation of powers, judicial review, the prohibition of retroactive legislation and habeas corpus. Genuine constitutionalism therefore provides a minimal guarantee of the justice of both the content and the form of law. On the other hand, constitutionalism is safeguarded by the rule of law. Only when the supremacy of the rule of law is established, can supremacy of the constitution exist. Constitutionalism additionally requires effective laws and their enforcement to provide structure to its framework.
- 3. **Democracy:** It has been observed that authoritarian governments are by their very nature unconstitutional. Such governments put themselves the law and do not see necessity for the separation of powers or representative governance. Nevertheless, constitutionalism is primarily based on the notion of people's sovereignty, which is to be exercised—in a limited manner—by a representative government. The only consensual and representative form of governance that exists in the contemporary world is democratic government. In this way, there is a very important and basic link between democracy and constitutionalism. Just as mere constitutions do not make countries constitutional, political parties and elections do not make governments democratic. Genuine democracies rest on the sovereignty of the people, not the rulers. Elected representatives are to exercise authority on behalf of the people, based on the will of the people. Without genuine democracy, there can be no constitutionalism.

Louis Honking has discussed the following elements of constitutionalism:

- government according to the constitution;
- separation of power;
- sovereignty of the people and democratic government;
- constitutional review;

- independent judiciary;
- limited government subject to a bill of individual rights;
- controlling the police;
- civilian control of the military; and
- No state power, or very limited and strictly circumscribed state power, to suspend the operation of some parts of, or the entire, constitution.

Broadly speaking, these nine elements of constitutionalism as discussed by Honking can be divided into two groups, one concerns power construction and power lodging; and the other deals with rights protection. These two groups of institutional arrangements together ensure the supremacy of the constitution, existence of limited yet strong government and protection of basic freedom.

#### 1.4.6 CONSTITUTION AND CONSTITUTIONALISM

"Constitutionalism" cannot be equated with "constitution," though the two concepts are linked. At present, most countries – and numerous subnational political units, such as the states in the U.S., the Länder in Germany, and the cantons in Switzerland, republics in the erstwhile Soviet Union, Jammu and Kashmir in India—have constitutions, but not all such constitutions satisfy the requirements of constitutionalism. Whether a country has a constitution is a question of fact, easily answered in most cases—particularly in those where an institutionalized, written constitution is involved. In contrast, whether a constitution conforms to the dictates of constitutionalism cannot be determined without some kind of normative evaluation. Constitutionalism is an ideal that may be more or less approximated by different types of constitutions and that is built on certain prescriptions and certain proscriptions. Determining whether a particular constitution approximates the ideal of constitutionalism, and to what extent, depends on an evaluation of how the institutions and norms promoted by the constitution in question fare in terms of the constitutionalist ideal.

The function of constitutions is to tame as well as protect and enrich democracy and popular and state sovereignty. However, constitutionalism, and the constitution

serving it, is more than simply a promise. It requires a set of institutional arrangements, and there is more than one governmental structure that satisfies the centralization of power.

Constitutionalism is the restriction of state power in the preservation of public peace. It seeks to cool current passions without forfeiting government efficiency. This definition is obviously inadequate, but the imperfection is comforting. In essence, constitutionalism cannot be moulded into a given shape by giving it exhaustive conditions. Constitutionalism is a matter of taste, and taste oscillates around a hard core. Constitutionalism is not merely a legal prescription or prudence elevated to the rank of prescription.

Law cannot be a substitute for morality, tradition, or everyday common sense. Constitutionalism can be called the genius of the people, or the nation's intellect, or justice, or a reasonable tradition, without which the written constitution is just a mere collection of words.

#### 1.4.7 CONSTITUTIONALISM IN PRACTICE

Constitutionalism in the formal sense means the principle that the exercise of political power shall be bounded by rule that determine the validity of legislative and executive action, and the procedure according to which it must be performed will be prescribed. The rule may be, as in the UK, mere conventional norms, or as in India, directions or prohibitions set down in a justiciable constitution. Constitutionalism becomes a living reality to the extent that these rules curb the arbitrary exercise of power and to that extent, permit significant scope for the enjoyment of individual liberty.

Political constitutionalism is based upon common belief in limited government and in the use of a constitution to impose the limitations. Political systems differ in extent to which they wish to impose limitations. The constitution might limit the executive or local bodies, or even the legislature insofar as amendment of the constitution itself is concerned. These limitations may be enforced by various means, like judicial review or special administrative justice. In short, constitutional government involves elaborate rules of political procedure and jurisdiction. Theoretically speaking, constitutional government is predicated upon certain essential attributes. *First*, it is characterized by a division of power. In a constitutional government, no person or official has the authority

to exercise all sorts of governmental power in all sorts of situations. *Second*, constitutional government involves the general acceptance of plurality of interests in society. *Third*, no single organized institution can monopolize authoritative leadership in society. *Finally*, such a system of government seeks to minimize governmental constraint on individual freedoms and liberties.

As the practice of constitutionalism is determined by many factors, viz. nature of constitution, type of political system, political culture, socio-economic development, etc., the following section briefly explains the practice of constitutionalism in three countries – the United States, the United Kingdom and India.

#### 1.4.7.2 UNITED STATES

Constitutionalism in the US has been defined as a complex of ideas, attitudes, and patterns of behavior elaborating the principle that the authority of government derives from the people, and is limited by a body of fundamental law. These ideas, attitudes and patterns of behavior, derive from a dynamic political and historical process rather than from a static body of thought laid down in the eighteenth century. In US history, constitutionalism has traditionally focused on the federal Constitution. Indeed, a routine assumption of many scholars has been that understanding "American constitutionalism" necessarily entails the thought that went into the drafting of the federal Constitution and the American experience with that constitution since its ratification in 1789. There is a rich tradition of state constitutionalism that offers broader insight into constitutionalism in the United States. US constitutionalism contains important features such as democratic polity, rule of law, written constitution, separation of powers, theory of checks and balance and popular sovereignty.

#### 1.4.7.2 UNITED KINGDOM

The United Kingdom is perhaps the best instance of constitutionalism in a country that has an uncodified constitution. A variety of developments in the 17<sup>th</sup> century England, including the protracted struggle for power between king and Parliament was accompanied by an efflorescence of political ideas in which the concept of countervailing powers was clearly defined, led to a well-developed polity with multiple governmental and private institutions that counter the power of the state.

British scholars especially John Locke made immense contribution to the idea of constitutionalism.

#### 1.4.7.3 INDIA

India is a democratic country with a written Constitution. Rule of Law is the basis for governance of the country. All the administrative structures are expected to follow it in both letter and spirit. It is assumed that constitutionalism is a natural corollary to governance in India. But the experience with the process of governance in India in the last six decades is a mixed one. On the one hand, it has an excellent administrative set up put in place to oversee even the minutest of details related to welfare maximization but on the other it has only resulted in excessive bureaucratization and eventual alienation of the rulers from the ruled. Since independence, those regions which were backward remained the same, the gap between the rich and poor has widened, people at the bottom level of the pyramid remained at the periphery of developmental process, bureaucracy retained colonial characters and overall development remained much below the expectations of the people. Principle of 'Constitutionalism' has been recognized by Supreme Court of India in different cases. The Supreme Court of India has viewed that the principle of constitutionalism is now a legal principle which requires control over the exercise of Governmental power to ensure that it does not destroy the democratic principles upon which it is based. These democratic principles include the protection of fundamental rights. The principle of constitutionalism advocates a check and balance model of the separation of powers, it requires a diffusion of powers, necessitating different independent centers of decision making. The protection of fundamental constitutional rights through the common law is main feature of common law constitutionalism

#### 1.4.8 CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM

Though constitutions have come and gone in the last millennium, constitutionalism lives on in this one. Institutions dedicated to the protection of rights are growing in size and number. Movements for constitutional government are sprouting up in lands where despots once reigned.

Constitutional decision-makers are 'internationalizing', increasingly looking to internationally shared principles and foreign sources when setting up institutions and

interpreting constitutional texts. One reason is increased domestic diversity, another one is increased international interdependence. Societies which seemed to have achieved a certain cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic homogeneity or harmony, and therefore had a constitution that was based on either homogeneity or harmony among certain groups, have welcomed an increasing number of people who may not share the constitution's foundational value assumptions. At the same time as human migration changes the composition of national polities, citizens are increasingly interacting with actors outside the physical borders of their nations, stretching the reach of traditional forms of governance and challenging national cohesion, in part because of the Internet, in part due to global economic and cultural integration. Our age is witnessing a dynamic interface between constitutional rights and the digital realm. This and future generations will confront new challenges involving online privacy, cyber terrorism and digitally assisted terrorism, intellectual property, and enforcement of the rule of law across borders.

This situation presents a central problem in judging the fortunes of constitutionalism in the new millennium: how can the foundational regime of legal standards remain both solid and flexible enough to meet the needs of the times? This dilemma is not new.

In the new millennium, constitutions will change with the times, but their stability is no less a source of their force. No matter how technical it may seem, amending a constitution is an essential element of the document itself and of constitutionalism. In the absence of rigorous amendment procedures, a constitution can become the victim of incidental considerations at any time, if any one of its prescriptions were to obstruct a current legislative improvisation or a prevalent legislative interest. Techniques of constitutional stability are particularly important in times of populism. The blessed self-restriction dictated by the constitution would cease to exist, even though it is the task of the constitution to ensure it. With an easily amendable constitution all its guarantees would cease, too. The intimate relationship with the people's sovereignty, which was so important when it was created, would discontinue. The legitimacy of the whole political system would be threatened if the content of the constitution were to appear as, or become part of, the ordinary political bargaining process.

Of course, constitutions are not immutable. In the name of democratic justification, Thomas Jefferson held that all generations should have the opportunity to amend their constitution; because what they inherited was not formulated with their participation, and earlier generations had no right to determine how future generations should live. While it is not always easy to draw a firm line between constitution-making and amending the constitution, from a formal standpoint constitutional amendments are readily identifiable inasmuch as constitutions themselves prescribe how they may be amended.

As the world becomes increasingly interdependent, and as the challenges constitutional law face expand beyond national boundaries, national courts responsible for constitutional adjudication will look more frequently to their counterparts in other countries for ideas and guidance.

Interest in comparative constitutional law has palpably increased in recent decades, because of, among other developments, (1) the proliferation of new constitutions and transitions to constitutional democracy in various parts of the world, such as Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and now the Middle East, and (2) the internationalization of fundamental rights, begun after World War II.

In more recent times, contact among judges from different countries has increased sharply, and foreign judicial decisions have become more readily available through the Internet. Moreover, interest in, and opportunities for, exchanges among constitutional scholars from different parts of the world have risen in recent years.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| •• | Write briefly the basic features of constitutionalism? |
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|    |  |
|    |  |
|    |  |

|   | Constitutional government is predicated upon certain essential attributes. Vare they?  How constitutionalism practiced in India? | are they?  | How do you  | differentiate between cons  | stitution and constitutionalism?       |
|---|--|--|-------------|-----------------------------|--|
| How constitutionalism practiced in India? | How constitutionalism practiced in India?  |  |             | nal government is predicat  | ted upon certain essential attributes. |
|   |  | Write a brief note on the status of constitutionalism in the new millennium? | How constit | utionalism practiced in Ind |  |

# 1.4.9 LET US SUM UP

In brief, constitutionalism is a limited government under a constitution. According to this philosophy, the government must operate in accord with the provisions of the Constitution. It must not exceed the authority granted to it by the Constitution. The essential features of constitutionalism are the government's compliance with these two basic legal requirements. The central purpose of constitutionalism is to limit governmental power, to check and restrain the persons

who hold public office and exercise political authority. Constitutionalism as idea emerged in the Western Europe and US and then expanded in the World countries.

Constitutionalism considers certain basic rights and values to be inviolable, as opposed to the majority principle of the sovereignty of people, which claims the supremacy of laws passed by the majority. The constitution, instead of declaring the sovereignty of people, settles on the appropriate restrictive institutions. What powers constitutional institutions do have was vested in them by the people. On the other hand, the sovereignty of the people does not mean that those who exercise this sovereignty may make sovereign decisions on the individuals' existence.

The principles that have underlain constitutionalism for hundreds of years must continue to do so in the future. Constitutionalism is about limiting power. So long as power exists, so too should a robust commitment to constitutionalism, in this millennium and those to come.

#### 1.4.10 SUGGESTED READINGS

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# 2.1 POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

- Dr. Harjit Singh

# **STRUCTURE**

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- 2.1.1 Introduction
- **2.1.2** Culture
- 2.1.3 Political Culture
- 2.1.4 Concept of Secularization
- 2.1.5 Types of Political Systems based on Culture
  - 2.1.5.1 The Anglo-American Political Systems
  - 2.1.5.2 The Continental European Political Systems
  - 2.1.5.3 Pre-Industrial or Partially-Industrialized Systems
  - 2.1.5.4 Totalitarian Political Systems
- 2.1.6 Socialization
- 2.1.7 Political Socialization
- 2.1.8 Development of Political Socialization
- 2.1.9 Let us Sum Up

#### 2.1.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to know:

- meaning and significance of political culture;
- what is meant by secularization of political culture;
- how to differentiate political systems based on political culture;
- the meaning and socialization with reference to political socialization;
- development of political socialization and its importance in systems stability.

# 2.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The cultural thrust in comparative politics conspicuously prominent during the 1 960s, emanated from traditional work on culture in anthropology, socialization and small group studies in sociology, and personality studies in psychology. The concept of political culture was related to nations or national cultures. In this sense political culture represented a sort of recasting of the older notions of national character. Political culture related to systems as well. Political culture consisted of beliefs, symbols, and values that define situations in which political action occurs. The pioneer comparative effort to construct a theory of political culture was Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's Civic Culture, which was based on a survey of the attitude of citizens toward their nations in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, and Mexico. Inherent in this study was the proposition that the ideal political or civic culture could be found in an Anglo-American model of politics. Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba elaborated on the theory and brought together essays by prominent specialists in the field in *Political* Culture and Political Development. Although there have been efforts to related political culture to the politics of specific nations, generally literature has been divided into two subareas: political socialization and communications. Edited volumes by James S. Coleman, Education and Political Development, and by Pye, Communications and Political Development, reflect the work in these areas.

# **2.1.2 CULTURE**

'Culture' is one of the most important concepts in social science. It is commonly used in Psychology, Political Science and Economics. It is the main concept in

Anthropology and a fundamental one is Sociology. It is obvious that the study of human society immediately and necessarily leads ups to the study of its culture. The study of society or any aspect of it becomes incomplete without a proper understanding of the culture of that society. Culture and society go together. They are inseparable. In political sphere the realization has, therefore, now come to stay that the attitudes, sentiments and cognitions that inform and govern political behaviour in any society are not just random categories but represent coherent patterns which fit together and are mutually reinforcing, that in any particular community there is a limited and distinct political culture which gives meaning, predictability and form to the political process, that each individual must, in his own historical context, learn and incorporate into his own personality the knowledge and feelings about the politics of his people and his community.

# 2.1.3 POLITICAL CULTURE

A political culture, according to Lucian Pye, is composed of the attitudes, beliefs, emotions and values of society that relates to the political system and to political issues. It is defined as the pattern of individual attitudes and orientations towards politics among the members of a political system (Almond and Powell). The people of a society share a common human nature like emotional drives, intellectual capacities and moral perspectives. The common human nature expresses itself in the form of certain values, beliefs and emotional attitudes which are transmitted from one generation to another, though with greater or lesser modifications, and thus constitute the general culture of that society. Certain aspects of the general culture of a society are especially concerned with how government ought to be conducted and what it shall try to do. This sector of culture we call political culture. It is this set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments that give order to meaning to a political process and that provides the underlying assumptions and rules that govern behaviour in the political system.

The political culture, then, may be seen as the over-all distribution of citizens' orientations to political objects. R.C. Macridis writes of it as the commonly shared goals and commonly accepted rules. Robert A. Dahl has singled out political culture as a factor explaining different patterns of political opposition whose salient elements are:

- Orientations of problem-solving; are they pragmatic or rationalistic?
- Orientations to collective action; are they co-operative or non-co-operative?
- Orientations to the political system; are they allegiant or alienated?
- Orientations to other people; are they trustful or mistrustful?

From the above, one may infer that political culture has certain components having their place in the world of sociology. They are: values, beliefs and emotional attitudes of the people towards their political system. We may observe that the people have, in general, certain political values as elections should be held periodically and also in a free and fair manner; that the ministers should resign if they forfeit the confidence of the people or their chosen deputies, that no person should be made to suffer in body or in goods unless a verdict is given by a competent court of law following a procedure established by the organic law of the country, etc.

Closely linked with political values is the component of political beliefs about the actual behaviour of men and countries. It includes certain norms such as that adult population of a country has the right to take part in the political discussions. The significant cause of the beliefs should also be traced in this fact, as pointed out by Beer and Ulam, that ideas that do not appear at first glance to have relevance to politics may be intimately connected with it through the belief system of the political culture. Finally, we come to the component of emotional attitudes, the tone and temper of the people. While attitudes inherited from a past full of struggles for a constitutional democracy, as in Britain, may inform that the speakers must behave courteously, the tone of discourse must be conversational and the whole style of behaviour and speech must conform not only to the rules of procedure of the Parliament but also to a complex and largely unspoken set of conventions, attitudes inherited from a long authoritarian past may impede the operation of a democratic ideal.

A political culture hinging on the fact of people's attitudes and beliefs towards the political system, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, is a product of several inter-related factors—historical, geographical and socio-economic. Moreover, it is not static, it is dynamic and thus responds to the needs generated within the political system or imparted or imposed from outside. A pragmatic orientation, in this direction,

is known by the name of 'secularization' of the political culture. A study of history offers ample authentic evidence to prove the continuity or discontinuity of a political system behind which the foundations of a political culture can well be found out. The importance of political continuity in a country like Britain, of example, lies in the fact that there order values have been allowed to merge with modern attitudes undisturbed by violent internal strife or domination by foreign power). France offers a sharp contrast in the chain of historical development. While the revolution of 1789 violently overthrew the existing structures and subsequent events showed the highly emotional attitudes of the French people, the English leaders expressed their shock at the events of 1789 and a leading parliamentarian like Edmund Burke could successfully draw the attention of his countrymen towards the horrors of such a violent upheaval. Such a political culture had its impact upon the fate of the colonies as well.

Geography has its own part in laying the foundations of a political culture. The character of the British Isles protected the country from foreign invasion and also from the massive influx of foreign races that could have created the problem of ethnic differences. Different from this, the limitless frontiers of a country like India opened the ways for the foreigners to invade and even stay here with the result that Indians developed the values of egalitarianism in the midst of sharp ethnic differences. Instances can be gathered to show that in case the ethnic differences are allowed to develop in the direction of hostile political cultures, national integration suffers heavily and different people in the name of their different nationalities struggle for their separate sovereign states.

Lastly, we take up the determinant of socio-economic development. A predominantly urban industrialized society is a more complex society, putting a premium on rapid communications. Educational standards are higher, groups proliferate, and participation in the decision-making process is, by necessity, wider. Rural societies are not geared to change and innovation, and states with a predominantly peasant population are more conservative. Developments in the field of science and technology have their impact on the growth of agriculture and industry; they also have their impact on the process of transportation and communications, migrations and immigrations, imports and exports, revolutions and warfares. It all

leads to changes in political values and beliefs of the people. Thus, the labour classes become 'embourgeoisiefied' in rich countries of the Western world. It contradicts the Marxian law of increasing misery, degradation and pauperization of the proletariat in the industrially advanced countries of the world. The Americans, for instance, abandoned their foreign policy of splendid isolationism at the time of the first Great War and they adopted the policy of effective intervention after the Second War for containing the growth of communism. It is also possible that an industrially developed nation may outstretch its imperialistic arms to subjugate another country and cause a transformation of the political culture of the subjugated people before it withdraws its control as happened in Japan where the promulgation of the Peace Constitution in 1946 at the hands of the Americans led to the superimposition of liberal-democratic values over the feudal political culture providing sanction to the norms of military behaviour (A.N. Burks).

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| What are the elements of political culture stated by Robert Dahl?    | you define political culture?                                |     |
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|  |  |     |
|  | re the elements of political culture stated by Robert Dahl's | ?   |
|  |  |     |
|  |  |     |
| How historical journey of a country determine its political culture? | storical journey of a country determine its political cultur | re? |
|  |  |     |
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| How so | cio-economic development influences political culture? |
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# 2.1.4 CONCEPT OF SECULARIZATION

Allied with political culture is the subject of secularization of the political culture. It has two attributes: (i) pragmatic and empirical orientations and (ii) movement from diffuseness to specificity of cultural orientations. Times change and so change the beliefs and values of the people. This change should, however, be in a pragmatic and empirical direction and that too in a way from diffuseness to specificity. That is, the political beliefs and values of the people must change from a parochial to a mundane variety, the people must learn more and more the meaning of political participation and political recruitment and their knowledge of political involvement should grow so that they may grasp the implications of the idea of political legitimacy. Thus, the process of the secularization of political culture means increasing political awareness of the people enabling them to have a growing information about their political system and their role as a political actor in it. It is through the secularization of political culture that these rigid, ascribed and diffuse customs of social interaction come to be over-ridden by a set of codified, specifically political, and universalistic rules. By the same token, as emphasized by Almond and Powell, the secularization process of bargaining and accommodative political actions become a common feature of the society, and the development of special structures such as interest groups and parties become meaningful.

# 2.1.5 TYPES OF POLITICAL SYSTEM ON THE BASIS OF POLITICAL CULTURE

Almond use the concept of political culture to classify political systems. He identifies distinct types of political system in the contemporary world. These are:

#### 2.1.5.1 THE ANGLO-AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

These systems are characterized by multi-valued political cultures in which a large majority of the population is firmly committed to the realization of values of individual freedom, mass welfare and security. In such systems, the political culture is homogeneous to the extent that there is general agreement about political ends and the means to their realization. Politics is played like a game. The result of the political struggle is constantly in doubt but the rival groups of political leaders do not convert the atmosphere as the game into a battlefield. The political system presents the scene of a market in which each actor has a well-defined role and a great deal of bargaining takes place between various role incumbents. Policies are offered for sale in exchange for votes. The outcome of the game of politics is determined by votes. That group of leaders wins it which gets more votes than every other group. Roles in these political systems are highly differentiated. Each structure – party or pressure group or voluntary organization or governmental institution – has a specialized purpose or some specific purposes and performs a specialized function in the political system. In addition to the complex and highly differentiated role structure, there is stability of this differentiation. Each structure performs its functions and contributes to the stability of the system. The Anglo-American political systems operate on the basis of the diffusion of power and influence. There is distribution of power among various structures. There are several meaningful checks and balances among them. Finally, in these political systems, all political interest group in society play a part in the system and make their influence felt in the political process. Anglo-American political systems are at work in developed western countries like Britain and America.

# 2.1.5.2 THE CONTINENTAL EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The continental European Political Systems are less developed than the Anglo-American Political Systems. The political culture is fragmented and not homogeneous.

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Different sections of society have different sub-cultures some of which are more developed than others. The political culture is of the nature of a series of sub-cultures. These sub-cultures are the product of internal industrial and technological developments. Some of the sub-cultures are feudalistic while others are modernized. Further, each sub-culture tends to be divided within itself. Each has elements which are more intransigent in their attitude towards other sections of society than the rest. The type of bargaining and compromising which characterizes the Anglo-American systems is absent here. Each cultural sub-section of society has conflicting and mutually exclusive design for the political culture and the political system. Political affiliations become more an act of faith rather than a starting point for negotiations among the competing big political actors. In the process of conflict resolution, each sub-cultural group tries to dominate the other and is not prepared to compromise and adopt the views of others. In Continental European system each sub-culture develops a separate sub-system of roles. These roles are not attached to the system as a whole but become embedded in the sub-cultures themselves. There is a general lack of mobility between role incumbents in various sub-cultures. The sub-cultural divisions are often challenged and sometimes swept by movements of charismatic nationalism using coercive methods for transforming the fragmented political culture into a synthetically homogeneous one. Continental European Political Systems includes, as Almond Says, the French, German and Italian Political Systems.

#### 2.1.5.3 Pre-Industrial or Partially-Industrialized Systems

The pre-industrial or partially-industrialized systems have a mixed political culture – traditional political culture plus western political culture. The cultural mix is very often the result of an imperialist or colonial era in the country's history. It results from contact between the native political culture and the western type culture which dominated society in the era of imperialism and colonialism. The erosion of traditional political culture often results in tensions appearing in society. People become concerned with the erosion of traditional values, norms, customs and traditions and develop a sense of insecurity which often leads to violent protests against the emergent system. However, like the Continental European systems, the conflict of political cultures often results in the appearance of charismatic nationalism attempting to consolidate the new

cultural norms. This type of system has a high potential for violence. It is caused by difficulties of communication and coordination which result from the fact that large groups within the system have radically different conceptions and orientations about the political system as a whole and its various parts. In place of functional specialisation and differentiation which characterises the Anglo-American Systems, in the Preindustrialised systems there tends to be a high degree of role exchanges among political structures. Armies and bureaucracies often take over the work of legislation, legislatures indulge in interfering with judicial proceedings and policy-making takes the form of party decision-making. Most of the Third World countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are having pre-industrial or partially-industrialised political systems with native-imperialist mixed political cultures.

#### 2.1.5.4 TOTALITARIAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS

Totalitarian Political Systems have an altogether different political culture from the Anglo-American political systems. Their main features being:

Voluntary-associations are not allowed to exist and operate in the society. Means of Communications are controlled by the government or its agencies. Political Culture of a Totalitarian Political System is projected as a homogeneous one, but this homogeneity is artificial and synthetic. Use of power as coercion or force stands centralised in the hands of bureaucracy which in turn is controlled by a monolithical political party. Legitimacy of authority in a Totalitarian Political System is secured through forcible means and propaganda. Force and fear are used by the state to control the system. There is centralisation of the power in the hands of a monolith party and no diffusion or decentralisation of power is really permitted. The party controls the government, the bureaucracy, the army and the police. These characteristics were present in the Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. The former communist countries of the World, the erstwhile USSR and socialist countries of Eastern Europe and at present China and Cuba fall in this category. During 1985-9 1, Perestroika and Glasnost in the USSR produced several changes not only in the Soviet Political System but also in the political systems of other Eastern European Communist countries. Their political systems, which, in the recent past, had all the above listed features of Totalitarian Political Systems, began becoming open and competitive. Within a short span of about

six years, these replaced their communist political systems with liberalised political systems - open, competitive, participatory and multi-party systems. However, their political cultures are yet to imbibe fully the new changes in values and orientations. This can lead to an era of political uncertainty and instability. The happenings in Rumania in this post- communist rule era tend to justify this observation.

## **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| ] | How secularization influence the political culture?  |
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|   | The Anglo-American political systems are characterized by multi-valued policultures. How do you understand this? |
| _ |  |
|   | The Continental European political culture is fragmented and not homogen Comment.                                |
| - |  |
|   | Charismatic nationalism generally emerges in pre-industrial political culture. you agree with this?              |
| - |  |
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| 5. | What are the main features of totalitarian political cultures? |
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## 2.1.6 SOCIALIZATION

Man is not only social but also cultural. It is culture that provides opportunities for man to develop the personality. Development of personality is not an automatic process. Every society prescribes its own ways and means of giving social training to its new born members so that they may develop their own personality. This social training is called 'socialization'. Little of man's behaviour is instinctive. Rather, man's behaviour is 'learnt' behaviour. The human child comes into the world as a biological organism with animal needs. She is gradually moulded in society into a social being and learns social ways of acting and feeling.

The continued existence of society becomes impossible without this process. No individual could become the person and no culture could exist without it. This process of moulding and shaping the personality of the human infant we call as 'socialization'.

## 2.1.7 POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

H. H. Hyman, who coined the term 'political socialization', has emphasised on the perpetuation of political values across generations. Picking up a thread from such an interpretation, Las swell says that political socialization unquestionably meets the criterion of significance in as much as it is an important feature of every past, present and future body politic. Every community transmits with varying degrees of success the mature practices of its culture to the immature. Every stable sub-culture engages in a parallel process, since it also distinguishes between participation by the mature and the immature

Political socialization is the process by which political cultures are maintained and changed. Through the performance of this function individuals are inducted into

the political culture, their orientations towards political objects are formed. In other words, it refers to the learning process by which norms and behaviour acceptable to a well-running political system are transmitted from one generation to another. Thus, the aim of this concept is to train or develop the individuals in a way that they become well-functioning members of a political community. It has a peculiarly psychological dimension in the sense that it is the gradual learning of the norms, attitudes and behaviour acceptable to an on-going political system.

The principal emphasis of the concept of political socialization is on the transmission of political values from one generation to another. The stability of a social or political system depends on the political socialization of its members on account of the fact that a well-functioning citizen is one who accepts (internalizes) society's political norms and who will then transmit them to future generations. For example, the members of a stable democratic system as operating in Britain are trained and made habitual of adopting constitutional means to affect changes rather than resorting to the techniques of taking the matters to the streets or creating conditions of a violent upheaval. Political socialization, Irwin Child says, thus covers the whole process by which an individual born cultivates the behaviour which is confined with a much narrower range—the range of which is customary and acceptable for him according to the students of his groups. Political socialization desires to achieve the goal of political stabilization. It stands on the premise that a political system cannot function smoothly unless the process of the internalization of political norms and values is at work simultaneously. As in the case of an individual organism so in the case of body politic, nothing but maintenance or survival is needed. And survival means nothing else than stabilization. As Roberta Sigel says, the goal of political socialization is to so train or develop individuals that they become well-functioning members of the political society. It enables the individual to be harmonious with the on-going political values so that the political system would function smoothly and perpetuating itself safely. Survival after all, is a prime goal of the political organism just as it is of the individual organism.

Political socialization seeks to inculcate values, norms and orientations in the minds of the individuals so that they develop trust in their political system and thereby keep themselves like well-functioning citizens and also leave their imprints on the

minds of their successors. Political socialization may thus be defined as the process by which an individual becomes acquainted with the political system and which determines his reactions to political phenomena. It involves the examination of the social, economic or cultural environment of society upon the individual and upon his political attitudes and values. Hence, as pointed out by Michael Rush and Phillip Althoff, political socialization is the most important link between the social and political systems, but may vary considerably from one system to another. From a political point of view, political socialization is extremely important as the process by which individuals become involved to varying degrees in the political system—in political participation.

## **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 3**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| The process of moulding and shaping the personality of the human infant is called as 'socialization'. Elaborate.                       |
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|  |
| Political socialization is the process by which political cultures are maintained and changed. Explain.                                |
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| Do you agree with the notion that the stability of a social or political system depends on the political socialization of its members? |
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#### 2.1.8 DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

Every society that wishes to maintain itself or to have its stability as a condition precedent to its survival has one of its essential functions in the socialization of the young in order to enable them to carry on willingly the established values, orientations and norms of their collective life. A new-born child is not a socialized creature. He is socialized by means of a learning process. Moreover, such learning is not limited to the acquisition of appropriate knowledge about a society's norms but requires that the individual so makes these norms his own, internalizes them, that to him they appear to be right, just and moral. Having once internalized society's norms, it will presumably not be difficult for the individual to act in congruence with them. Moreover, this process of norm-internalization is not exhausted with the age of adolescence; it also covers the young for the same reason which informs that a politically organized society has the same maintenance needs in which the young people have to play a quite responsible part. Let us, therefore, look at the norms—internalization process at two stages—socialization of the child and the adolescent and socialization of the young people.

The process of political socialization starts when the child becomes aware of a wide environment, he feels increasingly perceptive in response to particular situations and comes to have an outlook that becomes increasingly coherent and total where before it was fragmented and limited. It is at this stage that the general attitude of the children towards authority, obedience, resistance, cooperation, aggression, etc. has its germination. What a child gets from the family has its furtherance in the school that cements his early convictions towards political values. Easton and Dennis gives four stages in the process of political socialization at the childhood stage—(i) recognition of authority through particular individuals such as parents, policemen and the president of the country; (ii) distinction between public and private authority; (iii) recognition of impersonal political institutions like national legislature, judiciary and voting behaviour; and (iv) distinction between political institutions and persons engaged in the activities associated with those institutions so that idealized images of particular persons such as the President or the Congressmen are transferred from the Presidency and the Congress. Though it is true that early socialization lays the foundation of later socialization, it does not imply that the pattern of later socialization should strictly

conform to the former. The effect of the latter experiential influences may bring about a change in the attitudes or orientations of men at an advanced stage of his life. The knowledge, values and attitude acquired during the childhood and adolescence will be measured against the experience of adult life: to suggest otherwise is to suggest a static political behaviour. If the process of adult socialization tends to reinforce those of childhood and adolescence, the degree of change may be limited to that of increasing conservatism with age, but where such conflict occurs, radical changes in political behaviour may result. Such conflict may have its roots in early political socialization, but it may also be attributable to the experiences of later socialization.

It shows that the process of political socialization covers the whole life of a man. Its foundations are laid in the early stages of man's life; its superstructures may undergo change in the later stage on account of certain new experiences. What is strikingly noticeable at this stage is that the political socialization of the young witnesses, what Almond and Verba call, multi-directional flow of influences. The result is that what the individuals learn at their grown up stage, they strive to have in inculcated at the early stage of the life of their off-springs. While referring to the case of the United States, Almond and Verba point out that the people owing to the practice of political democracy in the country subsequently demand the practice of democracy in school, shop and church. Since the demand is often met, school-children, workers and others acquire an articulation, debate and decision-making. These experiences, in turn, help them towards developing the skills with which to participate in political life and either to help bring about or to accept political change. Thus, the socialization process contributes not only to a society's political stability but also to change and to the strain at ease with which changes to take place.

The process of political socialization has two forms: (i) homogeneous or continuous, signifying that the individuals cooperate with each other in an atmosphere of mutual trust towards their political system, and (ii) heterogeneous or discontinuous signifying that the individuals have an attitude of mutual suspicion and hatred towards each other that eventually leads them to have disaffection with their political system. Thus, while in the event of a homogeneous or continuous process of political

socialization, a political system can hope to receive a more or less dependable support from the individuals, the entire political life is likely to become restless and turbulent leading to the frustration and demands for radical social change. Obviously, it is in the interest of the stability of a political system that it draws its sustenance from a homogeneous environment. Though political socialization desires, as a matter of fact, political stabilization, it should not at all be construed as an anti-change concept. Political socialization, thus, emphasizes that if the attitudes, orientations and values of the people change through time, a simultaneous change in the sphere of political culture must take place in order to avoid the risks of sudden changes that may bring about the decay or destruction of a political system. That is, the process of the shaping of political values and the process of change should run in conformity with each other. It requires that the rulers must remain very careful to prevent the occurrence of any major event like that of inflation or war that may lead to the inculcation of radical changes in the attitudes of the people. The men in power are thus duty-bound to see that the pressure of events does not reach a point that the loyalists are converted into the rebels, or the collaborationists become the aggressors, or the friends are transformed into the foes. The fact is that, as emphasized by S. P. Verma, if the process of socialization is slow, the waters of political culture will run smoothly, and a political system smoothly adjusted with the political culture of the country will be able to function effectively. Too rapid a process of political socialization, on the other hand, is likely to throw everything out of gear.

The process of political socialization in the form of the acquisition of political orientations and patterns of behaviour is as applicable to non-democratic societies as it is to the democratic ones, though it cannot be denied that the emphasis placed on the role of the 'agents' or the system of mechanism may vary both in kind and in its effectiveness. An open society allowing room for dissent and opposition has a plural character wherein multifarious interests operate for the purpose of inculcating a multifaceted variety of political norms and values. Opposed to this is the case of a totalitarian society where the men in power impose their ideology or political values on the people as a whole with a view to de-educate the old and re-educate the young generations. As pointed out by Rush and Althoff, the totalitarian societies differ from modern democracies in the degree of control they exercise over the

political socialization of their members. All governments seek directly or indirectly to socialize members of society to varying degrees by the control of information, but in the totalitarian society, the control is all pervasive. A totalitarian state is one that seeks to control all aspects of society and lays stress on the socialization in general and political socialization in particular. The ideology of the state becomes the official basis of all the actions and pervades all activities. Political socialization is not and cannot be left to find its own channels; nor to purview uncontrolled knowledge, values and attitudes which may contradict or undermine that ideology. The minds of men must be captured, guided and harnessed to the needs of the state through the vehicle of its ideology. This is evident from the statements of great totalitarian leaders like Adolph Hitler.

## **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 4**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| oriefly the process of development of political socialization.                          |
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|   |
| are the four stages identified by Easton and Dennis to the process of political zation? |
|   |
| do you differentiate between homogeneous or heterogeneous socialization sses?           |
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|   |

| 4. | The totalitarian societies differ from modern democracies in the degree of control |
|----|--|
|    | they exercise over the political socialization of their members. Explain.          |
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## 2.1.9 LET US SUM UP

A deeper examination in this regard, however, leads to this astonishing impression that the process of political socialization is essentially a conservative concept, regardless of the case of democratic and totalitarian societies, in view of the fact that its real concern is with the survival or maintenance of a political system. Whether it is a free and open society like that of the United States or Britain, or it is the opposite of that as we find in the Soviet Union or China, the net over-all effect of political socialization is in the direction of supporting the status quo, or at least the major aspects of the existing political regime. As Greenstein says political socialization in both stable and unstable societies is likely to maintain existing patterns.

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M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics
UNIT - II: POLITICAL PROCESSES, POLITICAL PARTIES &
POLITICAL CHANGE

# 2.2 POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION

- Dr. Harjit Singh

## **STRUCTURE**

- 2.2.0 Objectives
- 2.2.1 Introduction
- 2.2.2 Meaning and Definition
- 2.2.3 Types of Political Participation
- 2.2.4 Classification of Levels of Political Participation
- 2.2.5 Factors involved in Political Participation
- 2.2.6 Representation
- 2.2.7 Meaning and Nature
- 2.2.8 Representation: Two Dimensions
- 2.2.9 Theories of Representation
- 2.2.10 Representation and Misrepresentation
- 2.2.11 Participation and Representation
- **2.2.12** Let us Sum Up

#### 2.2.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to know:

- meaning and types of political participation;
- levels of political participation and factors involved in political participation;
- meaning, nature and theories of representation;
- the democratic connection between participation and representation

#### 2.2.0 INTRODUCTION

Political participation is always a feature of every political system whether democratic or totalitarian, modern or traditional and developed or developing. No political system can work without securing the performance of political roles by the people. The process by which people participate in the political process is referred to as political participation. The need to study politics as an aspect of human behaviour has focused attention on the need to conceptualise and study political participation. Several modern political scientists have used this concept for analysing the behaviour of the people in politics.

## 2.2.2. MEANING AND DEFINITION

The term political participation covers all kinds of activities which involve the people in shaping and influencing the political decision-making process, the exercise of power, and in the selection of their rulers, casting of votes in elections, making of organised demands on the political system, participation in party politics, participation in political movements, conferences, discussions, strikes and demonstrations, communication with the representatives and other political leaders, involvement in political communication etc., all form part of political participation. In the words of Heinz Eulau, "Political Participation is the involvement of masses in the decision-making process or policy-formulation." In simple words, we can say that political participation refers to the involvement of the people in the decision-making, policy-formulation, electoral process, and in the struggle for power in society. It includes all activities through which the people get involved in the political process. It does not mean merely the exercise of right to vote by the people.

It refers to their active involvement in the decision-making process of the political system. J.L. Woodward and Elmo Roper hold that the following five activities form part of political participation:

- voting at polls;
- supporting possible pressure groups by being members of them;
- holding discussions and meetings;
- personally communicating directly with legislators;
- participating in political party activity and thus acquiring claim over legislators;
- engaging in habitual dissemination of political opinions through word of mouth communication to other citizens;

So we can say, political participation refers to the active and willed participation of the people in the political process, particularly in the decision-making and policy-formulation processes. It is confined to not merely the casting of votes in elections. It means the willing involvement of the people in various activities involved in the struggle for power in society.

## 2.2.3 TYPES OF POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In political participation we usually identify several forms or kinds of political participation. Since political participation refers to several kinds of activities through which people participate, directly or indirectly, in the political process, scholars identify political participation with the help of several variables, direct or indirect, active or inactive, high or low, legitimate or illegitimate etc. Mostly, the following forms of political participation are identified by them:

**Direct Political Participation:** When people play a direct role in the election of their rulers and in the decision-making or policy-formulation process, political participation is identified as Direct Political Participation. In political systems with direct legislation and direct election systems there is direct political participation.

*Indirect Political Participation:* In representative democracies, the people elect their representatives directly and through them take part in the decision-making

process. The representatives are accountable to the people and they represent the people in the decision-making and policy-formulation.

Active Political Participation: When people actively participate in the political processes, leadership-recruitment, elections, electoral politics, political communication, party politics, pressure group activities etc., the political participation is referred to as active political participation. Active political participation characterises liberal democratic systems, both developed and developing.

Low or Passive Political Participation: When the people have little interest in the political process and they are not fully oriented towards the political system and its sub-systems which makes them politically apathetic, the political participation is called Low or Passive.

*Instrumental Political Participation:* When people participate in politics with definite ends in view which they want to achieve in politics, the political participation is identified by Davies and Milbrath, as Instrumental Political Participation. When several people participate in politics for securing a majority for their political party, it is a case of instrumental political participation.

*Expressive Political Participation:* When people participate in politics without any commitment to a definite objective, but for the satisfaction of their feelings or sentiments or emotions, the political participation is referred to as Expressive Political Participation.

However, it is very difficult, almost impossible to separate instrumental political participation from expressive political participation. Almost always, the two are present simultaneously.

**Political Participation through Legitimate Means:** When people participate in the political process through legitimate and constitutional means, the political participation is identified as Legitimate Political Participation. Participation in politics through involvement in party campaigns, political meetings and demonstrations and the like, fall in the category of Legitimate Political Participation.

**Political Participation through Illegitimate Means:** Participation in politics through violent and non-constitutional means-riots, violent outbursts, destruction of

public property, involvement in political violence, electoral malpractices etc., fall under the category of Political Participation through illegitimate means.

Thus, political scientists make a distinction between several forms of political participation on the basis of several factors. In every political system, political participation is characterised by all these forms. The study of the nature, level and forms of political participation can be one basic way of studying the behaviour of the people in politics.

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

| How dir  | ect political participation is different from indirect participation? |
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| Differer | ntiate between legitimate and illegitimate political participation?   |

# 2.2.4. CLASSIFICATION OF LEVELS OF POLITICAL **PARTICIPATION**

Politics is one of the unavoidable facts of human existence. Human beings are social animals and they always develop political systems. Everyone is involved in some fashion at some time in some kind of a political system. Whatever be his values

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and concerns everyone is inevitably enmeshed in a political system-whether or not one likes or even notices the fact. However, nature of participation in politics differs from person to person and place to place. All are not equally concerned with politics. Some are indifferent to politics while some others are deeply involved. Even among those who are deeply involved in politics, only some actively seek power, and among the power-seekers some gain more power than others. On the basis of the levels of political participation, Woodword and Roper identify four classes of people: Very Active, Active, Inactive, Very Inactive. The Centre for the study of Developing Societies has suggested a five-fold classification citizens on the basis of the level of participation in politics: Apathetics, Peripherals, Spectators, Auxiliaries and Politists.

- Apathetics are those who remain away from politics. They are psychologically drawn away from politics.
- Peripherals are those who participate in voting and have a limited interest in politics.
- Spectators are those who vote, who have an interest in politics and who participate in lower levels of politics.
- Auxiliaries are those who have a medium level interest in politics and who participate in some activities of the political process.
- Politists are those who are fully oriented towards politics and who participate in the struggle for power.

*Robert Dahl* suggests a systematic classification of citizens on the basis of the level of political participation. He identifies four groups of citizens: the apolitical stratum, the political stratum, the power-seekers and the powerful.

#### 2.2.4.1 THE APOLITICAL STRATUM

The apolitical stratum is constituted by those citizens who are neither concerned nor informed about politics. They are not active in the political process. They are apathetic towards politics and relatively inactive. In every political system the apolitical stratum is present. Very often a large number of citizens, even in democratic systems, are apathetic towards politics. In most polyarchies (popular

governments or democratic system), something between a fifth and a third of the eligible voters do not usually vote in national elections. Much larger fractions abstain from other kinds of political activity). There are several factors which influence people in becoming political apathetics. Robert Dahl identifies the following reasons which lead to the emergence of the apolitical stratum.

- Feeling of Low Rewards: People are less likely to get involved in politics if they place a low valuation on the rewards to be gained from political involvement relative to the rewards expected from other kinds of human activity. Many people feel that political activity is less rewarding than other activities and hence they decide to remain away from politics.
- Lack of Real and Effective Choice: A person is less likely to get involved in politics if he thinks that there is no significant difference in the alternatives before him and consequently, what he does will not matter. Some people decide not to participate in voting because the parties do not offer them a real choice.
- *Self-assumed Insignificance:* An individual is less likely to become involved in politics if he thinks, what he does will not matter because he cannot significantly change the outcome anyway. The weaker is one's sense of political efficacy, the less likely one is to become involved in politics.
- Faith in Goodness of Decisions: People are less likely to get involved in politics if they believe that the outcome will be relatively less satisfactory to them without their involvement. A citizen who believes that a particular political decision is important might nevertheless not become involved in it if he feels quite confident that the decision will turn out well anyway. Just as low confidence in one's political efficiency discourages participation, so high confidence in the all-round justice, legitimacy, stability and fairness of decision in one's political system may make one's own participation seem unnecessary.
- Lack of Faith in Self-role: A person is less likely to get involved in politics if he feels that his knowledge is too limited to be effective if he may become involved in politics. In every country, a large number of people feel that they do not understand politics very well and hence, they decide to turn away from politics.

• Existence of Hurdles: Finally, the greater the obstacles placed in one's way, the less likely one is to become involved in politics. According to Dahl, when a person expects high rewards from an activity, he is willing to overcome great obstacles and incur high 'costs' to gain them. But when he believes that the rewards are going to be low or non-existent, even modest obstacles and costs are enough to discourage him. Why bother to climb over a fence if the grass is not greener on the other side.

Besides these, several other socio-economic factors-illiteracy, poverty, ignorance, regionalism, casteism, sectoral communalism, unhelpful rules and regulations (poll tax, property qualification, registration fees and conditions) can also act as hindrances in the way of political participation and can increase the area of apolitical stratum.

#### 2.2.4.2 THE POLITICAL STRATUM

The Political stratum consists of the people who are concerned and informed about politics, and are active in public affairs. It consists of the people who actively and freely participate in the political process. The persons who belong to the political stratum accept that politics is a high rewarding activity and that they have to play a role in the decision-making and policy-formulation process. They are confident of their roles in politics and are fully oriented towards politics. They are prepared to overcome the obstacles that may come in their ways. They participate in the political process by participating in the party activities and by organising and getting involved in interest group activity. They organise and participate in political campaigns, conferences, demonstrations and movements. They try to occupy political roles and get actively involved in the process of decision-making and policy-formulation. However, within the political stratum, some persons seek power more vigorously than others. They constitute a sub-stratum - the power-seekers. Further, those who are in a position to gain more power than others, constitute another sub-stratum - the powerful leaders.

#### 2.2.4.3 THE POWER-SEEKERS

The power-seekers are those persons who are eager to gain more and more influence over the policies, rules and decisions enforced by the government.

They have political resources, which they are prepared to use for securing power. They try to get power either for promoting collective good or for achieving the goals of self-interest or even both. They try to seek power for acquiring fame, reverences, security, respect, affection, wealth and many other values. The power-seeker believes that with power he can become more important, loved, respected and admired. According to Lasswell, Power-seeker is a person who, places a high value on gaining power; demands power for the self; has relatively high confidence that he can gain power; and acquires at least a minimum proficiency in the skills of power.

#### 2.2.4.4 THE POWERFUL

In the political stratum, those power-seekers who are in a position to gain and wield more power than others are referred to as the powerful. By a judicious use of their resources some people are in a position to gain and exercise power over others and they are the powerfuls. Though all powerful are not equally involved in the exercise of power in society yet their potential to do so makes it essential to refer to them as the powerful. Their participation in politics is high, active and continuous. Their ability to gain and exercise more power than others is related to two factors: (i) differences in the amount of resources used, and (ii) differences in the skill or efficiency with which resources are used.

This classification of citizens on the basis of the level of political participation can be useful in analysing the political behaviour of the people and their role in the decision- making or policy-formulation. Dahl's classification of the people into two stratums- apolitical stratum and political stratum, and the sub-classification of the latter into two sub-stratums-the power seekers and the powerful, can be used for a systematic study of political participation of the people in various political systems.

## 2.2.5. FACTORS INVOLVED IN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

The role that the people of a political system play in the political process, particularly in decision-making or policy-formulation, is influenced by several psychological, social, economic, political, environmental and situational factors. These are referred to as the determinants of political participation. In every political system,

the nature and level of political participation is dependent upon several such factors. The study of political participation necessarily involves a study of these factors.

#### 2.2.5.1 Psychological Factors

Participation in politics is also influenced by several psychological factors. Several people participate in politics for satisfying their psychological urges. Love for power and other values always impels people to get involved in the political process. Many persons find the political field useful as it provides them opportunities for winning over others or for reducing their tensions. However, the basic personality traits also act as checks upon political participation. The introverts are less likely to get involved in the struggle for power. Psychological aversion against competition also checks some persons from participation in politics. Robert McClosky observes that an individual who scores high on measures of paranoia, inflexibility, guilt, hostility and so on will ipso facto function less effectively in many social contexts. He will be less able to perform tasks that acquire accurate appraisals of reality and may find such political activities threatening as organising, deciding, bargaining, interacting, cooperating, debating and proselytising. The businesslike approach of the Swiss people has always been a determinant of their political participation. In many political systems, the low voting turn-out in elections is also due to psychological factors. The orientations of the people towards politics and political objects always influence the level and nature of political participation.

#### 2.2.5.2 SOCIAL FACTORS

Political participation is always affected by social factors: Education, Social Stratification, Sex, Age, Caste, Religion, Language, Residence, Region, Urban-Rural Gap, and Ethnicity. The nature and level of political participation in societies which have a high literacy percentage always differ from the political participation in societies inhabited by a majority of illiterates. In developing societies, like India, caste, religion, sex and language are the determinants of political behaviour and political participation. Caste groups, caste based politics, caste based elections and caste considerations in the formation of government are the realities of politics in India. In the American political system, the level of political participation among

the negroes is low. The Whites in the USA form the basic core of the political stratum. Likewise, ethnicity and urban-rural gap are always factors of political participation. Leadership very often remains in the hands of the urban elites. A major part of the powerful stratum is constituted by the educated urban elite. In British politics, role of social status as a determinant of political participation is clearly reflected in the working of British party system, House of Lords, Privy Council and Monarchy. Thus, social factors always determine the nature and level of political participation.

#### 2.2.5.3 POLITICAL FACTORS.

Political Factors are always the major determinants of political participation. Nature of the political system, the constitution of the state, the organisation of government, nature and organisation of the political parties, nature of Press and other means of mass media etc., are all the determinants of political participation. In the democratic political system, the people are encouraged to participate freely and actively in the decision-making process and other political activities. People have the right to vote, right to contest elections, right to hold public offices, freedom to criticise the policies of the government and to give one's own views on all subjects, freedom to organise and manage political parties, interest groups and associations, and freedom to participate at all levels of politics. These conditions encourage the people to voluntarily participate in the process of decision-making. In totalitarian systems an attempt is made by the power holders to secure popular support for their policies. Political participation of the people is secured by rules and regulations. The decentralisation of powers, which is a feature of every liberaldemocratic political system, always encourages the people to get involved in the struggle for power. It encourages the development of the substratum of powerseekers within the political stratum.

The existence of well-organised and active political parties always increases the level of political participation. The political parties act as important agencies of political socialisation, political recruitment, and interest articulation and aggregation, and political communication. These are directly involved in the struggle for power. These always affect the process of decision-making and the nature of

authoritative values made and implemented by political system. They play yeoman's role in involving the people in the process of politics. The campaigns and movements launched by them and election campaigns organised by them during elections always lead to increased political participation. Relations with political parties always act as a powerful determinant of political participation. Along with political parties, the mass media also act as a determining factor of political participation. Thus, political factors are always the determinants of political participation.

#### 2.2.5.4 ECONOMIC FACTORS

Economic motives always influence almost all human relations. These are also the determinants of political behaviour and political participation. The expectation of rewards in terms of economic gains always provides a basic incentive to people's involvement in the political process. The urge to get involved in the decision-making or policy formulation is always governed by considerations of economic gains. The rich always try to become richer and influential and for this they regard political participation as an ideal and useful means. The poor, often find their poverty, a hindrance in the way of an active and full political participation. Sometimes they get involved in politics out of frustration. The cost of contesting elections is always a factor of political participation. The role of money power in politics is a major factor of political participation in developing countries, like India.

#### 2.2.5.5 Environmental Factors

Political participation is also affected by environmental factors. Geography, Industrialisation, level of technological advancement, and demographic features also determine the nature and level of political participation. The people living in hot climates do not come forward to participate in political campaigns, movements and elections, particularly during summer months. People living in hilly areas are usually less active in politics. Geographical conditions have a bearing upon the temperament of the people and it, as such, influences their political participation.

## 2.2.5.6 SITUATIONAL FACTORS

Along with the above discussed five factors of political participation, the situational factors also act as the determinants of the people's participation in politics.

The existence of British rule over India and the need to end it acted as strong motivating factors for the people of India and they joined the national liberation movement in a big way. After independence, the political legacies became the determinants of popular participation in politics. The emergency rule (1975-77) also produced an increased political participation as a reaction against repressive policies of this era. In every political system, the policies adopted and formulated by the government of the state often act as inputs of political participation.

All the above account of the factors clearly shows that there are several determinants of political participation. All these factors influence, in varying degrees, popular participation in politics. These have to be analysed together for analysing their role as inputs of popular involvement in politics. No single factor is, individually and continuously, a determinant of political participation. All these factors together determine the level and nature of political participation. However, out of these, the social, economic and political factors are the major determinants and these exercise a continuous influence on the process of involvement of the masses in the process of decision-making or policy formulation i.e., in political participation.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

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## 2.2.6. REPRESENTATION

The term 'representation' has its general as well as particular connotations. In general terms, it means that any corporate group, whether church, business concern, trade union, fraternal order or state, that is too large or too dispersed in membership to conduct its deliberations in an assembly of all its members is confronted with the problem of representation, if it purports to act in any degree in accord with the opinion of its members.' Such a definition of the term is too loose to be applied to any form of representation. We are here concerned with its particular meaning as applicable to the realm of politics. In this sense, representation is the process through which the attitudes, preferences, viewpoints and desires of the entire citizenry or a part of them are, with their ex-pressed approval, shaped into governmental action on their behalf by a smaller number among them, with binding effect upon those represented. In agreement with this definition of the term, in question, German social theorist Robert von Mohl offers interprets that representation is the process through which the influence which the entire citizenry or a part of them have upon governmental action is with their expressed

approval, exercised on their behalf by a small number among them, with binding effects upon those represented.

## 2.2.7. MEANING AND NATURE

The two definitions of representation, given above, deserve examination and comments. As Friedrich suggests that we speak advisedly of influence rather than participation or control, since the large number of citizens is not very likely to participate in or effectively to control governmental action. We use the general expression 'governmental action' rather than legislation, because all kinds of governmental activities might be subjected to popular influence. By suggesting further, that influence of a part of citizenry, as well as the whole, may be represented, we recognize the representative quality of the American Senate. Group representation is more ancient than the representation of the whole people in any case. Finally, the most essential part of this descriptive definition i.e., the expressed approval is expressed presumably in the constitutional provisions regarding representative institutions-the particular institutions of that constitutional order, as well as the general principle. In short, it is this phrase that we recognize as the constitutional setting of such representation. The authority of the representative is not only created by the constituent power, but it is subject to change by the amending power under the constitution.

Curtis is of the view that the term 'representation' is inherently ambiguous and, for this reason, representative government may have different meanings. While carrying his point further he says that for some it is analogous to the activity of a lawyer acting on behalf of a client; for others it means-that the representer approximates the characteristics of the represented. Some see the representers as embodying the declared interests of the represented; others view his function as acting on behalf of his constituents in the way be thinks most desirable. The basic reason is that different attitudes on representation mirror the various views on the relationship between the rulers and the ruled. Samuel Beer has pointed out five typologies of views in this connection:

• The traditional conservative position based on the desirability of order, degree, authority and hierarchy holds that the common welfare is represented by a monarch or a government charged with formulating a political programme.

- The traditional whig or aristocratic view is based on the idea of a balanced constitution symbolising the differences or rank in the society. Men of reason and judgment deliberate on affairs without the need for a mandate from an electorate to guide or bind them, while an elected body like the House of Commons represents the common interest.
- The liberal view sees national welfare and common good as represented by a parliamentary assembly made up or individuals rather than of corporate bodies, though under middle class domination, emphasising a property qualification for the franchise and based on approximate quality or electoral areas.
- For men of radical view, representation is based on the unified will of the people binding individuals together. This will, regarded as the ultimate sovereign in the community, is in practice the will of the majority, expressed either directly or through interest groups.
- Modern conservative democrats and modern socialist democrats see representation in terms of a government based on disciplined political parties with social classes as basic units, and also related to functional groups. The voters are thus faced with the situation of choosing either of the two parties (representing social classes) for the sake of their representation.

## 2.2.8 REPRESENTATION: TWO DIMENSIONS

The concept of representation is a complex one; however, there are two fundamental ways in which we employ the idea. First, what is being represented—an individual, a district, or the nation itself? Thus, a president or monarch can stand for the nation, or a flag symbolize a country, and a U.S. senator represent a state. Second, representation is judged on whether it is authorized or it is typical. Thus, certain people are authorized to act on behalf of others—a lawyer is authorized to represent a client and a congressman legally represents constituents. In this way, someone or group of people consent to the representation. However, we can ask also if something or someone can be representative because it is typical of or has the same traits of some other group. For instance, we can ask if a legislature reflects the entire population with regard to race, ethnicity, or gender. Of course, it is an open question as to what

characteristics should be regarded as needing representing when evaluating how representative something is. In the case of typical representation, the judgment is about institutions because we must ask what is typical of bodies and not individuals. Furthermore, this form of representation as typical may not require the consent or involvement of those who are represented.

#### 2.2.9 THEORIES OF REPRESENTATION

Prof. Ball had given the theories of representation which may be put into two broad categories- liberal-democratic and collectivist-socialist. The liberal-democratic theories of representation have these characteristics.

- Here is emphasis on the importance of individual rights, especially the inviolability of individual's property and the necessity of limiting the powers of government to protect these rights. Liberal-democracy implies not only an extension of the franchise but an equality of voting rights. The representative represents individuals, their opinions and their interests, and therefore he is elected according to geographically demarcated constituencies and not according to classes, occupational distinctions or distinct social interests.
- Man being a rational being, he can identify his own opinions; he is also aware
  of the wider claims of the community. He will, therefore, use his vote in an intelligent
  manner and is consequently entitled to share in the selection of the representatives.
- There should be universal adult franchise, secret ballot and fair and free periodic elections. Constituencies should be earmarked for the recruitment of the representative acting according to the will of his electors; the business of the elected assembly is to protect the interests of its constituents against any encroachment made by the executive or by the majority acting in the name of 'general good'.

The theory of representation as given by the socialists whose salient features may be thus pointed out:

• Emphasis should be laid not on the individual but on the class. The assemblies should represent not the individuals and their opinions but the majority class, whose interests have been subordinated by middle-class parliaments.

- Democracy means the presence of social equality and absence of economic exploitation. Representation should, thus, be governed by this important consideration.
- There may be different parties and groups to represent social interests in the pre-socialist period; there must be only one party when the era of socialism is ushered in. The existence of the Communist party alone is justified on the ground of the absence of class conflicts.

As claimed by the writers in the socialist countries, their representative system differs from a bourgeois system in matters of principle. They deprecate the bourgeois representative system as a process of growing emasculation and limitation and instead admire their own system as being dependent upon the line of popular self-government and self-administration the model of which can be seen in the soviets of the erstwhile USSR and the communes of China. Socialist countries have also adopted a number of direct democratic devices and institutions such as method of recall, rural or town meetings, system of imperative mandate, social activists, popular initiative of legislation and the like so as to demonstrate that it should be a distortion of the institution of socialist representation if all these existing traits were ignored in a study of the organs of state power, the representative institutions. It is thus maintained that socialist representation is a form of indirect democracy which is increasingly completed with a series of direct democratic institutions, and which is absorbing these institutions or part of them.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 3**

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## 2.2.10 REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION

In considering this broader question of the health and legitimacy of the political system, representation directs us to think about what would be a good representation of the people and what would be misrepresentation of the constituents. In some sense, if the selection process is fair, then misrepresentation is impossible—the representative has the legal office and what that person does is binding, and constituents' only recourse would be at the reappointment moment. Yet, to many, this seems wrong. There is the notion, at least in democracies, that the people are

sovereign at all times. If that is the case then regardless of the time, whatever the actions of the representative may be, they are continually subject to the judgment of the people. For only the people have the authority to act. If this is so, the issue of accountability is paramount for representative democracy. Indeed, the failure of a representative to act correctly can be subject to continual evaluation, and, despite the recourse to elections, clear violations of the duty of the representative can lead to a recall or even, if need be, rebellious acts. In an increasingly complex and diverse world, the quality and opportunity for input from the citizens is vital. The effort to find new and effective ways to enlist voting and participation is essential in making democracy work. Thus, in recent years, various political entities (e.g., states, localities) have experimented with voting through the mail or via the Internet. If these ways are not successful, Rousseau's original challenge to the very idea of representation will stand as an indictment of modern democracy.

#### 2.2.11 PARTICIPATION AND REPRESENTATION

The term representative democracy conveys the complexity, richness, and uniqueness of the political order of the moderns, an original synthesis of two distinct and, in certain respects, alternative political traditions. Democracy, a Greek word with no Latin equivalent, stands for direct rule ("making things done") by the people. Representation, a Latin word with no Greek equivalent, entails a delegated action on the part of some on behalf of someone else. As a mixture of these two components, in its standard meaning representative democracy has four main features: (1) the sovereignty of the people expressed in the electoral appointment of the representatives; (2) representation as a free mandate relation; (3) electoral mechanisms to ensure some measure of responsiveness to the people by representatives who speak and act in their name; and (4) universal franchise, which grounds representation on an important element of political equality. The central element of this standard account is that constituencies are formally defined by territory, not economic or corporate interests or cultural identities, an aspect that belongs to democracy since Greeks. This basic formal equality in the distribution of the voting power among adult citizens gives the mark of authorization and legitimacy to a government that relies on consent.

Because representative democracy is first and foremost the name of a form of government, reference to people's sovereignty and authorization is essential, not accessory. Electoral representation is thus crucial in expressing the will of the people, even if the claims of elected officials to act in the name of the people unavoidably become an object of contestation by citizens. This tension is at the core of representation and also accounts for the complexity of representative democracy. Representation is the locus of the dynamics that keep the political process in motion and activates the communication between state institutions and society. Thus, although political representation starts with elections, because it starts with the equal distribution of the power of voting, a merely electoral rendering of representative democracy does not exhaust the meaning of representation and democracy. Nor does it exclude the possibility of a different approach and also different institutional solutions. Far from a homogenous category, representative government can be best described as a complex and pluralistic family whose democratic wing is not the exclusive property of those who argue for participation against representation and its representative wing is not the exclusive property of those who identify it with the electoral selection of an elite against participation. To better capture this complexity, the meaning of representation has to be revisited.

#### CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 4

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| What are the | four features of de | emocratic represent | tation? |  |
|--------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------|--|
|              |                     |                     |         |  |
|              |                     |                     |         |  |

| 3. | Representation is the locus of the dynamics that keep the political process in |
|----|--|
|    | motion. Explain,   |
|    |  |
|    |  |
|    |  |
|    |  |

#### 2.2.12 LET US SUM UP

Political representation testifies to the fact that although democracy can be explained in terms of rules of the game, citizens' participation is not a neutral game but a concrete way of promoting views and identifying with those who support or make convincing claims to support them. This is why representation is "problematic" when it is analyzed in relation to democracy. It is problematic because it can never be corroborated by and rendered in terms of the representative actually knowing about what people want and because peoples' expectations and their representatives' achievements will never correspond exactly. While it defies cognitivism, political representation is contingent upon much more than simply electoral procedures. It requires robust local autonomy and freedom of speech and association as well as some basic equality of material conditions. It also demands an ethical culture of citizenship that enables both the represented and the representatives to see partisan relationships as not irreducibly antagonistic and their advocacy not as an unconditional promotion of sectarian interests against the welfare of the whole.

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M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics UNIT - II : POLITICAL PROCESSES, POLITICAL PARTIES & POLITICAL CHANGE

# 2.3 PARTY SYSTEM: A COMPARATIVE **PERSPECTIVE**

- Dr. Harjit Singh

## **STRUCTURE**

- 2.3.0 Objectives
- 2.3.1 Introduction
- 2.3.2 Party System
  - 2.3.2.1 Meaning of Political Party
- 2.3.3 Functions of Political Party
- 2.3.4 Kinds of Party System
  - 2.3.4.1 One Party System
  - 2.3.4.2 Bi-Party System
  - 2.3.4.2 Multi-Party System
- 2.3.5 Critical Appreciation
- 2.3.6 Let us Sum up

## 2.3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to:

- know meaning political party;
- comprehend functions of party system:

- understand various kinds of party system;
- analyse advantage and disadvantages of party system.

## 2.3.1 INTRODUCTION

Modern democracy has procreated the system of political parties and organized interest (pressure) groups as an indispensable factor in its operation. The reason behind it is that the representative system lays stress on the maximization of political participation by enjoining upon the members of the political elites to take the people, in confidence, either for the sake of demonstrating their faith in the myth that 'the voice of the people is the voice of God', or to justify the very legitimacy of their leadership and authority. It also indicates the fact of political modernization by desiring the involvement of more and more people in the political process of the country with a critical and secular outlook. Hence, in this analysis an attempt has been made to discuss the themes of political parties, organized interest groups and elites which play an important part in the formulation of public policies and whose role determines the working of a democratic system.

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## 2.3.2. PARTY SYSTEM

The political party system is an essential element in the working of any democratic system. The political system's democratic success depends upon the existence of organized political parties.

#### 2.3.2.1 MEANING OF POLITICAL PARTY

According to Michael Curtis, it is difficult to define accurately a political party. The reason is that the views of the liberal and Marxist writers differ sharply on this point. Not only this, even the views of the English liberals differ from their American counterparts. The most celebrated view among the English leaders and writers is that of Burke, who holds that a political party is a body of men united for promoting the national interest on some particular principles in which they are all agreed. Reiterating the same view, Disraeli defined political party as a group of men banded together to pursue certain principles. So, according to Benjamin Constant, a party is a group of men professing the same political doctrine. The key point is that all these definitions relates to the issue of 'principles' of public importance on which the members of a party are agreed. But the American view is different in the sense that here a political party is taken as an instrument of catching power. A party is just a platform or machinery for taking part in the struggle for power; it is a device for catching votes; it is an agency to mobilize people's support at the time of elections; it is an instrument for the aggregation of interests that demand their vociferous articulation. As Sigmund Neumann pointed out, generally political party defined as the articulate organization of society's active political agents, those who are concerned with the control of governmental powers and who compete for popular support with another group or group holding divergent views. As such, it is the great intermediary which links social forces and ideologies to official governmental institutions and relates them to political action within the larger political community.

Such a view of political party makes it hardly distinguishable from a pressure or an interest group. A specific interest may constitute the foundation of a political party. Thus, difference between or among political parties may be sought on the basis of specific interests. Schuman observe that political parties have become essentially political institutions to implement the objectives of interest group. A similar meaning be discovered in the interpretation of Crotty who says that a political party is a formally organized group that performs the functions of educating the public, that recruits and promotes individuals for public office, and that provides a comprehensive linkage functions between the public and governmental decision-

makers. But basically different from the English and American views is the Marxist view on the theme of political party as elaborated by Lenin. He takes a political party as a 'vanguard' of the social class whose task is to create class consciousness and then to prepare the proletariat for a bloody and violent revolution. Every party is a class organization. The 'bourgeois' parties of whatever name have their vested interest in the maintenance of the status quo, but the party of the workers (communist party) has its aim at the overthrow of the existing system and its substitution by a new system in which power would be in the hands of the working class and the society under the rule of this party would be given a classless character so as to eventuate into a stateless pattern of life in the final stage of social development. According to Lenin, The communist party is created by means of selection of the best, most class consciousness, most self-sacrificing and far sighted workers. The communist party is the lever of political organization, with the help of which the more progressive part of the working class directs on the right path the whole of proletariat and the semi-proletariat along the right road.

According to Johari, it is true that political parties grew as a faction in the early modern age, but now a distinction between the two is made. Faction is a bad term, because its members take part in disruptive and dangerous activities so as to paralyse the working of a government. Opposed to this, party is a respectable term. Its members take part in the struggle for power on the basis of some definite policies and programmes and they observe the sanctity of constitutional means. So it is said that while a party acts by counting heads, a faction acts by breaking heads. But parties are 'specialized associations' and they become more complex, organized and bureaucratic as a society approaches the modern type.

#### 2.3.3. FUNCTIONS OF POLITICAL PARTIES

The political parties perform important functions in modern political system that may be enumerated as under:

 The parties unite, simplify and stabilize the political process. They bring together sectional interests, overcome geographical disturbances, and provide coherence to sometimes divisive government structures. For instance, the American Democratic Party provides a bridge to bring together the southern conservatives and northern liberals; the German Democratic Party bridges the gulf between the Protestants and the Catholics in Germany. In federal systems all political parties emphasise the uniting of different governmental structures, the extreme case being of South Africa.

- Political parties struggle for capturing power and they strive to form order out of
  chaos. They seek to widen the interests they represent and harmonies these interests
  with each other. Though interest articulation is performed by pressure groups, the
  work of interest aggregation is done by the parties. For example, the Conservative
  Party of Britain, in spite of the nature of its internal organization and distribution of
  power, depends upon the support of diverse economic, social and geographical
  sections in English politics. All parties strive to extend the area of their support.
- Political parties provide a link between the government and the people. They seek to educate, instruct and activate the electorate. That is, they perform the job of political mobilization, secularization and recruitment. Hening and Pindar states that in a liberal democratic system the parties use means of mass media to give political education to the people. The parties may organize and control some unions or organizations for 'occupational and social implantation'. In a totalitarian system the party in power works for the mobilization of support by activating the population by means of rallies, uniforms, flags and other displays of unity to emphasise the identification of the individual with the political party.
- While increasing the scope of political activity and widening the base of popular participation, political parties perform the important function of recruiting political leaders. Men in authority are recruited through some channel. In political systems having weak and ill-organised political parties, power remains in the hands of the elites that are recruited from the traditional groups like hereditary ruling families of military organizations. In totalitarian countries where only one party is in power, political recruitment is made from the ranks of the same party. It is only in countries having a liberal-democratic order that competitive party system prevails and political recruitment is made from different political parties.

- Political parties present issues; they set value goals for the society. All parties have philosophical bases, no matter blurred and no matter how divorced from the actual political behaviour of the party they are. Though American political parties have 'ideological similarity and issue conflict', they have no disagreement on the fundamental goals of the society (R.A. Dahl). The two parties of Ireland (Fianna Fail and Fine Gael) are prototypes of two parties of the United States in respect of their 'ideological similarity and issue conflict' nature.
- Political parties serve as the broker of ideas by selecting a number of issues and focusing attention on them. In a democratic system revolutionary parties (or those hostile to the established order as such) act not as conciliatory elements in aggregating the largest number of common interest but as focal points of discontent and organized opposition. The compromise needed in democratic political behaviour is never acceptable to them. These parties may adhere to the political left, as the communist parties do, or to the right as done by the fascist party in Italy and Nazi party in Germany (in the period before second World War), or the Poujadists in France, or to revolutionary nationalism as with Aprista in Peru, or the Revolutionary Nationalist Movement as in Bolivia. In a non-democratic system, revolutionary parties may not simply be the mechanism through which the political system operates, they may be the real core of the system itself with power being exercised by party leaders rather than by the government officials.
- In newer and developing nations of the world where political habits and traditions are yet to grow up, political parties perform the job of political modernization. That is, they strive to give a particular shape to the government, provide the main link between different social and economic groups, constitute the chief agency for political education and socialization, break down traditional barriers and act as the binding force in communities divided by groups based on tribal affiliations, religious denomination or sectarian origin. The role of the Congress Party in India may be said to be the best example of this kind where the great leaders played a significant role in framing the constitution and then running the administration of the country on the lines of parliamentary democracy so as to have secularization of the pohty.

• Political parties also perform social welfare functions that may be termed their 'non-political' activities. The parties work for the alleviation of the sufferings of the people during the days of famine, drought, epidemics, wars etc. They also work for the eradication of social evils like illiteracy, untouchability, ignorance, poverty etc. In Australia citizens may lead their life from cradle to grave within the frame of organizations linked to a party which include not only trade union and welfare groups but also stamp collecting societies, pigeon clubs, and weightlifting associations.

To conclude, we can say that main function of political parties is to offer politics and programmes and translate them into action after being in power.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

NOTE: Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| How do you differentiate a political party from interest group?  Briefly state the important functions of political parties. | Write   | briefly the meaning of political party.                     |
|--|---------|---|
| How do you differentiate a political party from interest group?  Briefly state the important functions of political parties. |         |   |
| Briefly state the important functions of political parties.  | How o   | lo you differentiate a political party from interest group? |
| Briefly state the important functions of political parties.  |         |   |
|  | Briefly | y state the important functions of political parties.       |

# 2.3.4. KINDS OF PARTY SYSTEM

The most simplified way of classifying different party systems is to put them into three broad categories—one-party system, bi-party system, and multiparty system, though a student of empirical political theory may discover some more forms within the three broad forms on the basis of a neater division of the party systems. We may briefly discuss them as under:

#### 2.3.4.1. ONE PARTY SYSTEM

With the emergence of a communist state in Russia in 1917 under the leadership of Lenin, one-party system came into being. The Bolsheviks became the Communist Party that established a new kind of political order called 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. The Stalin Constitution of 1936 frankly prohibited formation of any other political party. It had its own form in Italy when Mussolini gradually finished all other parties by 1925 and then established the dictatorship of his Fascist Party. So it happened in Germany under Hitler after 1934. He finished all other parties and claimed that the political parties have now been fully abolished. The National Socialist Party (NAZI) has now become the state. The model of one-partyism covered other countries of the world as well. Spain, Portugal, Mexico and a large number of Central and East European states (like Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania etc.) had the same experiment. After the second World War, it had its expression in China under the leadership of Mao. We may also consider the fact that military dictators followed the same pattern as Egypt under Arab Socialist Union of Col. Nasser, Burma under Socialist Party of Gen. Ne Win, Indonesia under Golkar Party of Gen. Suharto and Iraq under Baath Party of Saddam Hussain. Some arguments given in favour of oneparty system are stated below.

- It is urged that the single party is the reflection of national unity. Democratic pluralism sacrifices the general interest of the nation for private and sectional interests in the cracked mirror of parties with the result that the country no longer recognizes its own image. The single party preserves the unity of the nation and looks at all problems from the national point of view.
- This model is said to reflect the social unity of the people. As contended by the Marxists, each party is an expression of the social class. Since a communist society has a singular character, it is a 'state of the toilers, it must have only one political party. Different political parties may exist only in a bourgeois country where different social classes exist.

• A single-party state is a 'bearer of ideals', an incarnation of faith', 'a moral or an ethical system', 'a new religion'. As such, a single party can alone function in its defence. The development of the single party coincides with the rebirth of the state religions in the new forms they have assumed in the contemporary world; we have a religious state rather than a State religion.

But all such arguments are unconvincing in view of the fact that this one-party model is antithetical to the working of a democratic system. It is another name of a totalitarian system whether of the right (fascism) or of the left (communism). The one-party state is founded on the assumption that the sovereign will of the state reposes in the leader and his political elite. This authoritarian principle found expression first in monarchies and more recently in dictatorships. Needing a monopoly of power to survive, the dictatorship abolishes all opposition parties. In order to stifle recurring resistance, it is driven to adopt techniques of physical coercion through extensive and vigorous propaganda campaigns.

#### 2.3.4.2. BI-PARTY SYSTEM

Now we may take up the case of bi-party system. Here power alternates between two major parties. There may be some more parties in the country, but they are of no consequence in the struggle for power. Britain is its leading example where power alternates between the Conservative and the Labour parties. The Liberal and the Communist parties are there, but they have hardly any place of significance. Some regional parties are also there as Irish Nationalists, but their position is almost negligible. So in the United States, the Democratic and the Republican parties dominate the scene. Though Britain and the United States are the two leading cases in this direction, one important point may be stressed here that while the two parties of Britain may be distinguished on the basis of the policies and programmes, the lines of distinction between the two American parties are not clear in view of the fact that they have 'ideological similarity and issue conflict.' This model has its own merits and demerits. Its merits are:

• It ensures successful working of the parliamentary form of government. The party getting absolute majority forms the government, the other party forms the opposition. In this way, the government and the opposition form the fore and

back legs of a democratic stag. The ministers feel secure in their position; they know that they may not be voted out by the opposition party so long as they are united and their ranks have the mark of solidarity.

- The stability of government has its natural effect on the efficiency of administration. The government is in a position to maintain and effectively pursue its policies and programmes.
- This system keeps a good option before the people. In general election, they give their verdict in favour of one party. But when they feel dissatisfied with the working of the party, they may put another party in power. The opposition party always ensures the formation of an alternative government.
- Each major party plays a positive and constructive role so as to win the sympathy of the electorate. It behaves in a very responsible way so that the other party may not cash political capital out of its objectionable act of commission and omission.

In short, the bi-partyism is the only method by which the people can at the electoral period directly choose its government. It enables the government to drive its policy to the statute book. It makes known and intelligible the result of its failure. It brings an alternative government into immediate being. Its demerits can be taken as:

- It puts limits on the choice of the electorate. The voters are bound to choose only one of the two alternatives before them. It may be that they dislike both and yet they have to give their verdict in favour of either. In this way, it puts definite limits on the expression of public opinion.
- It is said that the division of the nation into only two political parties "must obviously be more or less unreal or arbitrary, since it would be absurd to suggest that there could ever be only two schools of thought in a nation.
- It strengthens the position of the government (cabinet) to the extent that the position of the legislature (parliament) is undermined. The ministers enjoy a safe tenure and they do not bother much for the criticism of the opposition leaders. The party in power is backed by a comfortable majority with the result that the authority of the legislature is declined. It leads to the emergence of 'cabinet dictatorship.

• It substitutes blind devotion for intelligent appreciation and choice in both the leaders and the led. The leaders of the two major parties get undue importance and the followers lose their individuality (Ramsay Mivr). In spite of this, it may be said that while single-party system is dictatorial, bi-party system is democratic.

#### 2.3.4.3. MULTI-PARTY SYSTEM

Finally, we take up the case of multi-party system. It signifies the existence of many political parties, big and small, in the country. The alternation of power takes place between parties more than two; it is also possible that coalition governments are formed which work successfully. France, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, South Africa and India are the leading instances here. The panorama of party system is so fluid that a good number of pressure groups behave like political parties. The cases of fragmentation and polarization of political parties may also be taken note of. It is also possible that some minor political organizations emerge at the time of elections and then they disappear. But the most essential fact remains that three, four, or even more parties manage to share power. Its merits are:

- It gives ample choice to the voters. They may examine and cross-examine the policies and programmes of different parties and then give their verdict in favour of one, or of few they like best. It widens the choice of the electorate and provides avenues of their satisfaction.
- It gives adequate representation to numerous interests of the people. Political parties may widen their base by means of having alliances with organized interest groups. Such a system has the merit of elasticity and mobility.
- It also protects the individuality of a self-respecting person. In case he is not satisfied with the working of one party, he may leave it and join some, opt for anyone of them without any fear of being condemned by this or that party in particular.
- It acts as a powerful check on the trend of despotism. The leaders of a party cannot act arbitrarily in dealing with the rank and file. The ministers also have

to act in a responsible way. In a coalition government dictatorial position of any party is impossible.

It has its demerits too. These are:

- The large number of political parties creates a lot of confusion. It is possible that no party is in a position to have stable majority. As a result, the government would not enjoy stability. Coalitions may be formed and deformed from time to time with the result that the tenure of a government is as short as that of a month as in the case of French cabinets under the Fourth Republic (1946-58).
- It encourages small groups to enter into the arena of struggle for power. The result is that the legislature is converted into a theatre of conflicting factions. Local and sectional interests dominate the scene. Considerations of general interest are ignored.
- The fact of the instability of government and the role of powerful interest groups mar administrative efficiency and seriously affect smooth working of the mechanism of political organization.
- The mushroom growth of political parties coupled with the fact of their frequent fragmentation and polarization obstruct the creation of a healthy public opinion and a healthy opposition capable of offering sound prospects of an alternative government in the country.

It is said that the model of one-partyism is undemocratic. But the models of bipartyism and multi-partyism are quite democratic. And if it is further asked as to which of the two is better? Now it may be said the both models are equally good and it depends upon the local conditions of a country as to which model she should adopt. The main requirement is that the system should be successful in its operation. Britain and America are well satisfied with the stability of their bi-party system. Other countries like Switzerland and Germany are also satisfied with the stable character of their multi-party system.

# 2.3.5. CRITICAL APPRECIATION

Now we may look into the issue of merits and demerits of the party system. The merits of the party system may be enumerated as under:

- It is argued that political parties are in accord with human nature. The people of a country have different nature and temperament due to which they have different social, economic and political ideas. It is on account of this fact that groups and factions of the people have always been in existence, though it is a different matter that they have assumed some new names in modern times.
- Political parties have an importance of their own in modern times of democracy.
   A party acts as the vehicle of ideas and opinions of the people and a powerful instrument for holding elections. Without political parties the electorate would be highly diffused and atomized and opinions too variant and dispersive. Hence, the true reason for the existence of the party is bringing public opinion to a focus and framing issues for the political verdict (A.L. Lowell).
- Parties unite the people of a country by means of political mobilization and recruitment. They not only place issues and matters before them, they give national character to local and regional issues. The leaders move from one part of the country to another; they have a set of followers hailing from different parts and regions of the country. They meet, they discuss, and then they decide matters in a way so that a semblance of public interest may be accorded to them. The result is that the working of the parties enables the people to distinguish between regional and national matters and accordingly shape their ideas and attitudes. The parties gather up the whole nation into fellowships, and they lead in the sense of bringing to the individual citizen a vision of the whole nation, otherwise distant in history, territory and futurity (Finer).
- Parties act as a check against the tendency of absolutism what is also known by the nicknames of 'Caesarism' and 'Bonapartism'. When one party forms government or few parties form a coalition to hold power, other parties play the role of opposition. It not only keeps the government vigilant, it also prevents it from being arbitrary and irresponsible. The leaders of the opposition expose acts of corruption, scandals and maladministration in which great men in power are involved. Lowell, therefore, endorses that the parties enable the people to hold the government in check. The constant presence of a recognized opposition is an obstacle to despotism.

- The parliamentary form of government cannot operate without the role of political parties. The party getting majority in the elections forms the government and other parties form the opposition. The Prime Minister is the leader of the majority party and the ministers are his party men. If the ruling party resigns, the opposition parties may be given the chance to form the alternative government. One may easily grasp the point that type of government cannot separate if there is no party system in the country.
- It is also said that political parties impart political education to the people. The leaders of the parties deliver public speeches, they lead processions and stage demonstrations, release pamphlets and books, publish newspapers and periodicals and do many other things to have the participation of the people in the domain of politics as far as possible. By organized campaigns and movements of the political parties the people are awakened; they understand the value of their political rights; they get lessons of political socialization; they come forward with their demands, which the government has to meet within the framework of the fundamental rules of the state.
- Parties save a country from political turmoil created by crafty leaders. They appraise issues and counter-issues and then apprise the people of their respective merits and demerits. They may also warn and forewarn the people of certain counts. In other words, great leaders may put a check on the irresponsible behaviour of the younger or distracted leaders whose doings may lead to unwarranted situations of public resentment. Only strong parties may give a constructive direction to the enthusiasm of the people.

#### But the party system has its demerits too:

• The rise and development of party system is like an unnatural political phenomenon. Different parties demonstrate an artificial agreement among people who profess to have identical views. The disagreement with their opponents is, in the same fashion, based on artificial grounds. Thus, reason is dominated by passions and emotions and the people agree to disagree in most of the controversial situations just for the sake of sticking to their pretentious convictions. As a result of this, groupism and factionalism develop that create conditions of ill-will and

confrontation. We may also take note of the fact that party system divides a community into irreconcilable camps which seek to degrade each other. It tends to make the political life of the country machine-like or artificial. The party in opposition, or, as it is sometimes called, the outs is always antagonistic to the party in power or the ins (R.N. Gilchrist).

- Political parties, in most of the cases, fight for their own interests. The members look at every important point from the viewpoint of their party interest. As a result, in many situations, the general interest is sacrificed at the altar of sectional interests. It narrows the vision of the members, because they are more concerned with the gains of their party and not with the gains of the community as a whole. Scramble for the 'spoils' goes on so that all benefits may be grabbed by the men of the party and more than that, by the group of the party in power.
- Party system destroys the individuality of man. Whatever is decided by the party bosses must be obeyed and followed by others. The dissenters are not taken happily; they are taken to task for saying or doing anything against the rules or traditions of the party. There is hardly any scope for most of the members to exercise their initiative in important policy matters. It is a small coterie that rules the roots, the rank and file are like hand-raisers of carpet unrollers. In case some man of initiative or enterprise displays his intrinsic mettle, it is likely that he may face the situation of a 'purge' or some other punitive action.
- Parties become an instrument in the hands of vested interests. Big social and economic organizations hire politicians for their selfish purposes. They finance political parties and provide them necessary resources for contesting elections. When such party leaders get high political offices, they do for the interest of their solicitors. Powerful pressure groups establish their links with party leaders and thereby manage to set up their lobbies in the important areas of public administrations. In such a situation, the real policy-makers and the real administrators of a country are not the so-called 'representatives' of the people, they are the 'agents' or powerful interests having influential positions in the ranks of political parties.

• Party system creates unnecessary politicisation from the level of national government to that of municipal and rural administration. Thus, the men of merit and integrity are replaced by the men of politics at all levels. The trends of hollowness and insincerity grow more and more; favouritism and nepotism also develop side by side, It all causes degradation of political life by sectional interests.

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is

# **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

| Write briefly the meaning of political party.                   |    |
|---|----|
|   |    |
| What are the advantages associated with single party sysem?     |    |
|   |    |
|   |    |
| What are the demerits you can find with two-party system?       |    |
|   |    |
| Critically analyse advantages and disadvantages of Party system | n? |
|   |    |

#### 2.3.6 LET US SUM UP

In spite of its weaknesses, the existence of political parties is essential. Therefore, the way out should be the reform of the system so that it may work as satisfactorily as possible. The successful working of party system in some leading democratic countries of the world should be referred to at this stage.

The number of political parties should not be unduly large. It is good that a country has four or five big political parties and the alternation of power takes place among them smoothly. A statutory check should be imposed on the proliferation of political parties. When a new party is created, it should be put on a period of probation and it should be recognized only after it has proved its bona fides. For this purpose, there should be very specific as well as stringent rules and regulations. The policies and programmes of every political party should be scrutinized. Recognition should be given to a party if it has a distinct policy of its own. If some parties have similar programmes, they should be merged. Importance should be given to the principles and not to the whims and caprices of the personalities. It is also necessary that only those parties should be allowed to function, which have faith in democratic and constitutional means. No leniency should be shown to a party that expresses its resolve to break the constitution or to subvert the democratic system by violent and insurrectionary methods. The funds of parties should be audited from time to time so that it may be given for public information as to wherefrom they could get the funds and on what items the money was spent. Lavish funding to political parties by private agencies should be banned. Any party having a militant outlook and military or para-military cadres in any form of its own should be banned. Communal and communitarian organizations may be allowed to play the role of political parties, but they should be outlawed if their orientations become anti-secular, anti-democratic and anti-national. Attempts should be made to do away with the trends of 'party bossism'. Those who seek to control party machine for their own ends, should be hounded out the organization. As far as possible, the members should have an atmosphere of intra-party democracy. The organization of the party should be done on democratic lines. All office-bearers should be elected by the members concerned for a specific time. They should be accountable for their acts of commission and omission to those who have elected them. Above all, the people of a country should be vigilant. They should know that the leaders of outstanding and unimpeachable integrity are the life-breath of a party.

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M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics
UNIT - II: POLITICAL PROCESSES, POLITICAL PARTIES &
POLITICAL CHANGE

# 2.4 REVOLUTION: CONCEPT, TYPES AND THEORIES

- Dr. Harjit Singh

# **STRUCTURE**

- 2.4.0 Objectives
- 2.4.1 Introduction
- 2.4.2 Revolution: Meaning and Definition
- 2.4.3 Features or Characteristics of Revolution
- 2.4.4 Categories of Revolution
- 2.4.5 Theories of Revolution
  - 2.4.5.1 Liberal Theory of Revolution
  - 2.4.5.2 Marxian Theory of Revolution
  - 2.4.5.3 Neo-Liberal Theory of Revolution
  - 2.4.5.4 Idealist-Liberal Theory of Revolution
- 2.4.6 Let us Sum up

# 2.4.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to:

• know meaning of revolution;

- understand features or characteristics of revolutions:
- know the various categories of revolutions;
- comprehend the theories related to revolution.

# 2.4.1 INTRODUCTION

Ever since the times of Plato and Aristotle the issue of revolution has been a focus of attention in all studies of politics. Plato and Aristotle regarded revolution as a violent unnatural overthrow of the existing order and tried to suggest the methods for preventing revolutions. As against this Machiavelli wanted revolution for securing unity and republicanism in Italy and Locke described the right to revolt as a natural right of the people which could be and should be used to overthrow the rulers or any one of all organs of the government in case these failed to keep up their part of the social contract which involved the obligation to protect the natural rights of the people. Hobbes despised revolution and held that revolution would lead the people into a state of anarchy and perpetual war which characterized the state of nature. Hegel, while accepting as the natural culmination of the evolutionary process after it has reached its node, into a big leap—the dialectical leap, rejected all talks of revolution against the state as blasphemy. Against Hegel, Marx held that revolution is the culmination of a historical process that was not only inevitable but also highly desirable for keeping up the march towards its final goal. He openly advocated the need to give a push to history (by revolution) and even talked of a permanent revolution. These ideas were fully supported by Lenin, who stated that revolution was a natural necessity and it involved, of necessity, the use of force, violence and bloodshed. Laski accepted the need for a socio-economic revolution designed to secure a society characterized by freedom and equality, an egalitarian society. The revolutionaries always talk of the need to prevent a counter-revolution and the radical reformists always keep on praising the ideal of a revolutionary change in all aspects of social relations.

#### 2.4.2. REVOLUTION: MEANING AND DEFINITION

In general way we can say that revolution involves an overthrow of the existing social order and the power structure. It seeks to destroy, change and replace the

existing class structure and establish new political institutions. It involves the use of force, violence, suppression, domination and popular upsurge which is often led by a revolutionary elite or group or leader. Further, sometimes a revolution is loosely conceptualized in terms of the process of overthrow of a status quo, introduction of profound changes in the political system by both peaceful and violent means. This view of revolution seeks to admit even a peaceful, widespread, rapid and profound change in the system in the category of a revolution. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 in Great Britain was accomplished without shedding a drop of blood and yet was a revolution in the British political system. The French Revolution of 1789 was a violent and popular revolution by the people of France for overthrowing the despotic regime and for securing their rights to liberty, equality and fraternity. The scientific, important and major inventions of the nineteenth century took the name of Industrial Revolution. The twentieth century stands characterized as the age of revolutions—Social Revolution, National Revolution, Technological Revolution, Information Revolution, State Revolution, Behavioral Revolution, Green Revolution, Anti-communist Revolution etc.

As such we can say that a revolution is taken a mean a big, sudden, fundamental, major and profound change or transformation of social, political, economic and cultural life of the people by peaceful means or by both peaceful and violent means. French scholar Mounier defines Revolution as a combination of rather far-reaching changes intended virtually to erase the real illness of society that has reached an impasse, rapid enough to prevent those terminal illnesses from spreading their poisonous decay throughout the national body, yet slow enough to allow for the growth of whatever requires time to mature. The result is what counts not how romantic or how restrained the language is. It is enough to know that operation is a major and vital one bound to meet violent resistance which in turn provokes counterviolence. Mounier views revolution as a major, profound and big change designed to eliminate the real illness from society. He prefers to measure the success of a revolution in terms of the results produced and does not accept that a revolution involves, of necessity, a violent change. Carl J. Friedrick holds that a Revolution constitutes a challenge to the established political order and the eventual establishment of a new order radically different from the preceding one.

#### 2.4.3. FEATURES OR CHARACTERISTICS OF A REVOLUTION

On the basis of the above discussion on revolution we can describe the following as the characteristics of revolution:

- A revolution involves a profound and big change in the social-economic-political life of the people.
- A revolution in the strict sense of the terms involves a profound change in the society through the use of force and violent means.
- A revolution is not confined only to the political life of the society. It has wider and far reaching ramifications. It brings in profound changes in all major aspects of social life.
- A profound and big change produced through peaceful and constitutional means is also, loosely, defined as a revolution. A better name for such a change, however, happens to be 'revolutionary change.'
- A revolution is different from revolt or rebellion in so far as the former involves a more profound and a bigger change while the latter involves a change in only the established political order.
- A revolution can be made to check or counter another revolution which had taken place earlier. In such a case it is known as a counter-revolution.
- The concept of revolution involves the idea of popular uprising against the prevailing socio-economic-politico system.
- A revolution always reflects a lack of popular faith in the credibility and legitimacy of the prevailing system.
- A revolution involves the replacement of an old order with a new one.
- A revolution can begin as a revolt or a protest and can subsequently develop into an overthrow of the prevailing politico-economic-social order.
- A revolution always involves the overthrow of status quo by the people, or most of the people of the society.

- A revolution is different from a revolt in intensity and scope. It is also different
  from a revolutionary change in any one aspect of the life of the society. It involves
  a profound, big and comprehensive change in the prevailing socio-economicpolitico order.
- Mostly a revolution has for its basis an ideology or at least a perception of the new order which is to replace the existing order.
- A big and real change in the political system by peaceful and constitutional means is a revolutionary political change. If it is of the nature of downfall, it is called political decay. If it is an upward change, it is called political development. It cannot be really defined as a revolution.

In short we can say that by a revolution we mean a profound, big, far reaching and real change in the prevailing socio-economic-political system through violent means. It always involves an overthrow of the status quo and is mostly based on an ideology or a set of ideological principles. Its intensity and scope is much bigger than a simple revolt or rebellion or *coup d'etat* which simply involves a change of rulers by the use of force.

# 2.4.4. CATEGORIZATION OF REVOLUTION

Tocqueville has employed a more empirical approach to the problem of revolution, and has defined it as an overthrow of the legally constituted elite, which initiated a period of intense social, political, and economic change. Crane Brinton has continued this empirical thrust by differentiating between the coup d6tat, as a simple replacement of one elite by another, and major revolutions such as the French or Russian, which were accompanied by social, political, and economic changes. Similarly, with respect to Latin America, George Blanksten suggests that we should distinguish between the coup d6tat and revolutions such as the Mexican experience, which eventually had profound consequences for the structure of that society.

The distinction between two forms of revolution may provide a basis for the development of further classifications. For example, Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan present a further refinement in the classification of revolution by the introduction of a three-category typology in which they differentiate between palace revolutions, political revolutions, and social revolutions. Edwin Lieuwen constructs a

similar classification, but instead of the palace revolution he discusses 'caudillismo' (predatory militarism), which is a common form of the coup d'etat in Latin America. These three forms of revolution appear to reflect an increasing degree of change initiated by the successful insurgents, and may be placed on a rank order of increasing political or social change. James Rosenau, in fact, constructs such a classification of revolution.

Samuel Huntington has suggested a classification of revolution in which four categories are enumerated: the internal war, the revolutionary coup, the reform coup, and the palace revolution. Huntington's use of the concept 'internal war' differs from the meaning attributed to that concept in earlier systematic studies. For that reason the term mass revolution will be substituted for internal war as used by Huntington. The terms mass revolution and palace revolution correspond respectively to Rosenau's structural and personnel wars, while the revolutionary and reform coups both may be placed under the heading of the authority wars. Kemal Ataturk's revolution in Turkey, for example, illustrates what Huntington might call a revolutionary coup, whereas the 1955 coup in Argentina might be classified as a reform coup. The major difference between the two forms is in the degree of change initiated in the structure of the political authority. The 'Young Turks' implemented a complete revision of the political authority which led to a truncation of the Ottoman Empire and the establishment of a republic. The revolt against Peron, on the other hand, was an attempt at reform, in that Peron's mismanagement of the economy and the dissatisfaction of major political forces, such as the Roman Catholic Church, led to a revolt against what had become an oppressive political executive.

#### Categorization/Types of Revolution

| Type of<br>Revolution | Mass<br>Participation | Duration                      | Domestic<br>Violence | Intentions of the Insurgents  |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|---|
| Mass<br>Revolution    | High                  | Long                          | High                 | Fundamental Changes in the structure of political authority and the social system                         |
| Revolutionary<br>Coup | Low                   | Short to<br>moderate          | Low to moderate      | Fundamental changes in the structure of political authority and possibly some change in the social system |
| Reform coup           | Very low              | Short, some<br>times moderate | Low                  | Moderate changes in the structure of political authority  |
| Palace<br>revolution  | None                  | Very short                    | Virtually none       | Virtually no change   |

The existence of several types of revolution suggests that we might be able to isolate different categories of revolution. Karl Deutsch proposes that the degree of mass participation in a revolution, as well as its duration, may be essential to an adequate description of the revolutionary experience. A third characteristic may be the number killed as a result of the revolution. Given a high degree of commitment by the revolutionaries and the incumbents, the number of persons killed both during and after the revolution may be a measure of intensity. This measure will be discussed more fully at a later point. Finally, the intentions of the insurgents may be critical to the form of the revolution as well as to its eventual outcome. If the successful insurgents are ideologically committed to certain goals, then they may initiate changes in the societal structure to effect the realization of these goals. If, on the other hand, the revolutionaries have no particular ideological orientation, then they might intend to replace the incumbents in the structure of political authority without recourse to changes in the societal structure.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| How do you diffe | rentiate between Mass | Revolution and Rev | olutionary |
|------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|------------|
| How do you diffe | rentiate between Mass | Revolution and Rev | olutionai  |

#### 2.4.5. THEORIES OF REVOLUTION

With passage of time, several great political masters and political theorists have offered their conceptualizations of revolution. Their views are classified as theories of revolution. Mainly, we can refer to four main theories of revolution:

- 1. Liberal Theory of Revolution
- 2. Marxian Theory of Revolution
- 3. Neo-liberal theory of Revolution
- 4. Idealistic-liberal Theory of Revolution

#### 2.4.5.1 LIBERAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION

The Liberal Theory of Revolution can also be described as the traditional theory of the revolution and it encompasses the ideas of great political masters from Plato to Locke. Plato's conception of revolution involved replacement of the traditional Greek city-state with the republic—a state characterized by justice, state controlled and state maintained system of education, communism of wives and property for the guardians and the rule of the philosopher king. Aristotle presented a complete and objective theory of revolution. He described revolution as a forcible overthrow of the prevailing system, analysed its causes and suggested several remedies against it. He was opposed to revolution as means of change, secured by force. He accepted and advocated the cyclic theory of political changes but rejected revolution and suggested several means for preventing revolution. He categorically in observed that inequality everywhere is the cause of revolution. The Church fathers, St. Augustine and St. Acquinas advocated the Christian faith which held that orders that be are ordained by God. But a revolution against an unjust and tyrannical ruler was justified. Machiavelli, the first modern political thinker, supported revolution for the unification of Italy. Bodin suggested a distinction between progress and revolution and advocated the need for preventing revolutions by monitoring the movement of stars. John Milton justified revolution for securing freedom. He supported the idea of overthrowing the oppressive rulers who were guilty of depriving their people of liberty.

In the writings of British political thinker John Locke, the concept of revolution (the support for revolution) received a big boost. He justified and supported the right of the people to revolt against the rulers or the government or any one of its organs which failed to protect the natural rights to life, liberty and property, as well as for removing the rulers or the government of the state in case they failed to

undertake the liability to perform the assigned functions as per the terms of political contract. He epitomized the spirit and philosophy of the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and accepted the need and necessity of revolution against inefficient and arbitrary rulers. The French Revolutionaries justified the overthrow and elimination of despotic rulers for securing liberty, equality and fraternity of the people. The American Revolution against the despotic British rule was described as American War of Independence and eulogized as a necessary exercise for securing and preserving the liberty of the people. As such, the Liberal Theory of Revolution regards revolution as an overthrow of the prevailing system for securing the rights and freedom of the people. It is described as a means or as an instrument for protecting the rights of the people. Obviously it supports revolution only for securing rights and freedom of the people. Since it also supports the use of revolution as a means for rescuing or for preserving an order which is considered good for the rights and freedom of the people, it is described by some as a reactionary or conservative theory of revolution.

#### 2.4.5.2 MARXIAN THEORY OF REVOLUTION

Marxian Theory of Revolution conceptualizes revolution as the overthrow of the existing social, economic and political order by forcible means. It regards use of the forcible means as an essential feature of revolution because the attempt to overthrow the prevailing order is bound to be opposed by the ruling class. As such a revolution is always characterized by force and violence. It further, describes revolution as a culmination of a particular stage of social evolution, which has to go after it has reached its saturation point. It, by nature, involves a comprehensive and violent change in all spheres of social life. Not only this, Marxism believes that revolution is always a revolution of the working class, the 'have-nots', against the 'haves' and its basis lies in the evolution of the material means of production in society. A revolution is a socio-economic revolution which takes the form of a political revolution. A social revolution takes place when there is change in the existing relations of production. A major change in the means of production changes the production relations and makes a way for the revolution. Marxian theory of revolution regards revolution as the means for securing the rights of the 'have-nots' by ending the

exploitation being inflicted upon them by the 'haves'. However, this objective can be really and finally achieved by a proletarian revolution against the capitalists.

According to Marxists, the bourgeois or capitalist revolution involves the displacement of one minority class by that of another, feudal rule by bourgeois one; the use of state power to remodel political and legal structures to suit the interests of the new ruling class, or remains passive but acquiescent. Marx accepts the importance of each revolution because it constitutes a step towards the final goal—emergence of a classless and stateless society. The bourgeoisie revolution overthrows the feudal system and leads to the establishment of a bourgeoisie rule which in turn sets the stage for the proletarian revolution. Thus, Marxian Theory of Revolution regards revolution as the ideal, fruitful and essential means for the overthrow of the prevailing system and as a valuable and essential step towards the attainment of the final goal. Revolution, of necessity, as Lenin points out, involves the use of force, violence and bloodshed. The ruling bourgeoisie can be thrown out only by force. The revolution has to be planned, organized and successfully executed in practice. This theory supports the cause of a socialist revolution for the overthrow of the capitalistic system. In fact, it believes that capitalism contains the seeds of its own destruction and it is destined to pave the way for a socialist revolution, a proletarian revolution, which is destined to overthrow it. The capitalist system is its own grave digger as its evolution is accompanied by a concentration of wealth into fewer and fewer hands, increase in economic inequality, recurrent economic crises, ever worsening condition of the proletarian class, disunity among the capitalists due to cut throat competition, and unity among the proletariat due to the rise of a strong bond of class consciousness. The capitalist system, involving the bourgeoisie rule, evolves into a hollow system which is overthrown by the proletariat emerges and it liquidates the forces and group-reaction and prevents attempts at counter-revolution. When the revolutionary class, the bourgeoisie, gets completely liquidated the state also withers away. The society then becomes a classless and stateless society. The pre-history ends and the real history begins. Thus Marxian Theory of Revolution accepts and advocates a socialist revolution as the best and only means for securing the replacement of the existing bourgeois capitalist system with the socialist system. It regards revolution as a socio-economic-politicocultural revolution which is both natural and essential.

Marxian theory accepts the inevitability of socialist revolution in every bourgeoisie ruled state and advocates fully the need to secure socialist revolution in all such states. It calls upon the workers of the world to unite for securing socialism in the world. Marxian theory designates this as permanent revolution. It implies the idea of export of revolution (socialist revolution) to all states for securing international communism. This theory says that socialist revolution in one state would always remain involved in a permanent revolution for exporting socialism to other countries. Both Marx and Engels categorically observed, and Lenin accepted the logic while Trotsky desired it at all costs. It is in our interest and task to make the revolution permanent, until all more or less possessing classes have been forced out of their position of dominance, until the proletariat has conquered state power, and the association of the proletarians, not only in one country but it all dominant countries of the world, has advanced so far that competition among the proletarians of these countries has ceased and that at least the decisive productive forces concentrated in the hands of the proletariat. For us the issue cannot be alteration of private property but only its annihilation, not the smoothening over of class antagonism but the abolition of classes, not the improvement of existing society but laying down the foundations of a new one (Trotsky). The final purpose of revolution is to secure the attainment of the final goal of historical evolution—the classless and stateless society. In contemporary times, this theory of revolution stands almost refuted by the events that had taken place in the former Soviet Union and the former socialist states of Eastern Europe. Revolutionary changes have taken place in these countries through revolutionary as well as constitutional means. These 'revolutions' have replaced the socialist systems of these countries with liberal democratic capitalistic system. Democratization, Liberalization, Development, Competitive Economic System, Market Economy and opposition to one party rule have all been the key words of these revolutions. By Marxian standard these have to be described as counter-revolution and not revolution because to it revolution in reality means socialist revolution.

#### 2.4.5.3 Neo-Liberal Theory of Revolution

Neo-liberal theory of revolution stands adopted by several scholars who came under the influence of Marxism. This theory accepts the use of force for the capture of

power but at the same time rejects the Marxian idea of class war. It defines revolution as an attempt by the use of force against the government legally in power to compel a change in what are held to by those using such force, the actual purposes of the state (Laski). Explaining the meaning of revolution, C.B. Macpherson writes that by revolution means a political overturn more far-reaching than a coup d'etat or 'palace revolution'. Revolution means a transfer of state power by means of involving the use of threat of organized unauthorized forces and the subsequent consolidation of that transferred power, with a view to bringing about a fundamental change in social, economic and political institutions. The neo-liberal theory of revolution accepts, as Davis observes, that as violent civil disturbance that cause the displacement of one ruling group by another that has broader popular basis of support. But at the same time it rejects the Marxian logic that the basis of each revolution is class consciousness. The revolutions can be spontaneous or organized, but these are not necessarily governed by class consciousness. Several social, economic, political and cultural factors, and not class consciousness alone, are the causes of revolutions. Even oppressive regimes survive for a very long time and people continue to tolerate these. At times these get replaced or in the end these get replaced due to the weakness suffered by the ruling group or its leader, and through revolutions.

As such the neo-liberalists hold that a revolution takes place when people get alienated from the political process or their relations become estranged. When a political system fails to provide opportunities for a peaceful change of rulers, the people can go in for a revolution, as Friedrick opines that it is the result of a deep rooted and slowly evolving political and social malformations rather than the sudden outbreak that they appear to be at the surface.

In short, it can be said that the neo-liberal theory of revolution accepts Karl Marx's idea of revolution as the capturing of power through the use of force but at the same time rejects the Marxian view that revolution is the result of class antagonism and that in it one class (the Haves). A revolution is the result of several socio-economicpolitico-cultural factors and at times has an ideological basis. A revolution can be avoided by a process of continuous adaptation and integration, and gradual

transformation of the political system in accordance with the changes in the environment within which it operates.

# 2.4.5.4 IDEALIST-LIBERAL THEORY OF REVOLUTION

The idealist-liberal theory of revolution, particularly as expounded by Kant and Hegal, seeks to analyse revolution on the basis of ethical values and norms. It describes revolution as a spiritual and cultural upheaval through which a group of persons seeks to establish a new basis of existence. It describes revolution as a big historical leap or step towards a higher moral end. Hegel described it as a sudden dialectical leap registered in the process of evolution of the universal spirit from imperfection towards perfection. It occurs at the culmination level of a particular stage of evolution. Hegel praised and described French Revolution as an event of world's historical significance. He described it as an overthrow of the unnecessary feathers which had come to be developed by many political institutions and it constituted a welcome step in the liberation of the spirit. Earlier, Kant had observed that revolution was a factor of nature, not morally or legally allowable as such, but to be accepted as natural if directed towards a higher ethical goal of life. He analysed the nature and importance of the French and American revolutions on the basis of such a logic.

Hegel described revolution as a historical step in the dialectical evolution of the universal spirit. The contradictions between the thesis and anti-thesis develop into a saturated situation (node) when further evolution cannot take place without a transformation. At this stage the dialectical leap—a revolution, takes place and a synthesis, combining the best in the Thesis and Anti-thesis emerges. This synthesis then becomes the new thesis and contains a new anti-thesis. The process of evolution then begins again, and reaches its node again sets the stage for a dialectical leap. The process, as such, continues endlessly. In this way Hegel accepted the naturalness and inevitability of revolutions and he praised revolution as a step towards the higher stage. Further Hegel advocated what was real was the 'idea' and not the 'thing'. The thing was a manifestation of idea. The idea was subject to dialectical evolution and hence to revolution. The evolution of things

followed the evolution of ideas. Hegel and his follows advocated that history was the record of the evolution of the universal spirit (the real and the rational) from imperfection towards perfection and in this process revolution were of historical significances, developments or steps. A revolution implies the emergence of a higher stage of evolution and is a necessary and vital link in the ever-continuous process of dialectical evolution of reality.

The idealist liberal theory of revolution accepts revolution as a natural phenomenon and explains it as step towards the liberation of human beings and their march towards moral perfection. It stands based upon the concept of evolutionary nature of all reality and supports revolution as a culminating act of an existing stage of evolution as well as the beginning of a new and higher stage of evolution. The great Indian thinker M.N. Roy was also a protagonist of the idealistliberal theory of revolution. He defined justified revolution as the awakening of the urge of freedom in man. He justified revolution, provided it was for securing the freedom of man. Any revolution directed towards the suppression of human freedom was rejected by M.N. Roy. The idealistic-liberal theory of revolution, as such supports revolution as a means for securing the liberation of man as well as for his moral and spiritual perfection.

To sum up, the review of the four theories of revolution brings out the fact that a revolution stands conceptualized differently by different scholars. Each scholar is guided by his own values and even biases. No one can deny the fact that revolutions have characterized the life of the people living in several different societies. These have been the results of several different societies. These have been the results of several different factors. Several social, economic, political cultural and ideological factors have acted as the causes of various revolutions that humankind has witnessed and experienced. Their natures and results produced by them have also been different.

# **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

| Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.                                 |
|--|
| Write briefly about liberal theory of revolution?  |
| Marxist theory describes revolution as a culmination of a particular stage of social evolution How do you understand this? |
| Briefly explain the neo-liberal theory of revolution?  |
| The idealist-liberal theory of revolution seeks to analyse revolution on the basis of ethical values and norms .Explain.   |
|  |

# 2.4.6 LET US SUM UP

Revolution, in social and political science, is a major, sudden, and hence typically violent alteration in government and in related associations and structures. Historically, the concept of revolution was seen as a very destructive

force, from ancient Greece to the European Middle Ages. The ancient Greeks saw revolution as a possibility only after the decay of the fundamental moral and religious tenets of society. Plato believed that a constant, firmly entrenched code of beliefs could prevent revolution. Aristotle elaborated on this concept, concluding that if a culture's basic value system is tenuous, the society will be vulnerable to revolution. Any radical alteration in basic values or beliefs provides the ground for a revolutionary upheaval.

Only after the emergence of secular humanism during the Renaissance did this concept of revolution, as a cause of the desecration of society, change to embrace a more modern perspective. The 16th-century Italian writer Niccolò Machiavelli recognized the importance of creating a state that could endure the threat of revolution; but, at the same time, his detailed analysis of power led to a new belief in the necessity of changes in the structure of government on certain occasions. This new acceptance of change placed Machiavelli at the forefront of modern revolutionary thought, even though he never used the word revolution in his texts, and he was primarily concerned with the creation of a truly stable state.

Scholars of social sciences interpreted revolutions interpreted revolutions differently based on their ideological foundations and perspectives. Hence, each one of them has interpreted revolutions in their way. In this lesson, we have studies four major theories related to revolution: a) liberal theory, b) Marxist theory, c) neoliberal theory of revolution and d) idealist theory of revolution.

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# M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics UNIT-III: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEPENDENCY AND POLITICAL ELITE

# 3.1 THEORIES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

- Dr. Shikha Malhotra

# **STRUCTURE**

- 3.1.0 Objectives
- 3.1.1 Introduction
- 3.1.2 Emergence of the Concept of Political Development
- 3.1.3 Concept of Political Development
- 3.1.4 Pye's Concept of Political Development
  - 3.1.4.1 Equality
  - 3.1.4.2 Capacity
  - 3.1.4.3 Differentiation

# 3.1.5 Other Concepts of Political Development

- 3.1.5.1 Huntington's views on Political Development
- 3.1.5.2 Riggs Views on Political Development
- 3.1.5.3 James and Coleman's Views
- 3.1.5.4 Kenneth Organsui's Views
- 3.1.5.5 Walt W. Rostow' Views

# 3.1.6 Features of Political Development

- 3.1.6.1 Problem of State-Building
- 3.1.6.2 Problems of Nation-Building
- 3.1.6.3 Problem of Participation
- 3.1.6.4 Problem of Distribution
- 3.1.7 Factors that Influence Political Development
- 3.1.8 Crisis in the Political Development
- 3.1.9 Critical Appraisal
- 3.1.10 Suggested Readings

# 3.1.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you shall be able to understand:

- how the concept of political development emerged;
- the meaning and concept of political development;
- the features of political development;
- the factors that influence the political development;
- the basic criticism against this approach.

#### 3.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The concept of political development, which is having a very important place in the field of comparative politics, is the post-Second World War phenomena. The concern with development was prompted by the emergence of many new states in the Third World. The new states that emerged on international scene posed a challenge to Western political scientists on comparative politics to develop frameworks for understanding and predicting the politics of new nation-states. The atmosphere of the Cold War with competing superpowers of the US and the USSR provided the motivating force since these two superpowers also stood for completely different ideologies. Almond and others in *Politics of the Developing Areas* directed attention to backward areas that promised to develop, and he found it necessary to tie his ideas about the nature of the political system and about political culture to development. The volumes commissioned by the Socia Science Research Council's (SSRC's) Committee on Comparative Politics (1963) also place an emphasis upon comparative development theory.

The literature on development actually falls into at least five categories. The first, represented by Almond and others, attempts to utilize traditional notions of democracy and political democracy and to recast them into more sophisticated, sometimes abstract, terminology. A stage theory of development is depicted in A.F.K. Organski's *The Stages of Political Development*, a work modelled after that of the economist Walt Rostow. These conceptions of political development, however, rest heavily upon the Anglo-American experiences in politics. Studies in the second category focus on conceptions of nation-building. These studies attempt to combine old notions of nationalism with new interpretations of development. Modernization is the focus of a third category of studies on development. Examples of this type of literature include Marion J. Levy's *Modernization and the Structure of Societies*, an ambitious effort to apply structural-functionalism to a theory of modernization, and David Apter's *The Politics of Modernization*, a provocative attempt at model building. A fourth category comprises the studies of change, a prominent example being Samuel P. Huntington's *Political Order in Changing Societies*.

# 3.1.2 EMERGENCE OF THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

It was in 1951, when the normative and the theoretical aspects of the subject were first brought out for discussion in a conference. Howard Wriggins (a political scientist) presented a paper entitled "Foreign Assistance and Political Development" in which various types of functions performed by the government in a more developed politics, was spelt out. He made a suggestion of the extent to which any state was not able to fulfil these functions, it was underdeveloped. Philip Curtright made another early effort in 1963. He prepared a statistical index of levels of political development in terms of degrees of democratisation.

It was however, left to the committee on comparative politics to make the concept of political development a major focus of theoretical inquiry. In 1963, Almond

made a proposal to relate his framework of political system to the problem of political development. After writing an article "A Development Approach to Political Systems", Almond wrote a book in 1966 on comparative politics with development approach. The committee on comparative politics sponsored a series of conferences and institutes leading to the publication of a set of volumes exploring various aspects of political development. Between 1963 to 1966, the committee brought out six volumes from the Princeton University press on various aspects of political development contributed by the western political scientists like Lucian Pye, Rastow, Verba, Coleman, Myron Wiener David Apter, E. A. Shils, Leonard Binder, Eisenotadt, Riggs Huntington and others. The commending of these volumes brought out some valuable ideas, proved to be of great importance to subsequent efforts at theory building in this field.

# 3.1.3 CONCEPT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Some pioneering efforts in conceptualisation of the phenomenon of political development were made by Lucian Pye and later on by several authors, particularly Huntington challenged some of the parameters of the Pye model. Therefore, it becomes imperative to be acquainted which the Pye's conception of Political Development.

Lucian W. Pye is the leading light among the earlier batch of writers to analyse the concept of development in depth, and left an abiding impression on the entire literature of political development. Lucian Pye in his books *Aspects of Political Development, Political Culture and Political Development, Communication and Political Development* has evolved the key elements of political development. He has acknowledged the relevance of social, economic, administrative, political and cultural variables in political development. He has traced the signs of political development at three different levels—with respect to the population as a whole, with respect to the level of governmental and general systematic performance, and with respect to the organisation of polity.

In his book *Aspects of Political Development* Pye presents the case of political development in a quite elaborate form. Before trying to furnish his own interpretation of the term political development, he discusses diverse definitions and goes ahead often accepting same and rejecting same other parts of each definition.

# 3.1.3.1 . POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS THE POLITICAL PREREQUISITE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Economists like Paul A. Baran, Nariman S.Buchanam, Benjamin Higgins, Alberit O. and Barbara Ward have laid stress on the point that political development should be taken as a result of the economic development. They are of the view that politics and social conditions can play a quite decisive role in impeding or facilitating the economic growth.

Pye criticises this concept of political development on four grounds. Firstly, it has a negative character in the sense that it is easier to be precise about the ways in which performance of a political system may impede or prevent economic development then about how it can facilitate economic growth. Secondly, such a concept of political development does not focus on a common set of theoretical consideration. Thirdly it should also be taken into account that the prospects for rapid economic development have become exceeding dim in most of the poor countries. Finally in most of the under-developed countries, people are concerned with far more than just material advancement. They are anxious about political development quite independent of its effects on the rate of economic growth. Therefore, to link political development solely to economic events would be to ignore much that is of dramatic importance in the developing countries.

# 3.1.3.2 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT CONCERNS ONLY THE POLITICS OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

Some social theorists like W. W. Rostow hold that the process of political development is related only to countries of industrialisation. Pye rejects it also on the ground that it ignores the role of several other factors like forces that threaten the vested interests of significant segments of the society, some sense of limitation to the sovereignty of politics, an appreciation of the values of orderly administrative and legal procedures, an acknowledgement that politics is rightfully a mechanism for solving problems and not an end in itself, a stress on welfare programmes and finally an acceptance of some form of mass participation.

#### 3.1..3.3. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS POLITICAL MODERNISATION

A good number of social theorists like James S. Coleman, Karl Deutsch and S.M. Lipset hold that political development means a study of the developed western and modern countries and of their ways that the developing countries are trying to emulate. It means that the advanced western and modern countries are the pace-setters of political development. Pye disagrees with such a view, as it fails to distinguish between the western and the modern and that it ignores the fact that the backward or developing countries may have their own historical traditions that they may not like to give up for the sake of merely emulating everything that is western or modern.

#### 3.1.3.4. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS OPERATION OF NATION-STATE

Social theorists like K.H. Siluert, Edward A Shils and William Mccord have laid down that political development consists of the organisation of political life and the performance of political function in accordance with the standards expected of a modern nation-state. Political development is thus, identified with the politics of nationalism. Rejecting this view Pye says that nationalism is necessary. But far from being a sufficient condition to ensure political development political development is identifiable with nation-building and not with merely a nation-state.

# 3.1.3.5. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS ADMINISTRATIVE AND LEGAL DEVELOPMENT

Some social theorists like Max Weber A. M. Handerson and Talcott Parsons and Joseph La Palombara have pointed out that political development is intrinsically linked with the legal and administrative order of the community. Thus the establishment of an effective bureaucracy is essential for the process of development. Pye, however finds some shortcoming in this view point also. It is quite possible that if administration is over-stressed it can create imbalances in the polity that may impede political development. This view according to Pye overlooks the problems of citizenship training and popular participation that are one of the essential aspects of political development.

# 3.1.3.6. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND MASS MOBILISATION AND PARTICIPATION

Clifford Greetz, Rupert Emerson, Eisenstadt stressed the role of a politically awakened citizenry and the behaviour of the people in the direction of an expanded popular participation. Pye considered the disastrous effects of the politics of mass manipulation and thus pointed out that such a view of political development is also fraught with the dangers of either sterile emotionalism or corrupting demagoguery, both of which can sap the strength of a society.

#### 3.1.3.7. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS THE BUILDING OF DEMOCRACY

Joseph la Palombara and J. Ronald Pennock held the view that the case of political development is integrally connected with the building of democracy and inculcating "values" of a democratic order in the minds of the people. Pye points out that such a concept would exclude the cases of those countries where democracy is non-existent.

#### 3.1.3.8. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS STABILITY AND ORDINARY CHANGE

Karl Deutsch and F.W. Riggs have emphasised that stability is legitimately linked with the concept of development in any form of economic or social advancement does generally depend upon an environment in which uncertainty has been reduced and planning based on reasonably safe predictions is possible. Pye differs from this viewpoint and says that it leaves unanswered how much order is necessary or desirable and for what purpose change should be directed.

#### 3.1.3.9. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS MOBILISATION AND POWER

Some social theorists like James S. Coleman G. Almond and Talcott Parsons have taken the view that the concept of political development can be evaluated in terms of the level or degree of absolute power which the system is able to mobilise. According to this view, states naturally differ in proportion to their inherent resource base with the result that the measure of development is the degree to which they are able to maximise and realise the full potential of their given resources. Pye is critical of this view that such an explanation is applicable to the case of democratic political system and thus it ignores the case of development in others where the mobilisation of power is deliberately kept limited.

# 3.1.3.10. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS ON ASPECT OF A MUTE-DIMENSIONAL PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Max F. Millikam, Donald L. M. Blackmer and Daniel Lerner hence put forth an argument that the political sphere may be autonomous from the rest of the society, for sustained political development to take place. It can only be within the context of a

multi-dimensional process of social change in which no segment or dimension of the society can lag behind. Pye appreciates this view on the plea that here all forms of development are related, development is much the same as modernisation, and it takes place within a historical context in which influences from outside the society impinge on the process of social changes just as changes in the different aspects of a society—the economy, the polity and the social order—all impinge on each other.

# 3.1..3.11. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AS SENSE OF NATIONAL RESPECT IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS.

Finally, Pye refers to the view that takes into account the case of post nationalism era where nation-state will no longer be used as the basic unit of potential life. Pye says nothing to criticise this interpretation it appears that the either accepts it or ignore it altogether.

## **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

| 1. | Write briefly about how the concept of Political Development emerged.                 |
|----|---|
|    |   |
|    |   |
| 2. | On four grounds Pye criticised limiting political development only to the economic    |
|    | growth. What are they?  |
|    |   |
|    |   |
| 3. | Do you agree with the view that Political Development concerns only with the politics |
|    | of Industrialised societies?  |
|    |   |
|    |   |
|    |   |

| 4. | What is the Pye's objection to the view that looks Political Development in terms of |
|----|--|
|    | Administrative and Legal Development?  |
|    |  |
|    |  |
|    |  |

## 3.1.4 PYE'S CONCEPT OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

The meaning of the concept of political development that Lucean Pye offers after viewing diverse definition and viewpoints, bears three characteristics, equality, capacity and differentiation. The degree of development of a country can be determined with the help of these characteristics. James S. Coleman called these characteristics as "development syndrome". "Syndrome" simply means characteristic features.

## **3.1.4.1 EQUALITY**

The first broadly shared characteristic noted is a general spirit or attitude toward equality. The subject of political development according to Pye, involve mass participation and popular involvement in political activities. Participation may be either democratic or a form of totalitarian mobilisation, but the key consideration is that subjects should become active citizens and at least the pretence of popular rule is necessary. Equality also means that laws should be of a universalistic nature, applicable to all and more or less impersonal in their operation. Finally, it means that recruitment to political offices "should reflect achievement standards of performance and not the inscriptive considerations of a traditional social system.

#### **3.1.4.2 CAPACITY**

It refers to the capacity of a potential system by which it can give "output" and the extent to which it can effect the rest of the society and economy. Capacity is also closely associated with governmental performance and the conditions that effect such performance. It also means effectiveness and efficiency in the execution of public policy. There is a trend towards professionalisation of government. Finally it is related to rationality in administration and a secular orientation towards policy.

## 3.1.4.3 DIFFERENTIATION

It implies diffusion and specialisation of structure. The offices and agencies tend to have their distinct and limited functions and there is an equivalent of a division of labour within the realm of government. It also involves the integration of complex structures and process. Thus, differentiation is not fragmentation and the isolation of the different parts of the political system but specialisation based on an ultimate sense of integration.

According to Pye, in recognising these three dimensions of equality, capacity and differentiation as the heart of development process, we do not mean to suggest that they necessarily fit easily together. On the contrary, historically the tendency has usually been that these are acute tensions between the demands for equality, the requirements for capacity and the process of greater differentiation. Moreover, development is clearly not unilinear nor is it governed by sharp and distinct stages, but rather by a range of problems that may arise separately or concurrently. In the wider perspective of comparative politics, a study of political development shows that while the characteristic of equality is concerned with political culture, the problems of capacity are related to the performance of the authoritative structures of government, and the questions of differentiation touch mainly on the performance of the non-authoritative structures and the general political processes in the society at large. This suggests that in the last analysis the problems of political development revolve around the relationships between the political culture, the authoritative structures, and the general political processes.

# 3.1.5 OTHER CONCEPTS OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

## 3.1.5.1 HUNTINGTON'S VIEWS ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Samuel P. Huntigton in his works, particularly in his *Political Order in Changing Societies* and in his famous article "Political Development" has played the most important role in liberating "political development" from "socio-economic modernisation" and challenged the very idea of "political development" as a "unilinear process". He introduced the idea of "political decay". He says that Chinese, Greek, Egyptian and Indian societies were highly developed political systems in ancient

time. But later on there was political decay in these societies. Huntington presents this main thesis in his article "Political Development and Political Decay" by saying that "Institutions, decay and dissolve, as well as grow and mature". So, Huntington seriously objected to the prevalent tendency of "linking up political development with modernisation not only on political field, but also in economic, social and cultural fields. "We identified political development with "institution building" based on a well institutionalised polity that would be marked by high levels of adaptability, complexity, autonomy and coherence.

## 3.1.5.2 RIGGS VIEWS ON POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Riggs sought to reconcile the formulations of Pye and Huntington in his dialectical theory of political development. Political development is represented as a kind of dialectical relationship between the process and forces of capacity and equality. With the growing process of differentiation, there is demand for equality. Unless movement towards equality is accompanied by the capacity of the system to integrate the system, there can be no political development.

#### 3.1.5.3 James and Coleman's Views

In "Crisis and Sequences", Coleman defined political development as a process which involves a continuous interaction among the process of structural differentiation, the imperative of equality and the integrative response and adaptive capacity of political systems. The interaction of these three dimensions, as Coleman remarked, is called as the "Development Syndrome".

## 3.1.5.4 KENNETH ORGANSUI'S VIEWS

Organsui is of the view that in order to study the developing societies, treatment of economic development was most essential. He outlined four essential stages to pass through before reaching goals of development: –

- → Political unification, designed to achieve a centralisation of power in the hands of the state.
- → Industrialization, with a view to bring about economic development.

- → National Welfare, where the results of political and economic power gained by the state are available to the masses, and
- → Abundance, where people begin to achieve high standards material affluence.

As Organsui laid stress on economic development, he would not mind if a state achieved development through bourgeois system (as in the west), Communist methods (as in USSR, China) or by following Nazi approach.

## 3.1.5.5 WALT W. ROSTOW, VIEWS

Walt Rostow in his book, Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist *Manifesto*, has mentioned six stages of Political Developments. These are:

- → Traditional stage
- → Precondition to take off stage
- → Take off stage
- → Drive towards maturity
- → Age of high mass consumption
- → The search for quality

In this way, many western political scientists related Political development to political modernisation having following characteristics: social mobilisation, Economic development, Rationalisation of authority, differentiation of structures and specialization of roles, expansion of political institutions, and secularisation of world culture.

Certain comparative political scientists tend to emphasize political development in relation to nationalism. They stress socialization as the means through which nationalism provides the ideological impetus and motivation for development. They also give attention to patterns of inculcating behaviour so that people not only will recognise their nation with pride but also render respect and obedience to authority and governmental legitimacy.

# **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

| 1. | According to Pye the first characteristic of Political Development is equality. Explain                      |
|----|--|
|    |  |
| 2. | What are the other two characteristics of Political Development in Pye's Model?                              |
|    |  |
| 3. | Write briefly about Hantington's concept of Political Development.   |
|    |  |
| 4. | Organsui outlined four essential stages to pass through before reaching goals of development. What are they? |
|    |  |
| 5. | What are the six stages of Political Development given by Walt Rostow?                                       |
|    |  |
|    |  |

## 3.1.6 FEATURES OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Though political development cannot be defined precisely, its broad features can be outlined. Accordingly, following factors affect political development:

- i. Industrialization
- ii. Urbanization
- iii Spread of education and literacy
- Expansion of secular culture. iV.

These independent factors are said to account for a variety of more strictly political developments such as:

- i. Growth of modern bureaucracies;
- ii. Development of a sense of nationhood;
- iii. Advent of political parties;
- Expansion of popular political participation; iv.
- Increased capacity of the political system to mobilise resources for the V. accomplishment of its ends in the most modern politics, and
- vi. Decline in the missionary fervour of the political movement.

According to Almond and Powell, the events leading to political development came from the international environment, from the domestic society, or from political elites within the political system itself. Development results when the existing structure and culture of the political system are unable "to cope with the problem or challenge which confronts it without further structural differentiation and cultural secularisation". So, Almond and Powell painted out four types of problems or challenges to political development:

- Penetration and integration or state-building
- 11. Loyalty and commitment of nation-building,
- iii. Pressure from various interested groups in the society for taking part in the decision-making process or participation.

iv. Pressure from the society to employ coercive power of the state to distribute opportunities, income, wealth and honour or the problem of distribution.

#### 3.1.6.1 PROBLEM OF STATE-BUILDING

The problem of state-building arises when there is a threat to the survivals of the political system from the international environment or from the society in the form of revolutionary pres sure challenging the stability or the survival of the political system. Even a change in the political goals of the powerful elites may create serious threats to the very existence of the political system.

## 3.1.6.2 PROBLEMS OF NATION-BUILDING

Nation-building emphasizes the cultural aspects of political development. It is the process by which people transfer their commitment and loyalty from smaller tribes, villages or pretty principalities to the larger central political system. The problems of state-building and nation-building may be studied together, but it is important to view them separately. While the problem of state-building can be solved, the problem of nation-building that still remained to create threatening postures for the very survival of the political system.

## 3.1.6.3 PROBLEM OF PARTICIPATION

We are many interest groups in the society that strive to have a share in the decision-making process. Thus, political infrastructure comes into being in the form of political parties, groups, cliques, factions, etc. It leads to the expansion of "demands" and also for participation in the process of decision-making, so that "outputs" are favourable to the interests of the claimants.

## 3.1.6.4 Problem of Distribution

There also, arises the problem as to how national income or wealth be distributed or opportunities be given to all without any artificial discrimination on the grounds of religion, caste, creed, colour etc. Talent should be recognised and that merit should be the deciding factor in the midst of "equal opportunities" for all. It is also known by the name of the politics of welfare or general good.

## 3.1.7 FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

Almond and Powell have also pointed towards the factors that needed to be considered in the analysis of political development.

## 3.1.7.1. NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THE POLITICAL SYSTEM

There is no doubt that the stability of a system is heavily dependent upon the types of problems it faces. Different people demand different forms of participation, national integration, economic betterment, situations of law and order and the like. The burden is not so heavy on the political system of the advanced countries, as they have solved most of problems. Difference is in the case of backward and developing societies, where such demands have come up suddenly and their effect is cumulative and reinforcing. It is generally recognized that a major problem in the new nations today is the cumulative revolutions they must face.

#### 3.1.7.2. RESOURCES OF THE SYSTEM

According to Almond and Powell, a second factor is the resources the system can draw upon under various circumstances. A political system has to satisfy the "demands" made upon it. It may be possible that the load of demands is too great that a political system may not bear or may do so at a heavy expense.

#### 3.1.7.3. EFFECT OF FOREIGN SOCIAL SYSTEMS

According to Almond and Powell, developments in other social systems constitute a third factor which may affect political development. In this sense, it is quite possible that international institutions like the International Monetary Fund or World Bank may develop a regulative or distributive capability that reduces the pressures on the domestic political system. Thus, the existence or the development of capabilities in other social systems may affect the magnitude of the challenges confronting political systems.

#### 3.1.7.4. Functioning Pattern of the System

The problem of political development or decay also depends upon the pattern of the political system. It means that a political system may or may not cope with the burden of 'inputs'. It may be resilient enough to bear the stress of 'loads' and thus keep itself

going, it may also be weak enough to break down under the pressure of 'demands'. It is not necessary that all political systems may be geared for change and adoption in an equal measure.

## 3.1.7.5. RESPONSE OF THE POLITICAL ELITES

It is also possible that powerful elites may change their goals in response to the pressure of demands and thereby save the political system from decay, or they may misjudge the seriousness and intensity of input fluctuations and thus either radically modify the system or fail to respond until it is too late with the result that there is the breakdown of the system itself.

## 3.1.8 CRISIS IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

From the above, it is quite clear that the subject of political development is rested with certain crises that, according to Lucian W. Pye, may be enumerated as under:

#### 3.1.8.1. IDENTITY CRISIS

The first and foremost crisis is that of achieving a common sense of identity. The most of the new states, traditional forms of identity ranging from tribe or caste to ethnic and linguistic groups compete with the sense of larger national identity. This undermines national unity and leads to conflict between ethnic loyalty and national commitments.

## 3.1.8.2. LEGITIMACY CRISIS

Closely related to the identity crisis is the problem of achieving agreement about the legitimate nature of authority and the proper responsibilities of government. In many new states, the crisis of legitimacy is a straight forward constitutional problem. The questions related to the pattern of central or local authority, limits of the executive or bureaucratic authority, the extent to which the colonial structure of government needs to be maintained, etc. are the problems related to the legitimacy crisis.

## 3.1.8.3. PENETRATION CRISIS

The critical problems of the new states give rise to the penetration crisis, which involves the problems of government in reaching down to the society and effecting basic policies. To carry out significant developmental policies a government must be able to reach down

to the village level and touch the daily lives of the people. The problem arises when an endeavour of the government in this direction, leads to the inculcation of 'demands explosion' that it feels hardly capable of solving.

## 3.1.8.4. Participation Crisis

It occurs when there is uncertainty over the appropriate rate of expansion and when the influx of new participants creates serious strains on the existing institutions. In a sense, the participation crisis arises out of the emergence of interest groups and the formulation of a party system.

#### 3.1.8.5. Integration Crisis

It deals with the extent to which the entire polity is organised as a system of interacting relationships, first among the officers and agencies of government and then among the various groups and interests seeking to make demands upon the system and finally in the relationship between officials and articulating citizens.

#### 3.1.8.6. DISTRIBUTION CRISIS

It refers to the questions about how governmental powers are to be used to influence the distribution of goods, services and values throughout the society. In some cases, governments seek to meet the problem directly by intervening in the distribution of wealth; in other cases the approach is to strengthen the opportunities and potentialities of the disadvantages groups. Pye tries to highlight the nature of this crisis and determines the sequence of political development in different countries of the world. It is therefore needed that ultimately any useful theory of Political development "must come to grips with the types of problems that may be subsumed under the category of crisis".

## **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 3**

| Write the factors that affect political development. |
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|  |
|  |
|  |
|  |

|             | nd Powell painted out four types of problems or challenges to political ent. What are they? |
|-------------|---|
|             |   |
|             | efly about any of the three factors that needed to be considered in the                     |
| analysis of | Epolitical development.   |
| How do w    | ou understand the Identity crisis in Political Development?                                 |
| ————        | ou understand the Identity crisis in Political Development?                                 |
|             |   |
| Write abou  | ut penetration crisis in Political Development?   |
|             |   |

## 3.1.9 CRITICAL APPRAISAL

The concept of political development is not free from ethno-centric biases. It is subjected to following criticism.

Firstly, the concept lacks a precise definition. After studying the enormous literature on this subject, it seems difficult to decide what it really covers and what it really excludes entangles the case of political development into all sorts of developments whether economic or cultural, or sociological and the like with the

result that concept lacks cohesion. Even Riggs feels at the very outset of his study, "In fact, of course, there is as yet no such theory, although there are a host of speculations and even hypothesis. Nor is there any consensus on the meaning of the word 'development' in this context, or even, for that matter, of the word 'political'."

Secondly, there is an absence of any coherent political model of the development process. The entire study presents a very confusing picture and, in addition to that, it plunges the discipline of political science into the ocean of other social-sciences like economics and sociology.

Thirdly, the greatest drawback of these studies was that they treated political development as a dependent variable generated by something else, a world-wide wave of modernisation, nationalism or democracy and not as an independent, or intervening variable which, in its own turn, could shape things.

Fourthly, the concept of political development does not offer a model that may be uniformly applicable to all countries of the world and, for this reason, be appreciated by social theorists belonging to any school.

Finally, diverse analyses of political development given by the American writers are just like the critiques of one directed against another. It will not be an error to say that the theorists of political development have certainly failed to understand the political reality of the countries of the third world is as much as they have tries to look at the poor and backward peoples of the Afro-Asian region through the affluent spectacles of the Chicago and Harvard Universities. It is due to this, that whatever theories of political development have been developed so far "lie in shambles today".

Despite these serious drawbacks, the theory of political development still has a relevance of its own. This approach has certainly broadened the scope of empirical political investigations by joining the frontiers of comparative politics with those of other social sciences. It has also engaged the attention of a host of new social theorists towards the study of the political conditions of the new and developing societies of the third world.

## 3.1.10 SUGGESTED READINGS

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M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics UNIT-III: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEPENDENCY, ELITE AND CIVIL **SOCIETY** 

# 3.2 THEORIES OF DEPENDENCY (A. G. FRANK, IMMANUEL WALLENSTEIN & SAMIR AMIN)

- V. Nagendra Rao

## **STRUCTURE**

- 3.2.0 Objectives
- 3.2.1 Introduction
- 3.2.2 Emergence of Dependency Theories
- 3.2.3 Dependency: Divergent Positions
- 3.2.4 Dependency Theory: Convergence and Consensus
  - 3.2.4.1 Major Propositions of Dependency Theory
- 3.2.5 Andre Gunder Frank: Development of Underdevelopment
- 3.2.6 Immanuel Wallerstein: World-system Theory
  - 3.2.6.1 World-system Theory
  - 3.2.6.2 World-system Theory: Critical Appraisal
- 3.2.7 Samir Amin: Unequal Development
- 3.1.8 Let us Sum Up
- 3.2.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you shall be able to understand:

- historical context in which dependency theory emerged;
- the divergent positions and perspectives among dependency theorists;
- the contribution of A G Frank to dependency theory and his theory of development of underdevelopment;
- Immanuel Wallerstein's World-system with critical appraisal;
- Samir Amin's theory of unequal development.

## 3.2.1 INTRODUCTION

Dependency approach has been widely used by various scholars to explain the political realities in third world countries. Although this concept, in its original formulation, had aimed at explaining 'development of underdevelopment' of Latin American countries against the backdrop of international capitalist development and penetration into those countries, later on this concept has found support both in Asia and in Africa. Broadly speaking, the dependency is a process through which peripheral countries have been integrated as well as assimilated into the international capitalist system, and the way the former have experienced structural distortions in their domestic societies because of such assimilation and penetration. According to the ECLA (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) tradition, the international system is divided into the centre and the periphery. The traditional international division of labour has resulted in an excessive concentration of production at the centre. To them development and underdevelopment cannot be differentiated from each other; on the contrary they are the two sides of the same coin. This tradition is broadly termed as 'structural' dependency theory.

The second school of dependency is known as the radical tradition, which is strongly influenced by Marxism and identified with the famous scholar Andre Gunder Frank, Immanuel Wallerstein and Samir Amin. The basic thesis of this radical tradition is the 'development of underdevelopment'. According to Frank, capitalism constantly generates underdevelopment in satellite countries through the expropriation of surplus by the advanced metropolitan countries. He visualizes "a whole chain of metropolises and satellites, which runs from the world metropolis down to the hacienda or rural

merchants who are satellites of the local commercial metropolitan centre but who, in their turn, have peasants as their satellites. In his centre-periphery model, Frank argued that the entire world is divided into centre and periphery. This centre-periphery model is not only useful to explain the dependence of the developing countries on the developed world but it is an effective tool to understand the phenomena of underdevelopment within a country.

## 3.2.2 EMERGENCE OF DEPENDENCY THEORIES

In the early 1950s, a group of economists stationed at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) in Santiago, Chile, launched a rigorous research program around one pressing question: What accounts for the growing divergence in living standards and gross domestic product (GDP) between the wealthy countries of the industrialized North and the poorer developing countries of the South? In 1850, for example, Argentina was among the richest nations of the world and GDP per capita in Latin America was \$245, compared to \$239 in North America. A century later, Argentina was mired in debt and poverty, and GDP per capita in Canada and the United States had quickly outpaced that of Latin America as both had firmly joined the ranks of the developed-country bloc.

According to neoclassical economic theory, strong trade and investment linkages between North and South should lead to a positive-sum outcome for all participants. However, by the 1950s it was difficult to ignore the widening global cleavages between North and South, as well as the growing gap between rich and poor within the developing countries. This latter trend, characterized by an uneasy coexistence between a modern urbanized sector of the economy with strong global ties and a largely rural traditional sector where production modes sorely lagged, was increasingly referred to as dualism. Both dualism and the North-South divide became the focus of conceptual debates and practical policy prescriptions for a new generation of dependency school theorists that emerged during the 1960s and 1970s.

## 3.2.3 DEPENDENCY: DIVERGENT POSITIONS

An initial wave of dependency thinking was triggered by the work of the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch (1901–1986), director of his country's first

central bank from 1935 to 1943 and subsequently the executive secretary of United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) between 1949 and 1963. In Prebisch's classic 1949 treatise, *The Economic Development of Latin America and Its Principal Problems*, he introduced the idea of an industrial, hegemonic centre and an agrarian, dependent periphery as a framework for understanding the emerging international division of labour between North and South. Prebisch argued that the wealth of poor nations tended to decrease when that of rich nations increased due to an unequal exchange of industrial versus agricultural goods in the North-South trading relationship. For the early dependency theorists, industrialization was considered a necessary step toward rectifying this pattern of unequal exchange and thus the most important objective in a development program.

From here, dependency theory quickly divided into diverse strands. The following aspects differentiate these two positions. First, they are rooted in divergent theoretical frameworks: Marxism in one case and structuralism in the other. Second, the Marxist perspective is far more critical of orthodox economic and sociological theories: neo-classical and modernization theory respectively. Third, there are political differences. The Marxist dependency writers characterize the local bourgeoisie as non-progressive and unable to overcome 'Underdevelopment' and 'Dependency'. They reject the structuralists' claim that a populist political alliance between the local bourgeoisie and the popular sectors will be able to reform the international economic system and thereby resolve the problem dependence. For the Marxists, only a socialist revolution can resolve the problems of dependence and underdevelopment. This, however, is seen as utopian by structuralists.

Those dependency theorists who have strongly influenced by Marxism like André Gunder Frank Paul Baran argue that imperialism and the colonial legacy had left Asia, Africa, and Latin America in a highly disadvantageous position. Frank identified a "comprador class" of local southern elites whose interests and profits from this system of exploitation had become closely intertwined with their counterparts in the developed or metropolitan countries. For both Baran and Frank, this third world bourgeoisie was parasitic in nature, leaving it to workers

and peasants to break with imperialism and move a given nation toward progress. While acknowledging the debilitating nature of these dual economies, others such as Ernesto Laclau criticized the Marxists for overlooking important distinctions between capitalist and precapitalist modes of production in the South. Given the tenacity of the latter, Laclau argued, it made no sense for dependency analysts to focus solely on capitalist modes of production as the linchpin for change.

Another key debate within the dependency school concerned the weight that should be given to domestic or international factors. In contrast to the hardline Marxian viewpoint, which held that southern development could only be grasped by placing this process within its proper global historical context, Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto argued that it is the internal dynamics of the nation-state and not its structural location in the international division of labour that determines a country's fate. Cardoso and Faletto emphasized that external factors had different impacts across the developing world due to the diverse internal conditions (history, factors of endowment, social structures) inherent in each country. In contrast to Frank or Baran, they regarded the national bourgeoisie within dependent peripheral societies as a potentially powerful force for social change and economic progress.

Dependency theorists were most likely to part ways when it came to the practical political and economic policy prescriptions that flowed from this worldview. One main difference arose between those advocating that the development of the periphery could still be achieved by working within the confines of the capitalist system and those who saw the need for a complete rupture with the advanced capitalist powers and the pursuit of a state-planned socialist model. The former stance embraced a more dynamic and evolutionary view of economic development and the possibilities to achieve upward mobility within the capitalist framework; the latter saw the future of the underdeveloped periphery as locked into a static world economic system that had determined its fate since the sixteenth century and could only be rectified via outright revolution and the installation of a socialist economy.

## **DEPENDENCY: DIVERGENT POSITIONS**

Structuralist Marxist

Anti-Imperialist Anti-Imperialist

Desarrollista, Structuralist and Nationalist Monopoly Capitalism Autonomous development (Prebish, (Baran and Sweezy)

Furtado, and Sunkel)

Internal Colonialism Sub-imperialism

(Gonzalez Casanova) (Marini)

Poles of development Capitalist development of

(Andracle) underdevelopment (Frank, Rodney)

New dependency (Das Santos) Dependent Capitalist development

(Cardoso)

## 3.2.4 DEPENDENCY THEORY: CONVERGENCE AND CONSENSUS

Although there are different streams within dependency theory, they share a common view on the meaning of dependency. For example, Sunkel's structuralist definition of dependency is very similar to Dos Santos' Marxist definition, as both emphasize 'Interdependence' and the absence of autonomous development in dependent countries:

Development and underdevelopment can therefore be understood as partial structures, but interdependent, which form a single system. A principal characteristic which differentiate both structures is that the developed one to a large extent by virtue of its endogenous capacity of growth, is the dominant, and the underdeveloped, due in part to the induced character of its dynamic, is dependent. (SUNKEL)

Dependence is a *conditioning situation* in which the economies of one group of countries are conditioned by the development and expansion of others.

A relationship of interdependence between two or more economies or between such economies and the world trading system becomes a dependent relationship when some countries can expand through self-impulsion while others, being in a dependent postion, can only expand as a reflection of the expansion of the dominant countries, which may have positive or negative effects on theier immediate development. In either case, the basic situation of dependence causes these countries to be both backward and exploited. (DOS SANTOS)

Both dependency positions also share the view that underdevelopment, or the pattern of development of dependent countries, is the particular form which capitalist development takes in these countries. They also agree that dependency originated when these countries were forcefully incorporated into the world capitalist system by the dominant countries. They concur that, in order to understand the internal dynamics of Third World countries, it is necessary to examine their relationships with the world capitalist system. Thus, underdevelopment is not an historical stage through which developed countries passed, as argued by stage and modernization theorists like W.W. Rustow. As Sunkel puts it, "Development and underdevelopment ... are simultaneous processes: the two faces of the historical evolution of capitalism".





Diagram 1: Dependency Theory View of the World

Diagram 2. Dependency Theory View of the Relationship between the National Core, the Rest of the Nation, and the World System



## 3.2.4.1 Major Propositions of Dependency Theory

Some of the propositions where one can see a general consensus among all shades of dependency perspective are give below.

- 1. Third World countries do not exist in isolation. They can only be understood in the context of the world economic and political system. Political events in Third World countries are directly related to events in First World countries. However, relations between First and Third World countries are asymmetrical. The flow of power and control is from the First World (centre or core) to the Third World (periphery). Political and economic events in the First World have a huge impact on the politics and economics of Third World countries, but Third World political and economic events usually have little impact on the First World.
- 2. Within the world political and economic system there is a tremendous amount of interaction among core countries and peoples, and between the core and the periphery. There is very little interaction just among periphery countries. The consequences of this are great, resulting in an isolated and weak periphery country having an unequal relationship with the united and strong core.

- 3. Politics and economics are related. They cannot be understood apart from each other. Economic ties and relationships between core and periphery countries are particularly important. These are advantageous for the core, and disadvantageous for the periphery. Core-periphery trading patterns result in continuous growth of political and economic power for the core at the expense of the periphery. Economic trade causes a widening of the gap between developed and developing countries, rather than a narrowing of that gap. Historically, lower priced raw materials have been exchanged for higher priced finished goods.
- 4. It follows from #3 that underdevelopment is not a natural state, but rather a condition that is caused. The fact is that developed nations are actively underdeveloping Third World countries as a result of the systems of interactions between them.
- 5. Put another way, the underdevelopment of weak Third World countries is directly related to, and makes possible, the "development" of the powerful countries of the industrialized core. Both the centre and the periphery are part of the world political-economic system, and neither would exist without the other.
- 6. Furthermore, so long as capitalism remains the dominant world economic system, there is no reason for the situation of developed and underdeveloped countries to change. Underdevelopment is not a temporary condition, as had been thought in the past, but is a permanent condition. In fact, if the present world system does not change we can expect the core to become more powerful and the periphery weaker in the future. Rather than "catching up" to the developed countries, most currently underdeveloped countries will fall farther behind. (In a limited number of cases, where exceptional circumstances exist, it may be possible for an underdeveloped country to move from the periphery to the core.)
- 7. The worldwide system of relationships is duplicated within individual Third World countries. There is a core area (usually the capital) which dominates and exploits the periphery (interior) of the country. The nation's centres of economic, political, cultural, and military power are found in the national core, and the core's power and wealth grows more rapidly than that of the interior as a result of contacts and interactions between the two areas. The urban sector becomes increasingly powerful, while the

rural sector becomes increasingly weaker. Resources flow from the periphery to the centre. The core profits at the expense of the periphery as a result of the movement of products and resources. The passage of time does not bring a growing equality within the country, but rather brings about an increasing gap between life in the capital and that in the countryside. 8. In a sense, national leaders in the capital exploit the people for their own personal benefit and power. Consequently, these "national" leaders could really be conceptualized as agents of the international system. Their national power and prominence derive from their international contacts. It is they (the military, government officials, and commercial and financial leaders) who act as links between the Third World country and the world political and economic system. They direct the country's contacts with the world, and they direct those contacts in such a way that the world core benefits more than their own country, although they themselves clearly benefit at a personal level. These national leaders may actually have more in common with their counterparts in London or New York than they do with interior citizens of their own country. (style of dress, food, literature, housing, travel, economic interests, etc.).

## **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| Wh  | nat are the two major traditions in Dependency Theory? How they differ on |
|-----|---|
| fro | m the other?  |
|     |   |
|     |   |
|     |   |
| Wh  | at is the context that led to the emergence of Dependency Theory?         |
|     |   |
|     |   |
|     |   |
|     |   |

|        | the key debate within the dependency school concerned the weight to be given to domestic or international factors. Elaborate. |
|--------|---|
|        |   |
| -      | state the issues on which both structural and Marxist theorists join tog<br>verge with each other?                            |
|        |   |
| What y | ou consider as important among the propositions advanced by Depend<br>t?  |
|        |   |

# 3.2.5 ANDRE GUNDER FRANK: DEVELOPMENT OF **UNDERDEVELOPMENT**

Andre Gunder Frank is considered to be one of the most important Dependency Theorist who attempt to apply Marxist perspective to analyze situation in most of Third World countries. In his writing regarding underdevelopment of development, Andrew Gunder Frank has tried to illustrate the history of the development, underdevelopment, and the evolution of dependency to a world system theory. Finally he has come up with some alternatives and has tried to elaborate the new dualism and the recent movements in the world.

Frank argues that the mainstream history that we have been subjected to (namely modernization theory) does not at all explain the underdevelopment of countries, and that an alternative historical viewpoint is necessary. Using Latin America as an example for the model, he begins his analysis by dubbing the urban centres (what Frank calls "metropoles") of these countries as the centres of exploitation. The exploitation comes from the "interdependence" that the metropolis has with the satellite region. What it means is that the productive (and natural) resources from the outside regions are forced to these centres of exploitation so that they can trade their resources for ones in the metropolis. In doing so, however, these satellites become caught in a relationship of pseudo-servitude.

What comes of this exploitative chain, according to Gunder Frank, is "a whole chain of constellations of metropoles and satellites [that] relates all parts of the whole system from its metropolitan centre in Europe or the United States to the farthest outpost in the Latin American countryside". Satellites supply cheap primary commodities to the rich countries that then use the raw materials to produce specialized goods, and then send them back to the satellites for profit. This metropolis-satellite relationship is only in existence to serve the "interests of the metropoles which take advantage of this global, national, and local structure to promote their own development and the enrichment of their ruling classes." This is what Gunder Frank means by the "development of underdevelopment". These countries are not undeveloped because of their lack of technological advancement, or disconnect from the real world. The case is, however, quite the contrary. Because of the exploitative relationship through the metropolis-satellite model, whole regions develop a state of "underdevelopedness" that is witness to the massive upheaval of its capital resources and the transference of said recourses to the metropoles. He says that:

... in short, that underdevelopment is not due to the survival of archaic institutions and the existence of capital shortage in regions that have remained isolated from the stream of world history. On the contrary, underdevelopment was and still is generated by the very same historical process that also generated economic development: the development of capitalism itself.

This resulted in a situation where the development in satellite countries linked to the economic success of metropolis countries (a linkage that is neither "self-generating nor self-perpetuating"). Therefore, Frank says, when countries in the

core experience growth, countries in the periphery also tend to experience growth at a proportional level. But, when world metropoles experience economic recession, the satellite countries feel it at a larger rate due to the loss of their resources and their subordinate relationship to metropoles.

This is not always the case, however. There are points when these satellite countries are safe from the exploitation of the world capitalist system, according to Gunder Frank. One of his hypotheses in developing this theoretical model states. "satellites experience their greatest economic development and especially their most classically capitalist industrial development if and when their ties to their metropolis are weakest." We can examine this historically, when we look at the economic growth of some satellite countries in relation to core countries throughout the first half of the 20th century. Periods of crisis in core countries' economies, namely during World Wars I & II and the Great Depression in 1930, were times that many Latin American countries saw their most consecutive expansions of development due to the deregulated terms of trade that kept these countries locked in a losing battle for attaining economic autonomy.

Another safe haven from the exploitative metropolis was being isolated from the world economy. The weak connection, as satellites, that certain countries were fortunate enough to have, saved them for a time, from their eventual underdevelopment. Unfortunately, once the crisis that the core undergoes becomes settled, or if metropoles find ways to penetrate the markets of the isolated regions, the relationships that were previously in effect, become reinstated. Any hope for "self-generation or perpetuation" becomes non-existent, choked off in a sense, and signs of growth begin to reverse.

By clearly articulating his position of underdevelopment in Asia and Africa to the development and exploitation of Western countries, Frank forcefully debunked the political development theories of Pye, Huntington, Almond and others. According to Frank, ideas about development based on unique attributes of Western society or culture were unfounded, as were suggestions about the difficulties to be faced by those from non-Western societies or cultures.

## **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

| Е: | Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.  |
|----|---|
|    | Why AG Frank criticizes Modernization theorists?  |
|    |   |
|    | According to Frank, "a whole chain of constellations of metropoles and satellites relates all parts of the whole system". Comment.  |
|    |   |
|    | Do you agree with the Frank's opinion that the development of Western world took place at the cost of under-development in the peripheral countries like Asia and Africa? |
|    |   |
|    |   |

## 3.2.6 IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN – WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY

Immanuel Wallerstein is the sociologist who invented world-systems analysis. Though a sociologist by profession, Wallerstein's work is inherently political and he does not recognize the possibility of social writing not being political. In his book, *The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century,* Immanuel Wallerstein develops a theoretical framework to understand the historical changes involved in the rise of the modern world. The modern world system, essentially capitalist in

nature, followed the crisis of the feudal system and helps explain the rise of Western Europe to world supremacy between 1450 and 1670. According to Wallerstein, his theory makes possible a comprehensive understanding of the external and internal manifestations of the modernization process during this period and makes possible analytically sound comparisons between different parts of the world.

Wallerstein's work developed at a time when the dominant approach to understanding development, modernization theory, was under attack from many fronts, and he followed suit. He himself acknowledges that his aim was to create an alternative explanation. He aimed at achieving a clear conceptual break with theories of 'modernization' and thus provide a new theoretical paradigm to guide our investigations of the emergence and development of capitalism, industrialism, and national states. Criticisms to modernization include (1) the reification of the nationstate as the sole unit of analysis, (2) assumption that all countries can follow only a single path of evolutionary development, (3) disregard of the world-historical development of transnational structures that constrain local and national development, (4) explaining in terms of ahistorical ideal types of "tradition" versus "modernity", which are elaborated and applied to national cases. In reacting to modernization theory, Wallerstein outlined a research agenda with five major subjects: the functioning of the capitalist world-economy as a system, the how and why of its origins, its relations with noncapitalist structures in previous centuries, comparative study of alternative modes of production, and the ongoing transition to socialism.

## 3.2.6.1 WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY

World-system theory is in many ways an adaptation of dependency theory. Wallerstein draws heavily from dependency theory, a neo-Marxist explanation of development processes, popular in the developing world. His World-system theory inherently adopted the Dependency theory logic of core and periphery.

For Wallerstein, "a world-system is a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remould it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an

organism, in that is has a lifespan over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others... Life within it is largely self-contained, and the dynamics of its development are largely internal". A world-system is what Wallerstein terms a "world-economy", integrated through the market rather than a political centre, in which two or more regions are interdependent with respect to necessities like food, fuel, and protection, and two or more polities compete for domination without the emergence of one single centre forever.

In his own first definition, Wallerstein said that a world-system is a "multicultural territorial division of labour in which the production and exchange of basic goods and raw materials is necessary for the everyday life of its inhabitants". This division of labour refers to the forces and relations of production of the world economy as a whole and it leads to the existence of two interdependent regions: *core* and *periphery*. These are geographically and culturally different, one focusing on labour-intensive, and the other on capital-intensive production. The core-periphery relationship is structural. He further elaborates his World-system theory by division of world into four different categories: core, semi-periphery, periphery, and external. The categories describe each region's relative position within the world economy as well as certain internal political and economic characteristics.

The Core: The core regions benefited the most from the capitalist world economy. For the period under discussion, much of northwestern Europe (England, France, Holland) developed as the first core region. Politically, the states within this part of Europe developed strong central governments, extensive bureaucracies, and large mercenary armies. This permitted the local bourgeoisie to obtain control over international commerce and extract capital surpluses from this trade for their own benefit.

*The Periphery:* On the other end of the scale lay the peripheral zones. These areas lacked strong central governments or were controlled by other states, exported raw materials to the core, and relied on coercive labour practices. The core expropriated much of the capital surplus generated by the periphery through unequal trade relations. Enslavement of the native populations, the importation of African slaves, and the coercive labour practices and forced mine labour made

possible the export of cheap raw materials to Europe. Labour systems in peripheral areas differed from earlier forms in medieval Europe in that they were established to produce goods for a capitalist world economy and not merely for internal consumption. Furthermore, the aristocracy in periphery grew wealthy from their relationship with the world economy and could draw on the strength of a central core region to maintain control. He specifically mentions Eastern Europe and Latin America as an example for periphery.

*The Semi-Periphery:* Between the two extremes lie the semi-peripheries. These areas represented either core regions in decline or peripheries attempting to improve their relative position in the world economic system. They often also served as buffers between the core and the peripheries. Good examples of declining cores that became semi-peripheries during the period under study are Portugal and Spain. Other semi-peripheries at this time were Italy, southern Germany, and southern France. Economically, these regions retained limited but declining access to international banking and the production of high-cost high-quality manufactured goods. Unlike the core, however, they failed to predominate in international trade and thus did not benefit to the same extent as the core.

External Areas: These areas maintained their own economic systems and, for the most part, managed to remain outside the modern world economy. Russia fits this case well. Unlike Poland, Russia's wheat served primarily to supply its internal market. It traded with Asia as well as Europe; internal commerce remained more important than trade with outside regions. Also, the considerable power of the Russian state helped regulate the economy and limited foreign commercial influence.

*Operation of the World-system:* The capitalist world economy, as envisioned by Wallerstein, is a dynamic system which changes over time. However, certain basic features remain in place. Perhaps most important is that when one examines the dynamics of this system, the core regions of northwestern Europe clearly benefited the most from this arrangement. Through extremely high profits gained from international trade and from an exchange of manufactured goods for raw materials from the periphery (and, to a lesser extent, from the semi-peripheries), the core enriched itself at the expense of the peripheral economies. This, of course, did not mean either that everybody in the periphery became poorer or that all citizens of the core regions became wealthier as a result. In the periphery, landlords for example often gained great wealth at the expense of their underpaid coerced labourers, since landowners were able to expropriate most of the surplus of their workers for themselves. In turn in the core regions, many of the rural inhabitants, increasingly landless and forced to work as wage labourers, at least initially saw a relative decline in their standard of living and in the security of their income. Overall, certainly, Wallerstein sees the development of the capitalist world economy as detrimental to a large proportion of the world's population.

Through this theory, Wallerstein attempts to explain why modernization had such wide-ranging and different effects on the world. He shows how political and economic conditions after the breakdown of feudalism transformed northwestern Europe into the predominant commercial and political power. The geographic expansion of the capitalist world economy altered political systems and labour conditions wherever it was able to penetrate. Although the functioning of the world economy appears to create increasingly larger disparities between the various types of economies, the relationship between the core and its periphery and semi-periphery remains relative, not constant. Technological advantages, for example, could result in an expansion of the world economy overall, and precipitate changes in some peripheral or semi-peripheral areas. However, Wallerstein asserts that an analysis of the history of the capitalist world system shows that it has brought about a skewed development in which economic and social disparities between sections of the world economy have increased rather than provided prosperity for all.

On the political side of the world-system a few concepts deem highlighting. For Wallerstein, nation-states are variables, elements within the system. States are used by class forces to pursue their interest, in the case of core countries. *Imperialism* refers to the domination of weak peripheral regions by strong core states. *Hegemony* refers to the existence of one core state temporarily outstripping the rest. Hegemonic powers maintain a stable balance of power and enforce free trade as long as it is to their advantage. However, hegemony is temporary due to class struggles and the diffusion of technical advantages. Finally, there is a global class struggle.

The current world-economy is characterized by regular cyclical rhythms, which provide the basis of Wallerstein's periodization of modern history. After our current stage, Wallerstein envisions the emergence of a socialist world-government, which is the only-alternative world-system that could maintain a high level of productivity and change the distribution, by integrating the levels of political and economic decision-making.

## 3.2.6.2 WORLD-SYSTEM THEORY: CRITICAL APPRAISAL

There are as many critics of world-systems theory as there are advocates, and Wallerstein addresses some of the charges levelled against his work. The most common criticisms claim that world-systems theorizing is too vague, overly selective in the historical examples it employs, and excessively capitalist-centric. Despite Wallerstein's arguments based on judicious research, some of his conclusions do appear too sweeping. An example of over-generalization is Wallerstein's concept of "antisystemic," e.g. nationalism. However, an ideology such as nationalism has simultaneously legitimated and destabilized the international order.

Despite these issues, Wallerstein challenges our conventional units of analysis (such as the national state) and the temporalities that we habitually rely on to frame our understandings of the world. His work may be read as a much-appreciated corrective to trendy postmodernist assaults on comparative research and on sweeping grand generalizations. There are, after all, grand patterns to history, that, if carefully assessed, may reveal crucial aspects of the human condition and how it relates to social change, property relations, and technological innovation.

## **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 3**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| Writ | e Wallerstein' | 's criticism to | owards Mod | ernization th | eorists? |  |
|------|----------------|-----------------|------------|---------------|----------|--|
|      |                |                 |            |               |          |  |
|      |                |                 |            |               |          |  |
|      |                |                 |            |               |          |  |

|       | according to Frank, "a whole chain of constellations of metropoles and sa |
|-------|---|
| re    | elates all parts of the whole system". Comment.                           |
|       |   |
| F     | For Wallerstein, "a world-system is a social system, one that has bound   |
| Si    | tructures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Elaborat  |
|       |   |
| <br>W | That are the political consequences of World-system?                      |
|       | nat are the political consequences of works system.                       |
|       |   |

# 3.2.7 SAMIR AMIN: UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT

Samir Amin, the Third World Forum President, is well-known for his "dependency theory" and the study of capitalism and the Third World development issues. He discusses the problems of underdevelopment in the Third World macroscopically and criticizes the traditional bourgeois economics and development theory, emphasizing that the Third World underdevelopment results mainly from the control and exploitation by the United States and other Western powers. Dependency theory is the notion that resources flow from a "periphery" of poor and underdeveloped states to a "core" of wealthy states, enriching the latter at the expense of the former. It is a central contention of dependency theory that poor states are impoverished and rich ones enriched by the way poor states are integrated into the "world system". So, in Samir Amin's opinion, if the Third World countries can't depart from the world capitalist system and move towards socialism, namely "delinking", it is impossible for them to get rid of their dependent status and get real independence.

## 3.2.7.1 VALUE, ACCUMULATION AND UNEQUAL EXCHANGE

According to Samir Amin, at present all societies form part of the capitalist world system which has expanded gradually over the last few centuries. It resulted in concomitant

subjection of previously autonomous countries to the rule of the capitalist system. It implies that a theory of 'accumulation on the world scale' has to be used to explain the present-day relationship between developed and developing countries. The integration of the periphery into the capitalist world system would have as its main objective the countering of this negative tendency, says Amin: "(1) by enlarging markets and exploiting new regions where the rate of surplus value was higher than the all the centre; and (2) by reducing the cost of labour power and of constant capital".

Amin's theory of accumulation on a world scale starts from the idea that the centre and periphery play different, unequal roles in the capitalist world system. The centre is the dominant part of the world system and is therefore able to impose its will upon the countries of the periphery with respect to the relations of exchange. The exchange of commodities between the centre and the periphery turns out to be *unequal*, *i.e.*, in favourable for the centre and unfavourable for the periphery. This unequal exchange transfer 'value' from periphery to centre, hence becomes central mechanism to the process of 'accumulation on world scale'. The ever-continuing tapping of resources from periphery, through this transfer of value, causes a situation of *underdevelopment*. In Amin's view underdevelopment is first and foremost a situation of unbalance.

The theory of unequal development acknowledges the different patterns of transition to peripheral capitalism and to central capitalism as the consequence of the impact of the capitalist mode of production and its mechanism of trade upon precapitalist formations. According to him, this resulted in the destruction of craft without their being replaced by local industrial production. Unequal international specialization is manifested by distortions in the export activities, bureaucracy, and light industries of the periphery. Given the periphery's integration within the world market, the periphery is without adequate economic means to challenge foreign monopolies. The underdeveloped countries should not be confused with the advanced countries at an earlier stage of their development, for the underdeveloped countries are characterised by an extreme unevenness in the distribution of production, which primarily serves the needs of the dominant centre. Underdevelopment is accentuated and growth is blocked in the periphery, making autonomous development impossible.

The capitalist mode of production tends to become exclusive at the centre, but not in the periphery where other modes may be evident. In the periphery capitalism may be limited to activities of the state.

According to Amin, whatever their differences of origin, the peripheral countries all tend to converge upon a typical model, characterised by dominance of agrarian capital and ancillary (comprador) commercial capital. The domination by central capital over the system as a whole, and the vital mechanisms of primitive accumulation for its benefit which express this domination, subject the development of peripheral national capitalism to strict limitations. The weak nature of the national community in the periphery confers an apparent relative weight and special functions upon the local bureaucracy that are not the same as those of bureaucratic and technocratic social groups at the centre. The contradictions typical of the development of underdevelopment, and the rise of petty-bourgeoisie strata reflecting these contradictions, explain the present tendency to state capitalism. This new path of development for capitalism in the periphery does not constitute a mode of transition to socialism but rather expresses the future from in which new relations will be organized between centre and periphery.

Two issues are apparent in theoretical discussion of inequality. One is the question of national and international development. Amin leans to an interpretation that sees capitalism as a world system upon which national entities may be dependent. Class, production, struggle, and transition all must be analysed in a world context. Thus the transition from capitalism to socialism must be on an international order, and it must begin in the periphery. "Under the present conditions of inequality between the nations, a development that is not merely development of underdevelopment will therefore be both national, popular-democratic, and socialist, by virtue of the world project of which it forms part".

The other issue is the debate as to whether analysis should concern exchange or production. Writers such as Emmanuel and Frank stressed exchange and market inequalities, whereas Amin seemed to use concepts such as the mode of production to move beyond market categories while focusing on the world system, centre, and periphery. Amin followed in the tradition of Marx who noted

the crises generated by financial and trade cycles in the capitalist system, but who also focused on the development of productive capacity by capitalism (including technology and resource accumulation), which would create the conditions, probably spurred on by these exchange crises, that would lead to change.

#### 3.2.7.2 THE THEORY OF DELINKING FROM THE CAPITALIST WORLD SYSTEM

Apart from analysing the fundamental structures and processes characterizing the capitalist world system, Samir Amin has also developed a theory of development for the underdeveloped countries of the periphery. It might be called the 'theory of delinking'.

In discussing "delinking", Amin emphasizes the need for underdeveloped countries to adopt new market strategies and values different from northern developed countries. Delinking, he explains, does not mean "autarky but refusal to bow to the dominant logic of the world capitalist system". Delinking implies a transfer of political hegemony to new "centres". Delinking is a form of cutting oneself off, "a kind of active anti-globalization which is in dialectical relationship with globalization itself". Amin has four propositions in justifying delinking. First, the necessity of delinking is the logical political outcome of the unequal character of the development of capitalism. Unequal development, in this sense, is the origin of essential social, political and ideological evolutions. Second, delinking is a necessary condition of any socialist advance, in the North and in the South. *Third*, the potential advances that become available through delinking will not "guarantee" certainty of further evolution towards a pre-defined "socialism". Socialism is a future that must be built. Fourth, the option for delinking must be discussed in political terms. This proposition derives from a reading according to which economic constraints are absolute only for those who accept the commodity alienation intrinsic to capitalism, and turn it into an historical system of eternal validity.

Amin agrees that the center grows at the expense of the periphery. It is in this context that Amin argues that the only way for the Third World to prosper would be through the process of delinking. But, because the capitalist Third World countries haven't yet achieved economic take-off, even though they verbally express to be self-sufficient, they are very weak and have no means for achieving delinking. Therefore, delinking can only be relative. It depends on the negotiating capacity,

bargaining power and the economic, cultural and political advantages of the peripheral countries. As a development proposal, delinking is associated with some kind of social program, which is the plan to build a national, modern and self-centered nation.

As for the means of "delinking", Amin suggests that socialism be a fundamental condition for progress and independence, and that only socialism can make "marginal capitalism" move towards the path of real self-reliant development, and only the socialist development path can be the only alternative to "the development of underdevelopment", because only in socialism, the Third World can really get rid of the control and exploitation by capitalism in the centre of the world capitalist system, thus achieving "delinking". That means, only by economically "delinking" from the developed countries and getting rid of unequal exchange, peripheral countries can gradually embark on a healthy path of development and ultimately surpass the developed capitalist countries economically. Amin believes that for the Third World countries, the prerequisite for realizing the socialist structure and creating a new international economic order is self-reliance. Self-reliant development path must be of a mass character, because only the "mass" development can lead to "national and self-reliant economy".

#### **3.2.7.3** Critique

Ira Gerstein provided one of the few critiques of Amin's work. He argued that Amin's treatment of the class struggle and possible transition to socialism is somewhat ambiguous, perhaps reflecting his commitment to the national bourgeoisie of the peripheral countries. Although Amin corrected negated Emmanuel Wallerstein's thesis that the dichotomy of centre and periphery relate to a division and therefore potential class struggle between bourgeoisie and proletarian nations, however, his emphasis on the market with resulting tendency toward dualism, making the class struggle, and ignoring the relations of production, lead him to a questionable world class analyst. Amin's rebuttal to these charge emphasized that the world capitalist system is heterogeneous, composed of central dominant formations and peripheral dominated ones. Within this framework, class conflicts cannot be considered within the narrow scope of national entities but only on a world scale. Thus attention to national bourgeoisie is suspect, for they are the main allies of contemporary imperialism.

#### 3.2.8 LET US SUM UP

Dependency theory became popular in the 1960's as a response to research by Raul Prebisch who was active in ECLA. Prebisch found that increases in the wealth of the richer nations appeared to be at the expense of the poorer ones. Known as structural Dependency theory, this tradition of theory advocates an inward looking approach to development and an increased role for the state in terms of imposing barriers to trade, making inward investment difficult and promoting nationalisation of key industries.

In its extreme form, dependency theory is based on a Marxist view of the world, which sees globalisation in terms of the spread of market capitalism, and the exploitation of cheap labour and resources in return for the obsolete technologies of the West. This view of dependency theory is that there is a dominant world capitalist system that relies on a division of labour between the rich 'core' countries and poor 'peripheral' countries. Over time, the core countries will exploit their dominance over an increasingly marginalised periphery. While few of the dependency school's theoretical assertions have stood the test of time, this perspective continues to offer a powerful description of the political and economic plight of the majority of countries that remain on the periphery of the world economy. A full understanding of the causal mechanisms and policy solutions for remedying underdevelopment may still be a long way off; however, the dependency school's specification of concrete problems like dualism, inequality, diminishing returns to trade, and the North-South divide have enriched debates about development and helped them to move forward.

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M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics UNIT-III: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEPENDENCY, ELITE AND CIVIL SOCIETY

# 3.3 THEORIES OF RULING CLASS & ELITES (PARETO, MICHAELS AND MOSCA)

- V. Nagendra Rao

### **STRUCTURE**

- 3.3.0 Objectives
- 3.3.1 Introduction
- **3.3.2** Elites
- 3.3.3 Political Elites
  - 3.3.3.1 Political Elites and Ruling Class
- 3.3.4 Theories of Ruling Class and Elites
- 3.3.5 Vilfredo Pareto: The Circulation of Elites
  - 3.3.5.1 Pareto's Circulation/Cycles of Elites
- 3.3.6 Michels: The Iron Law of Oligarchy
- 3.3.7 Gaetano Mosca: The Ruling Class
  - 3.3.7.1 The Theory of The Ruling Class
- 3.3.8 Elite Theory: Contemporary Relevance
- 3.3.9 Let us Sum Up

#### 3.3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you shall be able to understand:

- the meaning and concept of elites and political elites;
- theories of ruling class and elites;
- Pareto's theory of elites and his concept of circulation of elites;
- Michels concept of the Iron Law of Oligarchy;
- Mosca's views regarding ruling class.

#### 3.3.1 INTRODUCTION

Although the elite concept is often employed broadly and diffusely, it best refers to persons who are able, by virtue of their strategic decision-making positions in powerful organizations and movements, to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially. At the national level in modern polities elites number a few thousand people spread across the tops of all important sectors—politics, government administration, business, trade unions, the military, pressure groups, major mass movements, and so forth. Holding that such power concentrations are inescapable, elite theory seeks to explain political outcomes principally in terms of elite conflicts, accommodations, and circulations.

The theory's origins lie most clearly in the writings of Italian political scientist Gaetano Mosca (1858–1941), Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), and German-Italian sociologist Robert Michels (1876–1936).

#### **3.3.2 ELITES**

At one level, elites can be defined simply as persons who hold dominant positions in major institutions or are recognized leaders in art, education, business, and other fields of achievement. Such individuals exist in all societies, but beyond this mundane observation, social scientists are interested in why particular individuals attain positions of status and power. In the social sciences, the concept of elites refers to a more specific issue as well: the concentration of societal power—especially political power—in the hands of a few. At the heart of theoretical debates and empirical research

on elites is the famous assertion of Mosca: "In all societies . . . two classes of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled". One can distinguish the conception of "functional elites" in a variety of institutional contexts from that of a "ruling" or "political" elite that in some sense wields societal-level power.

Elites are differentiated and stratified. Differentiation accords principally with economic, political, administrative, military, and other 'strategic' or functional sectors of society. As these sectors wax or wane in power and functional importance, relations between elites heading them shift. Moreover, historically contingent crises sometimes alter elite relations profoundly. Elites are stratified, with central circles, executive cores, power cliques, inner leaderships or other 'elites within elites' discernible. Debates about the extent and shape of elite differentiation and stratification are similar to the Marxist debates about compositions and structures of capitalist ruling classes.

#### 3.3.3 POLITICAL ELITES

In contemporary social analysis, the term political elites refers to the segments of national elites—the groups of powerful individuals influencing the political outcomes on the national level in a systematic and significant way—that control the government and other political institutions of the state. In liberal democracies they typically include political leaders, top parliamentarians and government officials, and leaders of the major political parties. Their power and influence reflect control over political power resources concentrated in the state as well as mutual access and the capacity for solitary action. Members of the political elite are typically identified as holders of the top power positions in government and the key organizations of the state, by involvement in making key political decisions, by reputation among their peers, or finally, by a combination of the three methods.

At the other end of the power spectrum are the masses (or nonelites). In democratic regimes, political elites operate electoral systems in which their members compete for leadership by mobilizing popular electoral support. They also collaborate and compete peacefully with other elite groups, including political opposition. Dominant elite groups monopolize political leadership, and they restrict competition by intimidating political rivals.

#### 3.3.3.1 POLITICAL ELITES AND RULING CLASS

Political elites are sometimes conflated with ruling classes. The latter are typically circumscribed in terms of ownership of capital and land. Class theorists of Marxist persuasion treat political power as derived from property ownership, and they see political elites as executive arms of the ruling/ownership class. Some students of elites, such as William Domhoff, combine the class and elite perspective and depict elites as socially anchored in the dominant ownership class. The classical and contemporary elite theorists, by contrast, point to the autonomy of political elites, as reflected in elites' capacity to dominate or even expropriate the owners (e.g., in revolutions).

Contemporary elite theorists see the bases of elite power in command over the resources of the state (including the military might), organizational capacities, and intra-elite cohesion. C. W. Mills analyzed the emerging "power elite" in post–World War II America as firmly anchored in the national government, the military directorate, and the largest business corporations. Elite cohesion, according to him, did not preclude the possibility of temporary intra-elite divisions on specific policy questions. However, when faced with political challenges, the power elite acted in unison. Other contemporary students of political elites stress that the elites' grip on power is strengthened by their influence over the mass media, their alliances with nonelite social forces—dominant classes, strata, movements, and politically organized groups—and their control over political succession.

#### 3.3.4 THEORIES OF RULING CLASS AND ELITES

Social thought on elites goes back at least to Plato and Aristotle, but contemporary debates usually begin with the "neo-Machiavellians" Pareto, Mosca, and Michels. Reacting to the turmoil of European society in the early twentieth century, each developed arguments supporting the inevitability of elite rule in opposition to classical democratic theory, Marxian class analysis, and socialist political movements. Subsequent renditions of these theories also carried a strong imprint of Max Weber's ideas, especially concerning the centrality of political power and charismatic leadership.

The classic theorists focused on the inevitability of a group of powerful "elites" in all large-scale societies, offering a radical critique of two competing theoretical-

ideological streams of thought: the democratic theory ("government of the people, by the people, for the people" in Lincoln's Gettysburg Address), and the Marxist vision of class conflict leading to revolution and egalitarian socialism. In contrast with both of these ideologies, the elite theories suggested an inescapable division between dominant minorities (variously called "elites," "ruling classes," "political classes," "oligarchies," "aristocracies," etc.) and the dominated majority, or the "masses".

The elitist theory deny that there can be, in any real sense, government by the people and argued that "government of the people" is a sheer fantasy, a myth, a deceptive concept, which is impossible in practice. In every political system authority vest in the political elite because only they provide the leadership. The elitist theory does not accept the concept of political equality as the governors and the governed cannot be equal. The theory stands on the classical doctrine of natural in equality of mankind. It implies that even if all men are taken as equal according to Biblical injunction of 'Fatherhood of god and brotherhood of man', some are more equal than others with the result that few have position of advantage over the many. In other words, men are inherently unequal and thus only a few have a little to rule many. However, the supporters of this theory do not accept inequality by birth, instead they hold that the basis of inclusion elite is higher ability, knowledge, character, efficiency, wealth, or skill.

The supporters of the elitist theory maintained that though the political elite may give the slogans of "will of the people", "public interest:, "majority rule", "responsible government" and "popular sovereignty" to appease or bluff the people; though there may be elections at fixed intervals, yet political organisations demands that the political power should vest in the minority. The Elitist theory of Democracy emphasized that democracy "is a political system in which the influence of the majority is assured by elective and competitive minority to whom it is entrusted."

Elite theories can also be seen as an intellectual response to the "modern trends" that strengthened the state and have led to the rapid expansion of government bureaucracies, the emergence of bureaucratized mass parties, the concentration of corporate power, the growth of powerful and centralized mass media, and the rise of fascist movements and regimes—all of which have weakened liberal capitalism and

dented the hopes for participatory democratization. Mosca, Pareto, Michels, and Weber all saw these trends as a consequence of bureaucratic industrialism. In their view, the increasing complexity of modern society implied progressive bureaucratic organization of all activities and power concentration in the hands of elites, who can effectively manage democratic institutions, accumulate the privileges that power brings, orchestrate mass support, and protect their positions by controlling access to the top. This view of power stratification, combined with the insistence on the universality of elites and treatment of elite characteristics as key explanatory variables, constitutes the most distinctive tenet of classic elite theory.

The second theoretical tenet concerns the capacity of power holders to organize themselves and form cohesive groups. Strong cohesion does not preclude the possibility of temporary intra-elite conflicts and divisions on specific policy questions. However, when it comes to defending common power interests, members of the elite act in unison, and this makes their power irresistible.

The third tenet concerns the linkages between elites and various "social forces," such as social movements, classes, and ethno-racial groups. The classic elite theorists insist that such linkages are an essential condition of elite power, but they are less than clear on precise meaning of such linkages.

The fourth tenet is about access and succession. Entry to the elite ranks depends on acquiring certain rare attributes (e.g., wealth, prestige, education), and it is carefully controlled—directly and indirectly—by elite incumbents. Elites control recruitment of their successors through institutional "gatekeepers" (e.g., corporate hierarchies, political party machines) as well as through elite "selectorates" operating at each level of hierarchical promotion. One outcome of these selective practices is a biased social composition; another is a persistence of elite outlooks, even at times of rapid social mobility and elite circulation, that is, replacement of elite members.

The final tenet highlights the way in which elites typically exercise their power. All elite theorists converge on a view of "engineered" elite domination through persuasion and manipulation, occasionally backed by force. Democratic elections have a symbolic character and are an important tool for the orderly circulation of elite personnel, but they seldom alter elite structure.

## **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

| not su         | afficient.  |
|----------------|---|
| Elites         | s are differentiated and stratified. Comment.   |
| Polition this? | cal elites are sometimes conflated with ruling classes. How do you understand                     |
| The E          | Elite theory stands on the classical doctrine of natural in equality of mankind.                  |
|                |   |
|                | theories can also be seen as an intellectual response to the "modern trends". ou agree with this? |
|                |   |
| Brief          | ly state the core tenets of Elite theory?   |
|                |   |
|                |   |

NOTE: Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is

#### 3.3.5 VILFREDO PARETO: THE CIRCULATION OF ELITES

Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923) is an Italian economist and sociologist who is known for his theory on mass and elite interaction as well as for his application of mathematics to economic analysis. Believing that there were problems that economics could not solve, Pareto turned to sociology, writing what he considered his greatest work, *Mind and Society* (1916), in which he inquired into the nature and bases of individual and social action. Pareto, in this work, examined many societies, political regimes, and alternating eras of faith and scepticism in Western history. He sought to illustrate an intricate theory about humanity's several and conflicting non-logical propensities ('residues'), the rationalisations, superstitions, and ideologies derived from them ('derivations'), and how changing combinations of propensities and derived beliefs, together with concrete economic interests, shape the era-like fortunes of societies.

Pareto's starting point was deceptively simple. He portrayed all societies as containing two analytic and interacting categories: largely powerless masses and powerful elites, with the latter sub-divided into 'governing' and 'non-governing' elites. Historically, governing elites were hereditary aristocracies anchored in the most gifted and talented – the qualitatively superior élite of a society – and in socially delineated monopolies of power and privilege. For Pareto, the class and status underpinnings of governing elites are less important than their psychosocial profiles, that is, key personality traits and proclivities that shape dominant styles of governance and interest alliances. Pareto stressed that economic interests are always important determinants of elite preferences and actions, but he postulated that powerful non-logical biases, passions, values and the ways in which they are justified are in the long run more decisive.

Three aspects of Pareto's governing elites stand out. First, he conceived of them as complex aggregations of powerful political, economic and social groups, the inner leaderships of which are located in governments. In Pareto's usage, governing elites encompass opposing parties and allies rotating in and out of government offices and squabbling endlessly over policy matters. But these rotations and squabbles do not alter basic psychosocial propensities and governing styles.

Elite members are disposed to combine the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, but over time they, and especially their leaders, come to rely primarily on one mode, one style of governance. They constitute intertwined and polyarchal webs of patrons with diverse clienteles, but there is always a 'common accord' resulting from 'an infinitude of minor acts, each determined by present advantage'. In Pareto's treatment, governing elites are in no sense monolithic; their unity is manifested at a meta-political level – in shared outlooks and tacit consensus about boundaries of political patronage and a style of governance. The major difference between Pareto's governing elites, Marx's ruling classes and Weber's dominant status groups is that for Pareto shared elite outlooks and tacit consensus encompass not only a dominant class interest and a legitimation formula, but also and most importantly a basic set of non-logical ('residual') propensities that shape the balance or imbalance between force and persuasion.

Second, Pareto agreed with most of his contemporaries, such as Weber, Michels and Mosca, that government executives in modern bureaucratic states acquire overarching control of national policies. Accordingly, a modern governing elite's inner leadership is pivotal, often displaying a sufficient commonality of purpose to be treated analytically as a social actor, though Pareto always stressed the broader governing elite's importance. For him, as for Weber, political and social change is mainly top-down, but Pareto located its causalities in a governing elite's psychosocial complexion, which, he held, alters in step with changing rates of circulation between the elite and the masses. This gave his theory a more systemic character than Weber's leader-centred theory. Pareto's conception of governing elites also differed from Marx's thesis that in capitalist societies state executives are mere management committees of ruling bourgeois classes and their main interests. Pareto agreed that state power lies in the hands of bourgeois ('plutocratic') interests, but, like Weber, he held that the leaders of governing elites enjoy considerable autonomy vis-à-vis bourgeois interests and can, in fact, 'despoil' those interests by wasting their wealth. The inner cores of governing elite leaders favour only some economic interests, only some holders and producers of wealth, and this selective patronage tends to squander economic resources and weaken economies.

Third, Pareto famously theorized that governing elites can be distinguished most fundamentally according to which of two non-logical propensities predominates: a 'Class I' propensity to combine things in innovative ways, which renders governing elites fox-like in actions; a 'Class II' propensity to keep or restore things to traditional forms and ways, which produces lion-like actions. Vulpine governing elites act in cunning, inventive, innovative and manipulative ways; leonine elites act with idealism, intolerance and a strong preference for applying force to achieve and cement social unity. Cutting across the customary right/left spectrum – Pareto portrayed revolutionaries as exemplifying the Class II propensity.

In sum, governing elites embody wide and complex patronage networks and practices, as well as a psychosocial propensity and consequent style of governance tending to rely on cunning and persuasion or determination and force. Governing elites seldom achieve a high degree of integration and are rarely if ever cabals; they are instead broad condominiums of groups and circles that are normally capable of defending their advantaged positions and pursuing mutually beneficial courses of action. More concretely, governing elites are congeries of political party leaders competing for government offices, groups promoting specific economic interests, factions trumpeting various ideologies, as well as groups of ethno-religious, military, regional and other important leaders.

#### 3.3.5.1 PARETO'S CIRCULATION/ CYCLES OF ELITE

Pareto's discussion of elite cycles can be summarised into five principal claims:

- While routine elite circulation movements of persons from non-elite to elite positions and vice versa is constant and produces gradual elite change, the inflow of talented persons with a different psychosocial profile varies in a broad cyclical manner as a consequence of gradual elite closure and degeneration followed eventually by intensified elite replacement and renewal.
- The closure and degeneration that occur in broad cycles subsume cultural, economic, and political sub-cycles that accelerate broad cycles when they coincide and retard them when they cross cut.

- Each broad cycle is distinguished mainly by a governing elite's predominant non-logical propensity especially but not exclusively its mix of Class I and Class II propensities and by economic alliances within the elite.
- The end of a broad cycle and start of a new one may be sudden or gradual, but it is usually marked by a profound crisis that is contingent in details, yet path dependent in the sense that some 'general regularities' are discernible.
- In the course of each broad cycle there are periods of elite renewal and periods of deterioration, but degeneration eventually becomes pronounced and signals a profound crisis that terminates the cycle.

The duration of elite cycles is unclear in Pareto's exposition. In fact, Pareto seemed to have two kinds of elite cycles in mind: (1) long cycles involving enduring configurations and dispositions of elites, both governing and non-governing, accompanied by slow-moving mass currents prevailingly religious-ideological or secular-rationalist in thrust; (2) short cycles book-ended by crises that materially alter governing elite composition and political regime type, such as shifts from 'demagogic' to 'military' plutocracies and back. Long cycles begin and end with definitive collapses of governing elites and much of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical orders they have overseen. But long cycles encompass shorter cycles during which the stability and effectiveness of governing elites weaken but are renewed by adjustments made during periodic crises that stem from this weakening.

The end of a long cycle is the result of a governing elite's gradual but inexorable degeneration and the dire situation it eventually creates. Degeneration occurs in three principal and interrelated ways. First, routine circulation slows so that a governing elite becomes increasingly closed, with able persons who do not fit the elite's preferred psychosocial and stylistic profile more and more excluded from its ranks. This not only unbalances the elite's composition and denudes the elite of talent, it breeds frustration among aspirants, who, on finding their careers blocked, foment mass opposition. Second, a governing elite's intellectual and political qualities deteriorate, with key positions held increasingly by mediocrities who have risen to power through family inheritance, cronyism, and sycophancy, and who lack the

vigour and wisdom necessary for decisive and effective actions. Elite members who promise such actions are shunted aside because they threaten to upset mutual back-scratching practices. Third, a governing elite becomes increasingly biased, doctrinaire and inflexible, less and less able to adjust its policy repertoire to fit changing circumstances. Where new circumstances call for policies more persuasive or forceful, more cunning or coercive, the elite – especially its inner leadership core – sticks to templates and bromides its members regard as true. As a consequence of all three processes, blunders and miscalculations multiply.

Thus, governing elites of both types degenerate and ultimately fail, though they do so in somewhat different ways. The degeneration of predominantly leonine elite typically involves enervating military over-extensions, quagmires and setbacks; that of a predominantly vulpine elite typically involves enervating gridlocks and dissipations of authority that stem from trying to placate myriad patrons and clienteles. Either degenerative process culminates in a crisis that triggers wide elite circulation and an influx of groups and persons inclined toward the alternative propensity. This circulation may take sudden and violent forms, as in revolutions or military coups, or it may involve discredited leaders being shouldered aside by those better able to deal with the crisis at hand. In the latter case, groups and persons formerly excluded from leading positions assail the existing modus operandi, out-manoeuvre current leaders and take charge. The exact mode of a wide circulation depends on contingencies such as the extent of elite degeneration, the relative severity of the crisis to which it has led, or a conjunction of military failure and fiscal insolvency.

Pareto spurned any idea that a lasting elite equilibrium – an efficacious balancing of persuasion and force – is possible. Cycles of elite circulation and degeneration can never be eliminated. He observed, however, that the start of a cycle may provide a temporary respite – an interval of renewal and hope – because the influx of new elite groups and leaders supplies needed flexibility, innovation, talent, and vigour. A measure of temporary equilibrium is achieved, and a honeymoon period for the new elite unfolds. But this is bound to be short-lived, because the new elite tends to attribute its predecessor's downfall to specific errors and stylistic shortcomings, rather than to more general bias and closure, political mediocrities in high positions and inflexible policies.

It is important to bear in mind that Pareto's theory of elite circulation and degeneration was but a component of his more general theoretical vision, in which he conceived of societies as moving constantly toward or away from the equilibrium of non-logical propensities and clashing economic interests. No society attains full and lasting equilibrium; it can at most be partial and temporary, because circumstances change constantly, and imbalances of propensities and interests cannot be prevented. When these imbalances become great, major upheavals occur and reduce them, so a condition closer to equilibrium obtains for a time. But inevitably, imbalances again become aggravated and the process is repeated. Imbalances in the propensities and interests of governing elites are political manifestations of this wider flux in societies. Treating Pareto's elite theory in isolation from his general theory makes the former seem more simplistic than it actually is.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| What are the two p |   |
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| What are the two I |   |
| What are the two p |   |
|                    | propensities that governing elite possesses?            |
|                    |   |
|                    |   |
| Pareto's discussio | on of elite cycles can be summarised into five principa |
| What are they?     |   |

| Accor   | ding Pareto degenerative process culminates in a crisis that trigger |
|---------|--|
| elite c | irculation. How do you understand this?                              |

#### 3.3.6 MICHELS: THE IRON LAW OF OLIGARCHY

Robert Michels (1876-1936) belongs to that generation of European social scientist which tried to understand twentieth-century Western society. Michel's standing in social sciences is assured by his brilliant monograph *Political Parties* (1911 a), in which he formulated the problem of oligarchical tendencies in organizations. Michels grappled with the problems of democracy, socialism, revolution, class conflict, trade unionism, mass society, nationalism, and imperialism, and with the role of intellectuals and of elites.

To Michels organizations are the only means for the creation of a collective will and they work under the 'Iron Law of Oligarchy'. He explicitly points out the indispensability of oligarchy from the organizations by saying that "It is organization which gives birth to the domination of the elected over electors, of the mandatanes over the mandators, of the delegates over delegators, who says organization, says oligarchy".

Oligarchical tendencies in organizations are not related to ideology or ends of the organizations. Of course, it is evident that any organization which is set up for autocratic aims, it is oligarchic by nature. To Michels, regardless of any ideological concerns, all types of organizations have oligarchic tendencies. It was his major question in political parties that "how can oligarchic tendencies be explained in socialist and democratic parties, which they declared war against it?"

When he examines this question throughout in his book *Political Parties*, he sees organization itself particularly bureaucracy, nature of human being and the phenomenon of leadership as major factors for oligarchical tendencies in organizations. According to Michels' assessments, the crowd is always subject to suggestion and the masses have an apathy for guidance of their need. In contrast the leaders have a natural greed of power. To Michels, leadership itself is not compatible with the most essential postulates of democracy, but leadership is a necessary phenomenon in every form of society. He says "At the outset, leaders arise spontaneously, their functions are 'accessory' and 'gratuitous'. Soon however, they become professional leaders, and in this second stage of development they are stable and irremovable".

Leaders also have personal qualities that make them successful as a ruling class. These qualities are: the force of will, knowledge, strength of conviction, self sufficiency, goodness of heart and disinterestedness. Furthermore there is a reciprocal relationship between leadership functions and the organizational structure. Majority of leaders abuse organizational opportunities for their personal aims by using their personal qualities and by creating means, organizational process or principles like party discipline.

As for as organization itself is considered as a source of oligarchy, Michels says that it is generally because of "psychology of organization itself" that is to say, upon the tactical and technical necessities which result from the consolidation of every disciplined political aggregate. Further as a particular type of organization bureaucracy and its features require an oligarchic structure.

At the societal level, although development in the democracy, oligarchy still exists. First of all he says by looking at the state as an organization, which needs a bureaucracy that is the source of enemy of individual freedom, the state represents a single gigantic oligarchy. An attempt to destroy this gigantic oligarchy in fact brings a number of smaller oligarchies in society but does not eliminate it. Secondly he agrees with Rousseau on the idea that "it is always against the natural order of things that the majority rule and the minority ruled". Along with this idea professional leadership is seen by Michels as an incompatible phenomenon with

democracy, because, although the leaders at once are not more than executive agents off collective will, as soon as they gain the technical specialization, they emancipate themselves from the masses and start to use their power against the majority. In addition to this, representative political system is not compatible with the ideal democracy, because to Michels, "a mass which delegates its sovereignty, that is to say transfer its sovereignty to the hands of the few individuals, abdicates its sovereign function".

The third factor is related to level of socio-economic development of societies and experience of democracy in history. To him in this time ideal democracy is impossible due to socio-economic conditions. He further says that, "The democracy has an inherent preference for the authoritarian solution of the important questions".

#### 3.3.6.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF OLIGARCHY

Michels used the term "oligarchy" or "oligarchic tendency" to cover several aspects of political behaviour that are conceptually quite distinct and that may or may not coexist in organizations, parties, or trade unions: (1) the emergence of leadership; (2) the emergence of professional leadership, and its stabilization; (3) the formation of a bureaucracy, that is, an appointed, regularly paid staff with distinct duties; (4) the centralization of authority; (5) the displacement of goals, particularly the shift from ultimate goals (e.g., achieving a socialist society) to instrumental goals (i.e., perpetuating the organization); (6) increased ideological rigidity—conservatism, in the sense of adherence to policies and ideas that have been rendered obsolete by changed circumstances, and intolerance toward attempts to revise such policies or ideas; (7) the growing difference between the interests and/or points of view of the leaders and of the members, and the precedence of the leaders' interests over those of the members; (8) the decrease in the members' opportunities to participate in policy decisions, even when they are willing to participate; (9) the co-optation of emergent opposition leaders by the existing leadership; (10) the "omnibus" tendency of parties, the shift from appeals to the membership to appeals to the electorate and from appeals to a class electorate to appeals to a broader electorate—such shifts may produce a more moderate program, while opposition as a matter of principle is replaced by competition with other parties, and disloyal opposition to the social and political system is replaced by loyal opposition and even by participation in governing.

If, as the list suggests, the label "oligarchic tendencies" is used to cover so many different things, it becomes quite meaningless. Such critics as Cassinelli and Dahl therefore have tried to define the meaning of "oligarchy"— or of related concepts, like "ruling class"— in more precise and operational terms.

#### 3.3.6.2 Modification to Pareto's Theory of Circulation of Elites

As a logical result of his 'iron law of oligarchy', he admits there are elites in society but not elite circulation in terms of replacing one another. He does not redefine the concept of elite, he took Pareto's theory of circulation of elites and modified it. To Michels, there is a battle between the old and new elites, leaders. The end of this war is not an absolute replacement of the old elites by the new elites, but a reunion of elites, a perennial amalgamation. Complete replacement of elites is rare in history. The old elites attract, absorb and assimilate the new ones, and it is a continuous process. Because for Michels, first old aristocracy does not disappear, does not become proletarian or impoverished, does not make way for new group of rulers, but that always remains at the head of nations, which it led over the course of centuries. Secondly, the old aristocracy be it very old rejuvenated, does not exercise the rule alone but is forced to shave it with some kind of new rulers.

Aristocracy for Michels is not homogenous stratum, and consists of nobility and ruling class. Nobility represents a small but strong part of aristocracy. In this sense it seems that nobility represents real oligarchical power in the society. To Michels nobility holds itself at the helm and does not even dream of disappearing from the stage of history. Though not coinciding with aristocracy, and not constituting more than a part of it, nobility generally takes hold of it and makes itself its master. It pervades, conquers, and molds, the high middle class according to its own moral and social essence. In contrast to nobility, aristocracy is heterogeneous and a place where lower class members can easily rise and members of aristocracy can be subject to downward social mobility. For his time, he describes elements of aristocracy (1) aristocrats by birth (2) aristocracy of government clerks, (3) aristocracy of money (4) aristocracy of knowledge. All this groups also represent ruling class.

Michels does not get in too much special analysis of the relationships between aristocracy, ruling class and majority. He doesn't see that there are much differences in oligarchy in organization and oligarchy in society at large.

To sum up, Michels in his work, *Political Parties*, traced the necessity of elite rule in modern societies to the imperatives of complex organization. Influenced by Weber's work on politics and bureaucracy, Michels's most famous conclusion is summarized in his "Iron Law of Oligarchy", the argument that large-scale organizations necessarily concentrate power in the hands of a few at the top. Once in power, leaders in organizations such as labour unions and political parties act to preserve their positions. Those who rise from lower levels in the organization are co-opted in a process that preserves the structure of power. The resources available to institutional leaders and their relative unity of interest and perspective give them numerous advantages in maintaining their power over the unorganized rank and file. Over time, leaders develop similar interests and intraelite attachments that reflect their elevated position and separate them from the masses. For their part, Michels saw the masses contributing to elite rule through their general apathy and acquiescence. With his focus on organizational factors, Michels has been very influential in the development of contemporary elite approaches to power.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 3**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| l. | To Michels, organizations are the only means for the creation of a collective |
|----|---|
|    | will and they work under the 'Iron Law of Oligarchy'. Explain.                |
|    |   |
|    |   |
|    |   |
|    |   |
|    |   |

| Why Michels consider that oligarchy continues even in societies where democracy |
|---|
| is developed?   |
|   |
|   |
| How Michels modified Pareto's theory of Circulation of Elite?                   |
|   |
|   |
|   |

#### 3.3.7 GAETANO MOSCA: THE RULING CLASS

Gaetano Mosca (1858-1941) was an Italian political philosopher, political scientist, journalist and public servant. He is credited with developing the Theory of Elitism and the doctrine of the Political Class and is one of the three members constituting the Italian School of Elitists together with Vilfredo Pareto and Robert Michels.

Mosca's hostility toward democratic ideology and the parliamentary system was evident in his first major work, "On the Theory of Governments and Parliamentary Government" (1884). The book is an outburst against contemporary Italian political life, which, Mosca alleged, had become arbitrary and corrupt as a necessary consequence of popular sovereignty. Mosca's criticism is, in part, simply an instance of the then prevailing antiparliamentarianism; but it stands apart because of its clear-cut distinction between the ideal of liberty on the one hand and the evils to the democratic "myth" on the other hand.

Basic to Mosca's thought was the conviction that only the substitution of scientific truth (such as the doctrine of "ruling class") for "metaphysical abstractions" (such as the democratic myth) would make it possible to purify and to heal political practice. His faith in the redeeming power of political science appears to have been fostered by the prevailing cultural atmosphere of his youth. At that time, in Italy as elsewhere, positivist philosophy was dominant, and Mosca believed he could transfer its inductive method from the study of nature to the study of human society.

#### 3.3.7.1 THE THEORY OF THE RULING CLASS

Mosca's ideas were first systematically presented in *The Ruling Class* (1896), the work that may be said to mark the birth of Political Science in Italy. Mosca was never to change basically the theory he presented at that time, although by 1923, when the second edition of the work appeared, his doctrine had been in many respects deepened and elaborated.

Mosca maintains that in every society there are governors and governed. The governors belong to minority and are organized whereas the governed belong to majority and are unorganised. To quote his own words: "In all societies two classes of people appear, a class that rule and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that power brings, whereas the second, the more numerous class, is directed and controlled by the first, in a manner that is now more or less legal, now more arbitrary and violent and supplies the first, in appearance at least, with the instrumentalities that are essential to the vitality of the political organism."

As indicated by the title of Mosca's programmatic lecture "The Aristocratic Principle and the Democratic One, in the Past and the Future" (1908), he held that two opposite tendencies are inherent in society: the aristocratic tendency toward keeping power in the hands of the descendants of those who govern and the democratic tendency toward renewal by means of elements derived from the governed. Paralleling these tendencies are two principles, likewise opposed to each other: the "autocratic," according to which authority is transmitted downward, and the "liberal," by which authority is delegated from below. The two antitheses are independent and may coexist.

The theory acquires a tighter articulation by its distinction between two levels within the ruling class, with government proper being at one level, and at the other, lower level all the existing political forces. Finally, the theory is crowned by the concept of "juridical defence," possible only when there exist a "balance of social forces" and therefore a government of law dispensing "relative justice". Juridical defence can be realized only when there is a plurality of forces, independent of and checking each

other and sharing in the power of government. His concept of "relative justice" gives us an indication that Mosca believes in a kind of law, that the governing elite, in course of time, is not able to provide are no longer regarded as valuable can be replaced.

According to Mosca, the distinguishing characteristic of the elite being "the aptitude to command and to exercise political control", once the ruling class loses this aptitude and people outside the ruling class cultivate it in large numbers, there is every possibility that the old ruling class will be deposed and replaced by the new one. Mosca is able to establish some relationship between the changes in social circumstances and individual characteristics. New interests and ideals are formulated in society, new problems arise, and the process of circulation of elites is accelerated. He prefers a mobile society and change through persuasion. He also advises the governing elite to bring about gradual alterations in the political system in order to make it conform to changes in the public opinion.

Mosca explains the rule of the minority over the majority by the fact that it is organized, whereas the individual in the majority stands alone before it, and also by the fact that the minority is usually composed of superior individuals. Mosca recognizes the role of certain social forces in balancing and limiting the influence of other 'social forces'. Mosca also introduces the concept of the 'sub-elite', composed practically of the whole 'new middle class' of civil servants, managers of industries, scientists and scholars, and treats it as a vital element in the government of society. He states that "The stability of any political organism", depends on the level of morality, intelligence and activity that this second stratum has attained".

Mosca attaches a great deal of importance to what he calls the 'political formula'. Mosca's 'political formula' is equivalent to Pareto's 'derivations'. In every society, he believes the governing elite tries to find a moral and legal basis for its being in the citadel of power and represents it as 'the logical and necessary consequence of doctrines and beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted'. The political formula may not, and generally does not, embody absolute truth. It may as well be merely a plausible myth which is nothing but plain and simple fraud cleverly contrived by the ruling class in order to dupe the masses into subjection. The fact that the policies of the ruling class, even though formulated in its own interest, are covered in a moral and legal garb satisfies, according to Mosca, a definite social need and gratifies a deeply felt human requirement that man should be governed on the basis of some moral principle, and not by mere physical force. It also serves as a factor in the unification of political institutions, peoples and civilizations. Mosca would, therefore, regard it as an instrument of moral cohesion.

To sum up, Mosca, through his work of The Ruling Class, Mosca emphasized the ways in which tiny minorities outwit large majorities. He states that "political classes"—his term for elites—usually have "a certain material, intellectual, or even moral superiority" over those they govern. Pareto postulated that in a society with truly unrestricted social mobility, elites would consist of the most talented and deserving individuals but that in actual societies they are those who are most adept at using the two modes of political rule, force and persuasion, and who usually enjoy important advantages such as inherited wealth and family connections.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 4**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| According Mosca two opposite tendencies are inherent in society. What are |
|---|
| Briefly state about Mosca's notions about 'nolitical formula'             |
|   |

#### 3.3.8 ELITE THEORY: CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE

The classical elite theory significantly contributed to increasing our understanding on how the contemporary political systems are functioning. It also contributed to comprehend modern bureaucratic state and its top-down functioning. However, the post-World War II students of elites played down the cohesion of elites and questioned the classic theorists' skepticism as to the prospects for democratization. In the seminal formulation of Joseph Schumpeter (1954), elites are an essential ingredient of modern democracy, which implies a regular electoral competition for political leadership. This idea was followed up by Robert Dahl (1971), Giovanni Sartori (1981) and many other "plural," "demo-," and "neo-" elite theorists. It was backed by empirical studies of modern elites, especially in advanced democracies, that revealed complex networks of competing and collaborating elite groups, rather than cohesive minorities. The results of these studies, however, were inconclusive, largely because any picture of power distribution depends on the way power is defined and measured. Those who identified power holders by their reputation and incumbency in top organizational positions produced a picture of cohesive "establishments" and "power elites." In contrast, those who defined elites as key decision makers produced a picture of "plural" elites, that is, competing elite groups.

#### 3.3.9 LET US SUM UP

The elitist theories were originally developed in the field of Sociology to explain the behaviour of men in social setting. This theory was put forward by liberal sociologists in the 19th century in opposition to the Marx's theory of ruling class which maintains that in a class-divided society, the economically dominant class is always the ruling class. As T.B.Bottomore writes in his book *Elites in Society*, "the idea of elites was originally conceived in opposition to the idea of social classes." Historically the concept of elite originated in the works of Pareto, Mosca and Michels who emphasized that elite is not a static concept since there is always "circulation of elites." Though in the beginning the elitist theory was in opposition to socialism and democracy yet later on the elitist theory of democracy was built up on the argument that if there is a competition between the elites for people's votes, and people vote in periodic election to choose the ruling elite, then, in spite of the ruling elite, there will be a democracy.

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M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics UNIT-III: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, DEPENDENCY, ELITE AND CIVIL **SOCIETY** 

# 3.4 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN THE PROCESS OF **DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE**

- V. Nagendra Rao

#### **STRUCTURE**

- 3.4.0 Objectives
- 3.4.1 Introduction
- 3.4.2 Social Movements
- 3.4.3 New Social Movements
  - 3.4.3.1 Defining New Social Movements
  - 3.4.3.2 The Emergence of New Social Movements
  - 3.4.3.3 What was New about New Social Movements
- 3.4.4 State, Civil Society and Social Movements
- 3.4.5 Civil Society and Globalization: Democratizing the Power
- 3.4.6 Let us Sum up

#### 3.4.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson you shall be able to understand:

• the importance of social movements in contemporary world;

- the emergence of new social movements and how they are different from earlier movements;
- the interface between state, civil society and social movements;
- the role of civil society and social movements in democratizing global power.

#### 3.4.1 INTRODUCTION

Over the past two to three decades, social movements have been acknowledged to be of increasing significance within political science, social research and policy making. Social movements are broadly considered to be the cradle of democracy.

Social movements are a key element of civil society. New social movements theory started to appear in the late 1 960s and 1970s to explain new waves of political activism – student protests, feminism, peace and environmentalism. Unlike political parties, new social movements have a loose network structure and often use direct action as a campaigning tool. On the other hand, what distinguishes a social movement from social networks more generally is that a movement has a purpose beyond sociability, in that it is engaged in social change.

#### 3.4.2 SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The origins of social movement theory go back to the attempts by the Chicago School (USA) to make sense of informal social action by understanding the rationality of the actors themselves. The political process model derived from the historical research suggests that modern social movements appeared after the French Revolution as local actions against individuals (for example landlords) were replaced by national movements to change state policy.

Social movements rise and fall through cycles of protest, in which some movements act as 'early risers', while others follow as 'late comers'. In the course of a protest cycle social movements develop action repertoires which are understood by their opponents. Since the nineteenth century, as Tarrow says, a modular action repertoire has come into being, to which particular modules are added in each new cycle of protest. Action repertoires tend to focus on convention (lobbying government, press work and so on) or contention (protest, particularly direct action). The political

opportunities open to social movements can increase when the state is opening up to give greater access to power or when divisions emerge between ruling elites. Conflicting political opportunities may, however, appear at the local, national and global levels.

Social movements must mobilize their resources of membership, money and expertise. This involves forming organizations and building networks between organizations. Movement leaders need to provide a strategy that links up these resources in the most effective way and that makes participation most attractive to their potential supporters. Yet strategy needs to be put in the context of a movement culture. Social movement leaders present their actions in terms of collective action frames. Several authors have distilled specific framing tasks they see as essential for any successful social movement — Gamson offers three such frames. An *injustice frame* defines what's wrong — the social issue at stake. An *identity frame* defines who 'we' the social movement are and who the adversaries are. An *agency frame* defines what 'we' can do — viable methods of social change. The alignment of these frames among key actors and organizations and their diffusion to wider publics is then a key process of establishing a social movement.

Contemporary social movements do not simply mobilize existing challenging groups against power holders, they create new values and identities (such as feminists and environmentalists). In emphasizing culture and emerging identities as the main product of social movements, Melucci encouraged students of social movements to look beyond visible mobilizations, to the submerged cultural networks of social movements in everyday life, which act as 'cultural laboratories' experimenting with new identities. Thus festivals and protest actions began to merge in the 'DIY Culture' of the late 1990s.

At the turn of the millennium, the radical environmental movements took a distinctly global turn and connected with social justice issues. Both governance and civil society now operate at a number of geographical scales. Not only has global governance become far more significant in itself, but has also become evermore the focus of global civil society and social movement mobilization activity, as events in Seattle, Prague and Genoa have demonstrated. Since then global financial and trade organizations have been a focus for a series of actions, mobilizing a wide range of

participants, using and innovating a mixture of conventional and contentious action repertoires, combining global and cultural politics. The heightened tensions of international politics since 2001 have caused recurrent waves of peace mobilizations against wars and threats of war. Yet it has remained unclear whether radical elements are able to combine with broader sections of civil society to sustain a social movement dynamic in which alliances are not purely instrumental, but are strongly backed by shared identity. While the nation-state still remains a central focus for politics, global issues are central to current social movements. However, even the most global social movements recruit, mobilize and act much of the time in particular localities, demanding their respective state for their rights and entitlements and it is here that state, civil society and social movements converge either as partners and conflictual agencies.

### 3.4.3 NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

New social movements (NSMs) are both a major phenomenon of recent Western history and an important topic within contemporary social and political studies. The study of these movements extends from straightforward empirical description to more theoretical attempts to explain their rise, activities and ultimate fate.

#### 3.4.3.1 DEFINING NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Although there is no straightforward answer to the question 'What are new social movements?', a provisional definition will help to locate the problem. Social movements, then, are less organized, partially extra- or anti-institutional forms of collective activity aiming, over an extended period, to bring about (and sometimes prevent) social change. Social movements interact with, influence and sometimes succeed in transforming the institutionalized political structures of a society.

The term 'new social movements' refers to a group of contemporary (or recent) social movements that have played a significant and largely progressive role in societies from the late 1 960s. The identification of these waves of activism as 'new' typically refers to their concern with *issues* other than *class*. The category normally includes peace and anti-nuclear movements, environmental, ecological or green movements, lesbian and gay liberation, second-wave feminism, anti-racist and alternative lifestyle movements.

#### 3.4.3.2 THE EMERGENCE OF NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

The term and history of the New Social Movements can be traced back to Western societies. In fact, the emergence of new social movements in thevWest came as a surprise to most commentators. Thev'long economic boom' and 'social democratic consensus' after World War II corresponded to a period of political stability and even apathy, marked by academic pronouncements of the 'end of ideology'. The conflict between capital and labour was tamed by the class-compromising structures of the welfare state with its progressive taxation, social security and welfare provision, policies of full employment. A state of permanent Cold War with the communist East helped to contain social conflicts in the capitalist West, cementing consensus under US hegemony around a security policy based on the nuclear deterrence of 'mutually assured destruction'.

However, there are many segments are society in Western countries that have still witnessing oppression, exploitation and discrimination. From the 1950s in the USA, the black Civil Rights movement spoke for 'outcasts and outsiders', who were excluded not just from most of the material benefits of the 'affluent society' but also from civil and democratic rights. During the 1960s further cracks appeared. Protests against the USA's war in Vietnam were both products and catalysts of an emerging student radicalism, giving rise to emergence of new organizations. Student radicalism was itself inseparable from a more diffuse 'counterculture' of 'sex, drugs and rock 'n' roll'. Horrified by the failures and crimes of Stalinism but equally dissatisfied with the compromise and bureaucratic paternalism of social democracy, New Left intellectuals fashioned a more democratic version of socialism. These diverse strands of dissent and activism reached their public and symbolic climax in the 'May Events' of Paris in 1968, when a combination of students and workers seemed on the point of toppling the French state. Although prospects of revolution were soon averted, the dramatic nature of these events shattered complacent belief in the inevitable stability of Western democracies. This period also saw a strong revival of peace and anti-nuclear activism, and the upsurge throughout Western societies of the environmental or 'green' movements. It is in the aftermath of the Paris Events and these new movements that the origins of new social movements can be located.

#### 3.4.3.3 WHAT WAS NEWABOUT NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS?

The new social movements of the 1970s displayed a number of seemingly novel characteristics. In contrast to the 'old politics' dominated by class and distributional issues, new social movements addressed issues of gender, sexuality, race, nature and security. Although they still made material demands (for equal pay and opportunities, social justice, fair trade, etc.), the new movements insisted on their independence from class-based divisions. In contrast to the centralist and bureaucratic electoral and revolutionary organizations of the old left, new forms of political practice and collective action were also in evidence. Alongside more conventional organizations, there was a flourishing of more fluid, participatory and even anarchistic groups. Loosely organized 'affinity' and 'consciousness-raising' groups practised a different kind of politics, which included the transformation of personal consciousness and identity as well as direct action, moral and symbolic protest. The activists of the new movements also differed from the traditionally working-class stalwarts of the labour movement: they were mainly younger, tertiary educated, from middle or 'new middle' class backgrounds and less preponderantly male.

In short, the new social movements reflect the ideological impact of the civil rights, anti-war and student activism of the 1960s. New social movements directly attack intrinsically political features of civil society, such as patriarchy, homophobia and racism.

They seek changes independently of, as well as through, state action. Social movements are, in sum, both an important determinant of institutionalized politics and a crucial constituent of the relatively autonomous politics of civil society.

### 3.4.4 STATE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

All citizens are presumed to have basic rights and the capacity to exercise free will, associate as they chose and vote for what they prefer. This *capacity* of rights-bearing citizens to associate, deliberate and form preferences in turn produces the norms that underwrite the legitimacy of democratic political authority. In the context of developing democracies, where inequalities remain high, and access to rights is often circumscribed by social position or compromised by institutional weaknesses,

the problem of associational autonomy is so acute that it brings the very notion of citizenship into question. And in the absence of effective citizenship, the problem of subordinate group collective action becomes acute. If we recognize this problem, then we have to understand both the potential of civil society—a space in which all citizens can freely associate and participate equally—and the reality of existing civil society.

A functioning civil society is one that enjoys and defends associational freedoms. While not all groups are equally positioned to take advantage of such freedoms, the one comparative advantage that subordinate groups do have is the possibility of collective action, a possibility enhanced by a more open civil. The history of civil society struggles that have advanced democratization and social rights can be interpreted as a process of redeeming the unredeemed claims of democraticconstitutional societies, a process that has relied critically on subordinate group collective action. The transformative movements of the 20th century—labour, women, civil and indigenous rights—all had in common demands to expand and deepen rights of citizenship. As we shall see in the next section, the deepening of rights has become a key point of articulation between national civil societies, and global movements and international NGOs. The discourse of rights has in effect become the lingua franca of transnational movements, a shared normative base that has facilitated collective action on a range of political and social fronts. The emerging infrastructure of global civil society, both in the form of international law and an increasingly dense network of NGOs and movement alliances, has provided national civil societies critical points of leverage in promoting the expansion of civic, political and increasingly social rights.

A historical perspective underscores the affinity between social movements and the ideal of political equality that animates democracy. Charles Tilly, the most influential scholar of social movements, argues that while some press particularistic claims, they nonetheless expand possibilities for broader claim-making by excluded groups:

Social movements assert popular sovereignty [...] the stress on popular consent fundamentally challenges divine right to kingship, traditional inheritance of rule, warlord control and aristocratic predominance. Even in systems of representative government [...] social movements pose a crucial question: do sovereignty and its accumulated wisdom lie in the legislature or in the people it claims to represent?

But if social movements and civil society have played a critical role in promoting democracy, understanding of their transformative effects should not be limited to questions of political inclusion. The recent revival of interest in civil society came in the aftermath of democratic movements in Eastern Europe. In resisting authoritarianism, these movements naturally emphasized civil and political rights. This lent powerful support to liberal conceptions of civil society that emphasized individual rights and cast civil society in opposition to the state.

For instance, social movements in India are attempting to redefine the governance. Claims for the rights have emerged precisely from those areas which were not characterized by the presence of rights – from the rural poor, tribals, urban proletariat, caste groups, communities, women, which had been marginalized by the activities of the state and placed outside the pale of civilized interactions. These rights claims have expanded the civil sphere by inserting their own discourse in the multitude of discourses constituting the sphere.

Neera Chandhoke identifies three categories of 'Rights-based' movements in India. Firstly, demands have been made that the state fulfil the promise made to the people in the name of social and economic equality and political participation. Secondly, these struggles have contributed in significant ways to the vocabulary of rights, by adding new categories of rights such as the right to human environment and the right of indigenous people to practice their own life-styles. Many of these demands call for the restoration of customary community rights to common property resources; many of them insist on the control of local resources by local communities. The resistance to the construction of the Narmada Dam has been truly spectacular, posing issues of people's rights versus the right of the state to appropriate resources in the name of development. The Chipko Andolan against deforestation in Garhwal district insisted that people should have the right to the Five Fs – fodder, fuel, fertilizer, food, and fibre; the urban poor have demanded the right to shelter. Thirdly, these assertions constitute a distinct challenge to the attempts of the state to control and subdue society.

Marginalized groups have resorted to the language of rights to make claims on the state and on civil society. They seek to enlarge the space of civil society by the entry of a large number of hitherto dispossessed groups using the language of rights. The appropriation of civil society by these struggles is by no means complete, and it will into be complete until civil society charts out its discourse relatively independently of the state, and more importantly, till it succeeds in transforming the sphere itself. The presence and the practices of civil society, therefore, offer possibilities for reappropriation by social movements, since they present the potential of engagement.

#### 3.4.5 CIVIL SOCIETY AND **GLOBALIZATION: DEMOCRATIZING GLOBAL POWER**

Ideas of how civil society can influence power and be a transformative force have largely been developed in the context of national societies. There, associational rights and freedoms are clearly defined, and channels of influence—elections, lobbying, media, public campaigns—are all relatively well institutionalized.

But when we switch from national stages to the global stage, the rules of the game and the nature of the playing field change dramatically. There are strictly speaking no institutions of global democratic representation. States are represented in some international venues, but citizens are not. Other channels of influence exist, but they generally favour powerful and well-organized interests, most notably states and corporations. There is clearly such a thing as global public opinion, but compared to national publics it is amorphous, asymmetrically developed, and does not have the kind of direct power to hold officials and representatives accountable that we would find in a national public sphere. As such, any effort to conceptualize global civil society must begin with these concerns in mind.

In an era of increasing transnational power, how then can global governance be realigned with global politics and specifically global democracy? In the absence of a globally constituted state with representative institutions, there appears to be no institutional answer. But increasingly, global movements and emerging networks of transnational activist networks suggest the possibility that global governance could be embedded in a global civil society. Indeed, this has been the thrust of so-called 'anti-globalization movements', which are more accurately described as global democracy movements. While these movements cut across a range of issue areas, articulate diverse substantive claims and embrace an almost endless variety of political messages, they nonetheless share a basic concern with making new forms of transnational power accountable to civil society

Many theorists seem to be of the view that global civil society represents a 'third sector', which can not only be distinguished from but which is an alternative to both the state-centric international order and the networks of global markets. Lipschutz, for instance, employs the concept of 'global civil society' to indicate a plurality of agencies such as social movements, interest groups, and global citizens. If the distinguishing feature of these organisations is that they defy national boundaries, the cornerstone of global civil society is constituted by the 'self-conscious construction of networks of knowledge and action. Global civil society actors, in other words, engage in practices that can possibly reshape the 'architecture' of international politics by denying the primacy of states or of their sovereign rights. Other scholars are of the opinion that the anti-state character of global civil society is revealed through its projects, for example, through the promotion of values from below, which exist in tension with dominant statist conceptions of the state system. Or that global civil society moving beyond 'thin anarchical society' is in the business of inaugurating a post-foreign policy world.

In other words, contemporary thinking gives us a picture of a global civil society that seems to be supremely uncontaminated by either the power of states or that of markets. Moreover, many theorists believe that global civil society, consisting of transnational non-governmental organisations, political activists, social movements, religious denominations, and associations of all stripe and hue, from trade unions to business and financial groupings, can neutralise existing networks of power by putting forth a different set of values. Global civil society, it is said, represents 'a post realist constellation, where transnational associational life challenges the conceit of the state system. It is touted as the antidote for the anarchical structure, inequality, and exclusions of the state system'.

Now, it is true that global civil society organisations have managed to dramatically expand the agenda of world politics by insistently casting and focusing widespread attention on issues such as human rights, the environment, development, and banning land mines. And all these issues have traditionally fallen within the province

of state sovereignty. Global civil society actors have simultaneously challenged the new contours of the world economic order as mandated by the World Trade Organisation, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund: think of the protests against the global economic dispensation at Seattle in November 1999, at Prague in September 2000, and at Genoa in 2001. But to conclude from this that these actors have drawn up a blueprint for a new or an alternative global order, or indeed to assume that they are autonomous of both states and markets, may prove too hasty a judgement.

This is not to say that global civil society can be reduced to the logic of the state-centric world order or to the workings of the global economy. But we must treat with a fair amount of caution the assumptions that (a) global civil society is autonomous of other institutions of international politics, that (b) it can provide us with an alternative to these institutions, or (c) that it can even give us a deep-rooted and structural critique of the world order.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| Write b  | riefly about state, civil society and social movements interface.   |
|----------|---|
|          |   |
|          |   |
|          |   |
| Critical | lly analyse the role of civil society in democratising global power |

#### 3.4.6 LETS US SUM UP

Under what conditions then does civil society—defined as voluntary associations and movements that operate outside the market, the state and primary affiliations, and that specifically orient themselves to shaping the public sphere contribute to democracy and to more inclusive forms of development? Given how often the idea of civil society leads to a conflation of the normative with the empirical, we should begin with a clear disclaimer: There is nothing about associational life that is inherently democratizing. Associations can be formed to pursue narrow interests, and many associations are clearly uncivil, devised to deny other groups their associational rights.

Whether civil society expands rights-based conceptions of democratic inclusion, serves as an extension of state power or devolves into inward-looking and exclusionary forms of retrenchment is an empirical question, and one that is shaped by civil society's relation to the state, market and emerging social movements. Historical work shows that civil society can become the conduit through which reactionary elites or authoritarian regimes mobilize support, as in the case of the fall of democracy or the rise of fascism in Italy and Spain. However, slight differences in the balance between civil society and political society can have dramatic effects on democratic deepening. In contrast to traditional liberal conceptions of civil society that focus exclusively on freedom of association and contract defined with respect to the state, more recent work in political theory has emphasized that socioeconomic inequalities—including differences in economic well-being and status recognition can have perverse effects on associational life. In this relational view, when civil society's autonomy is compromised and associational life becomes an extension of state power, economic influence or traditional authority, it is more likely to magnify than to reduce inequality. Social movements might have possibility of building collective action to reverse these inequalities and marginalization.

M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics UNIT - IV: STATE, GLOBALIZATION, EUROPEAN UNION AND CLIMATE **CHANGE** 

## 4.1 STATE THEORY: RECENT DEBATE (STATIST & **FOUCAULDIAN PERSPECTIVES)**

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## **STRUCTURE**

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#### 4.1.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to know:

- the recent debates on state with emphasis on state-society nexus;
- the 'statist' perspectives, their main assumptions and critique on these perspectives;
- the Foucauldian approaches on state and their limitations;
- a critical appraisal on recent theories about the state.

#### 4.1.1 INTRODUCTION

The state has been and continues to be one of the classic concerns of political science. Political theory has consequently being somewhat inundated by deliberations on the state. Political theorists, with their great sensitivity to power, concentrate on the state because they recognize that the state is the condensate of power. It has the capacity to shape and control the lives of individuals in a way no other institution can. And therefore, it structures almost every phenomena in society. It is almost impossible to theorize any phenomena – whether it is gender, family, religion, ecology, law, rights, culture or literary text without reference to state as the codified power of the social formulation, the state both contextualizes the phenomena and orders them. Yet, despite the wealth of details on the state, and despite the passionate and intense debates that surrounds it, the nature of the state has proved almost impossible to grasp. The problems that face any theorists seeking to define the state are numerous.

## 4.1.2 THEORIZING THE STATE

The state is the formal incorporation of the community into an entity which can formulate policy and make decisions, the government, and carry out its decisions by means of compulsory measures, the law. The state differs from all other associations in that membership in it is mandatory. It follows that the rules formulated by the government for the community are binding on all persons, whether they consented to these rules or not. The consequence of disobeying the bylaws of an interest group is expulsion or resignation.

The state plays a paradoxical role in the life of individuals and collectivities. On the one hand it is a coercive institution; on the other it provides certain benefits and protections to its members such as access to citizenship rights, social service, and items of collective consumption which no other institution is able to or willing to do. Though it represents the interest of the dominant classes, it is also the site where the general interest of the community can be formulated. Further, it establishes the legal, political and coercive framework within which society exists; it also establishes a sense of belonging to the wider community. And, if it is an instrument which maintains law and order, it is equally an institution which dispenses Justice.

Due to this multi-dimensional and contradictory roles played by the state, it's become extremely difficult to conceptualize it. Theorists differ on the question of which aspect is primary and definite and which is secondary and contingent. This to a large extend explains the disputes that surrounds the discussion on the state. David Easton for instance suggests that any conceptualizing of the state should be abandoned, as it leads to rapid debates and a conceptual morass. On the other hand, John Hoffman has argued that it is the state which has to be at the centre of any theory of politics. Despite all this confusion, there is almost universal acceptance that some kind of state is needed. Critics of the state launching the most devastating attack on it, admit simultaneously the need for some kind of regulatory power which will be able to maintain a certainty to life itself.

Libertarians such as Hayek, argues against the welfare state as inimical to freedom, but also accepts the need for a minimal state which can provide property and enforcing of contracts. Scholars concerning the oppression of the subordinate class also held the same view. For instance the writing from the feminist perspective, Harrington asserts that despite the suspicion that the anti-liberal feminists and liberal internationalists have of the state, 'the very fact that the state creates, condenses and focuses political power may make it the best friend, not enemy of feminists, because the availability of the real power is essential to real democratic control.' The need for a state is almost universally accepted by the majority of political theorists; the problem arises when we seek to conceptualize the kind of state that not only exists, but more importantly should exist. Conceptualizations of the state are almost always the critiques

of the existing states. Political theorists, deeply conscious of the capacity and the power of the state to inscribe social relations, have been profoundly wary of existing states. Therefore the liberals have insisted that the state should be limited and circumscribed and Marxists argued that the state should be transformed through political action.

At the same time, political theory has been constantly preoccupied with thinking about the desired state, a state which would be capable of realizing conditions conducive to human nature

The state is the contentious concept in political theory, because any inquiry into the state is value laden. It is worth remembering that the only time the state was sought to be taken out of political science was when political science tried to be value free in its bid to approximate the natural sciences, during the behavioural phase.

There are accordingly two points that need to be made before any conceptualization of the state is attempted. *First*, any conceptualization is 'normative' enterprise. There can be no objective theory of the state. Secondly, since the state play such a contradictory role in the lives of individuals and collectivities, no conceptualization can adequately capture the state in its entirety.

The state is simply a social relation, in as much as it is the codified power of the social formation. This carries the corresponding formulation, that any attempt to think of state without society can be both problematic and inadequate. This point needs elaboration and this elaboration is carried through in a discussions of the two very influential perspectives on the state in recent times. The first perspective is that of the "Statist School" and the second is inspired by the works of the Michael Foucault. The first focus is on the state, the later on is on society and both are insufficient and incomplete as the subsequent section argues.

#### 4.1.3 THE STATIST PERSPECTIVE

The Statists constructed a case for the state centric theory on the basis of sustained attack on Pluralists, Structuralists, Functionalists and Marxists accounts of the state. They sought to demolish a society-centred perspective in favour of a state-centred one. They did so by asserting somewhat fiercely, that the state is autonomous

of society. Therefore it is the capacity and power of the state, rather than its linkages with society which should be the focus of the any study of the state. Of course there is no one statist perspective but many since it is characterized multiple viewpoints. On the one hand, it is the 'softer' version of statism as encapsulated in works of Skocpol, on the other hand, 'harder' version can be seen in the works of Eric Nordlinger. However, certain commonality unites all these versions.

#### 4.1.3.1 STATIST CRITIQUE ON SOCIETY-CENTRIC THEORIES

The Statists make determined argument against society-centric theories of the state. They argue that society-centred approaches collapse the state into society. The state thus loses both its specificity as a social actor and its specificity as an autonomous structure. The autonomy of the state, argue the Statists, must be given primacy in explaining the institution. Skocpal, an prominent theoretician of neo-statist school, makes out a case for the study of the state by itself and for itself, through a detailed critique of Marxism. Though the Marxists focus structural dynamics is important, she argues, it lapses into reductionism and evolutionism, because it does not pay enough attention to historical detail, or to the state as a distinct political presence. The multidimensional casual variables what constitute the state, she holds, cannot be reduced to the unifying logic of capitalism. Skocpol accepts that the neo-Marxist concentration on the state and the formulation of the school on the relative autonomy of the state is a welcome advance. She, however, continues to insist that the neo-Marxists retain 'deeply embedded society centred assumptions, not allowing themselves to doubt that, at base, states are inherently shaped by classes or class struggles and functional to preserve and expand modes of production'.

The focus on class as a structuring feature of the state, she further asserts, rules out any consideration of the state as an autonomous actor. It, effect, reduces the state to the dictates of the dominant classes. A society-centred perspective may have been adequate as an explanation in the nineteenth century, but the twentieth century has seen the inauguration of the state as an actor, rather than as the register of social forces. It is time, Skocpol says, that this fact is recognized and registered by political theory. And it is time that the interests and imperatives of the state are seen as autonomous in their own right, and not as reflections or expressions of dynamics originating in society.

Following the logic of Skocpol's argument, the statists attempt to reconstitute understanding of the state in multiple ways, the analyses on which will be carried in the following section.

#### 4.1.3.2 STATIST THEORY: MAIN ASSUMPTIONS

Since emerging as a distinct school in the mid-1970s, statists have sought to rehabilitate and emphasize the state as central to the study of politics. They attempted to justify an independent focus on the state as opposed to interest groups, business elites, or class forces. Hence, the statist approach often advocated a return to classic theorists such as Machiavelli, Clausewitz, de Tocqueville, Weber, or Hintze. The real focus of state-centred work is detailed case studies of state building, policy-making, and implementation.

Any intellectual grasp of the state depends in crucial manner upon the way states re thought of and defined. Definitions provide not only a starting point in the analysis of the state, they also indicate the approach of the theorist. The thesis of state autonomy rests in critical ways upon these definitions. Two such definitions are offered as illustrations of the statist approach. In 1979, Skocpol reveals a sensitive to the social location of the state,

The state properly conceived is no mere arena in which socio-economic struggles are fought out. It is rather a set of administrative, policing and military organizations headed, and more or less well coordinated by, and executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts resources from society and deploys those to create and support coercive and administrative organizations. Of course, these basic state organizations are built up and must operate within the context of class divided socio-economic relations as well as within the context of national and international dynamics. Moreover, coercive and administrative organizations are only parts of overall political systems. These systems also may contain institutions through which social interests are represented in state policy-making as well as institutions through which non-state actors are mobilized to participate in policy-implementation are the basis of state power.

In this formulation, Skoepol emphasizes the social context of the state, and also admits that actors strictly external to the state have a presence in, and an influence

on, the policy decisions of the state. However, later on Skoepol emphasizes more of state autonomy, state capacity, and the impact of states on the working of politics, rather than the contexts within which the state is situated.:

On the one hand, states may be viewed as organizations through which officials collectivities may pursue distinctive goals, realizing them more or less effectively given the available state resources in relation to social settings (state capacity). On the other hand, states may be viewed more macroscopically as configurations of organizations and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and classes in society (state autonomy).

The shift from contexts, surroundings and constituencies, to capacities and power of the state officials, is very marked and visible in this formulation. Societal forces and their projects disappear into the background. It is the state that emerges as a strong institution controlling, manipulating and regulating the lives of the people.

Contrary to the Skoepol' "softer" version, in the "harder" version of the statist theory, the state is seen in overtly narrow and restricted terms as a complex of administrative and coercive apparatuses. According to Nordlinger, the main vocalist of 'harder' version of the statist thoey, the state is collapsed into a collection of official preferences:

The definition of the state must refer to individuals rather than to some other kinds of phenomena, such as 'institutional arrangements' or the legal normative order, since we are primarily concerned with the making of public policy, a conception of the state that does not have individuals at its core could lead directly into ...[some kind of] fallacies. ... Only individuals have preferences and engage in actions that make for their realization. And only by making individuals central to the determination can Hegelinan implications be avoided when referring to the state's preferences.

According to Statists, the state is prescient, omnipotent, omnipresent, even arbitrary. It knows exactly what it has to do, and it has the capacity to implement its project unhampered by any other consideration. Nordilinger, for instance, asserts that the 'policy preferences (of autonomous states) are its own, they are also decidedly distinctive. In their substance and underpinnings, they do not regularly coincide with

those of any larger or smaller societal associations, groups, strata, ethnic segments, or regions'. The state is conceptualized as a closed off entity; bounded, shielded from socity, its reference point is it won officials.

The Statists have emphasized six themes: (1) the geo-political position of different modern states within the international system of nation-states and its implications for the logic of state action; (2) the dynamic of military organization and the impact of warfare in the overall development of the state; (3) the distinctive administrative powers of the modern state – especially those rooted in its capacities to produce and enforce collectively binding decisions within a centrally organized, territorially bounded society – and its strategic reach in relation to all other social sub-systems (including the economy), organizations (including capitalist enterprises), and forces (including classes) within its domain; (4) the state's role as a distinctive factor in shaping institutions, group formation, interest articulation, political capacities, ideas, and demands beyond the state; (5) the distinctive pathologies of government and the political system – such as bureaucratism, political corruption, government overload, or state failure; and (6) the distinctive interests and capacities of 'state managers' (officials, elected politicians, etc.) as opposed to other social forces. Different 'state-centred' theorists have emphasized different factors or combinations thereof. But the main conclusions persist: there are distinctive political pressures and processes that shape the state's form and functions; that give it a real and important autonomy when faced with pressures and forces emerging from the wider society; and that thereby give it a unique and irreplaceable centrality both in national life and the international order. In short, the state is a force in its own right and does not just serve the economy or civil society.

The 'state-centred' theorists advance a very different approach to state autonomy. For Marxist theorists, the latter was primarily understood in terms of its capacity to promote the long-term, collective interests of capital even when faced with opposition. Neo-statists reject such a class- or capital-theoretical account and suggest the state can exercise autonomy in its own right and in pursuit of its own, quite distinctive, interests. Accordingly, they emphasize: (a) state manager" ability to exercise power independently of (and even in the face of resistance from) non-state forces – especially where a pluralistic universe of social forces provides them with

broad room for manoeuvre; and (b) the grounding of this ability in state capacities or 'infrastructural' power, i.e., the state's ability to penetrate, control, supervise, police, and discipline modern societies through its own specialized capacities. Moreover, neo-statists argue that state autonomy is not a fixed structural feature of each and every governmental system. It differs across states, by policy area, and over time. This is partly due to external limits on the scope for autonomous state action and partly to variations in the capacity and readiness of state managers to pursue a strategy independent of non-state actors.

The statists attempt to demolish the assumption that the officials of the state act either on the behest of, or on the behalf of, the dominant classes in society. They insist that the perspectives of the state officials are often, if not always, divergent from those of the groups in society. Confrontation is, therefore, inbuilt in the relationship between the state and society. In any case, given the immense power and the strategic position of the state, if such a confrontation takes place, it is the interests of the holders of state power which will prevail. This alone is enough to establish the state as an actor autonomous from society.

## 4.1.3.3 MILITARY DIMENSION OF STATIST THEORY

A specific variant of state-centred theorizing is found in war-centred state theory. A growing band of theorists re-instated the military dimension of state theory and complained about its neglect in other schools – something they attributed to Marxists' exaggerated interest in class struggle and to sociologists' false belief in the inherently pacific logic of industrialism. Yet, for war-centred theorists, war is not just of archival interest: it is highly relevant to modern states. They note that war has decisively shaped the present century, states continually prepare for war and have much enhanced military and surveillance capacities, and wars have repercussions throughout state and society.

For such theorists, the state is seen as an apparatus for war-making and repression. It must defend its territorial integrity against other forces and maintain social cohesion inside its own territory by resorting to coercion as and when this proves necessary. Thus the state is seen in the first instance as the bearer of military power within a world of other nation states, rather than as a political community

within which citizenship rights may be realised. Indeed, for some war-centred theorists, not only is the fully-formed state a military-repressive apparatus but the very process of state formation is itself closely tied to war. For, as Charles Tilly notes, wars make states and states make wars. This goes beyond the trite remark that states are often forged in the heat of war (either in victory or defeat); it also involves the idea that war-making can induce political centralisation, encourage the development of a modern taxation system, and produce other such features of a modern state. Moreover, once the state emerges (through war or preparation for war), many key aspects of the state's form and functions are determined primarily by concerns with external defence and internal pacification.

### 4.1.3.4 Critique on Statist Theory

Five main lines of criticism have been advanced against recent statist theories. *Firstly*, it is said that the approach is hardly novel and that all its core themes can be found in the so-called 'society-centred' approaches. *Secondly*, it has been said that statism is one-sided because it focuses on state and party politics at the expense of political forces outside and beyond the state. In particular, it seems to substitute 'politicians for social formations (such as class or gender or race), elite for mass politics, political conflict for social struggle'. *Thirdly*, some critics claim to have identified empirical inadequacies in several key statist studies as well as incomplete and misleading accounts of other studies cited to lend some credence to the statist approach. *Fourthly*, charges of political bad faith have been laid. Thus Binder argued that recent statist theory implies that politically autonomous state managers can act as effective agents of economic modernization and social reform and should be encouraged to do so; in support of this charge, he notes that no neo-statist case studies exist revealing the harmful effects of their authoritarian or autocratic rule.

*Fifthly*, and most seriously, statism is held to rest upon a fundamental theoretical fallacy. It assumes there are clear and unambiguous boundaries between state apparatus and society, state managers and social forces, and state power and societal power. It implies that the state (or the political system) and society are mutually exclusive and self-determining, each can be studied in isolation, and the resulting analyses added together to provide a complete account. This renders absolute what are really

emergent, partial, unstable, and variable distinctions. It rules out hybrid logics such as corporatism or policy networks; divisions among state managers due to ties between state organs and other social spheres; and many other forms of overlap between state and society If this assumption is rejected, however, the distinction between state-centred and so-called society-centred approaches dissolves. And this in turn invalidates, not merely the extreme claim that the state apparatus should be treated as the independent variable in explaining political and social events, but also lesser statist claims such as the heuristic value of bending the stick in the other direction or, alternatively, of combining state-centred and society-centred accounts to produce the complete picture.

Neera Chandhoke emphasises the same when she says that "because the complex interaction between state and society is disregarded, the manner in which the state is constrained by society in its agendas, the way in which society is subverts and reorganizes state-given agenda is almost completely neglected. State-society relations are seen as a one-way traffic zone, with the state possessing the initiative in all the moves".

Neera Chandhoke also criticizes statist theory for its conservatism. Since the statist perspective is excessively concerned with equilibrium, order, and formal functions of the state, the main objective of the state seems to be to control society and bring it into congruence with its own perspectives. This approach is passive, inert and static because it rules out any questions of change and transformation from below. But it is also short-sighted, because it allows for no consideration of the complex interplay of state-society relations. It also does not allow nay understanding of the manner in which states can become irrelevant as the colonial state became irrelevant, or the states in East Europe and the Soviet Union became irrelevant, because society wrested political initiative from the state. Ultimately statism is a rigid and a conservative theory, because the entire notion that social forces can diverge from the state, that they are capable of altering the best laid plans of officials, that society has a certain momentum of its own which transcends states and its institutions, is unknown to the statists. The state is seen as complex of institutions that reproduces itself for itself. It is indeed free-floating, formed out of nowhere and responsible for no one.

According to Chandhoke, the biggest problem with the statist is theory is its association with 'realist' theory. She considers it dangerous because it rules out the

desirability of a public discourse creating and constituting agendas and limiting the state. As some scholars suggests, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the autonomous state violates certain principles of democracy. One core democratic principle involves a relation of responsiveness between ruler and the ruled by and large, the less responsive a state is to private interests, the more suspect it is on grounds of democratic theory. The statist perspective tells us a great deal about the kind of society a state needs, it does not tell us anything about the kind of state a society needs. The conservatism in these formulations is explicit, even if the proponents of this do not see themselves in this way.

Finally, in their eagerness to demolish a society-centred perspective, the statists disregard the entire arena of organized politics which exist outside the frontiers of the state. This sphere of organized and expressed politics, this zone of engagement which we may term civil society, is consequently both devalued and depoliticized. Politics is identified with the sate and emancipated from the processes of affirmation and contestation in civil society.

However, the above criticism does not rule out theoretical analyses of the state, of course; it does mean that state theory cannot take the state for granted. For the very existence of the state is problematic. Thus Mitchell concludes his own critique of neo-statism with a plea to study "the detailed processes of spatial organization, temporal arrangement, functional specification, and supervision and surveillance, which create the appearance of a world fundamentally divided into state and society". This division is conceptually prior to any possible influence of state on society, or society on the state; and it is one that is always produced in and through practices on both sides of the state-society divide. This crucial point provides an appropriate bridge to Foucault's work.

### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

1. The conceptualization of state is extremely difficult due to multi-dimensional and contradictory roles played by the state. Comment.

| Briefly state | the statist critique on society-centric theories. |  |
|---------------|---|--|
|               |   |  |
| What are the  | e major assumptions of statist theory?            |  |
|               |   |  |
| Write some    | of the criticisms on Statist theory.              |  |

## 4.1.4 FOUCAULDIAN APPROACHES

If the statists concentrate on the state at the expense of society, another strand of social theory powerfully affected by the works of Michael Foucault concentrates its attention on society at the expense of state. The beginning of this shift can be traced to Gramsci and his insistence on civil society. Foucault has extended Gramsci's focus on civil society.

Foucault linked his historical investigations into power, knowledge, and discipline to a sustained theoretical rejection of liberal and Marxist views of sovereignty, law, and the state. More generally his work has major implications for all state theorists because it casts grave doubt on their preoccupation with the state – whether as an independent, intervening, or dependent variable. Indeed Foucault compared his rejection of attempts to build a state theory with the wholly sensible refusal to eat an indigestible meal.

Foucault's rejection of the state-centrist theory has grounded in three key arguments. *Firstly,* Foucault alleged that state theory is essentialist: for it tries to explain

the nature of state power in terms of its own inherent, pre-given properties, that is they are always part of the state and within the state. But in reality, the state and its power are located in wider practices prevalent in the society. **Secondly**, state theory is alleged to retain medieval notions of a centralized, monarchical sovereignty and/or a unified, juridico-political power. In place of such notions Foucault stressed the tremendous diffusion and multiplicity of the institutions and practices involved in the exercise of state power and insisted that many of these were extra-juridical in nature. And, thirdly, state theorists were allegedly preoccupied with the forms of sovereign political and legal power at the summits of the state apparatus, the discourses which legitimated power at the centre, and the extent of the sovereign state's reach into society. In contrast, Foucault advocated an ascending, bottom-up approach which proceeds from the diffuse forms of power relations in the many and varied local and regional sites where the identity and conduct of social agents was actually determined. He was concerned with what he described as the micro-physics of power, the actual practices of subjugation, rather than the macro-political strategies that guide attempts at domination. For state power does not stem from control over some substantive, material resource peculiar to the state. It is actually the provisional, emergent result of the complex strategic interplay of diverse social forces within and beyond the state. It is dispersed and involves the active mobilization of individuals and not just their passive targeting, and can be colonized and articulated into quite different discourses, strategies, and institutions. In short, power is not concentrated in the state: it is ubiquitous, immanent in every social relation. Directing attention away from the visible and formalised codes of power, Foucault concentrates on the manner in which individual experience power in all sites of human relations. The state, he concludes, can only operate on the basis of existing relations of domination and oppression in society.

This did not mean that Foucault rejected all concern with the macro-physics of state power. Indeed, among those most closely identified with the linguistic turn and post-structuralism, Foucault is unusual for his interest in the state. This was no longer identified with the sovereign state described in juridical-political discourse, however; for Foucault's approach was far more idiosyncratic and powerful. He regarded the state as the site of statecraft and governmental rationality. Thus he

studied how different political regimes emerged through shifts in 'governmentality'. What interested Foucault was the art of government, a skilled discursive practice in which state capacities were used reflexively to monitor the population and, with all due prudence, to make it conform to specific state projects. At the origins of the Foucauldian state was *raison d'état*, an autonomous political rationality, set apart from religion and morality. This in turn could be linked to different modes of political calculation or state projects, such as those coupled to the 'police state', social government, or the welfare state. It was in and through these governmental rationalities or state projects that more local or regional sites of power were colonized, articulated into ever more general mechanisms and forms of global domination, and then maintained by the entire state system. Foucault also insisted on the need to explore the connections between these forms of micro-power and mechanisms for producing knowledge – whether for surveillance, the formation and accumulation of knowledge about individuals, or their constitution as specific types of subject.

Foucault's work has inspired many other studies of the state and state power. These are generally focused on specific policies or policy apparatuses and/or specific political discourses and strategies. A few studies have tried to develop a general account of the state purportedly based on Foucauldian perspectives. For example, Giddens treats surveillance as one of four key institutional clusterings in modern societies that intersect in the nation-state: the others are industrialism, capitalism, and militarism. As surveillance techniques develop, control can be extended further over time and space, thereby enhancing the state's capacities for internal pacification and external military operations. In this regard the modern state's control can be distinguished from the local community control and armed intervention found in the traditional state. For its main means of control and punishment are policing, codified law, and imprisonment; these are linked in turn to the dominance of exchange relations in production, civilian control of the military, and extended citizenship. An interesting consequence of these changes is that the modern state actually resorts less often to violence to control the populace: surveillance and disciplinary normalization do much of the work of regularizing activities in time and space. These ideas are taken further in a recent study by Dandeker, who offers a typology of states based on surveillance mechanisms and the interests they serve

## 4.1.4.1 CRITIQUE ON FOUCAULDIAN APPROACH

In essence, Foucault shifted the focus on orthodox views of the state and power relations to concern with the role of political discourses and statecraft in the emergence and transformation of the modern state. Along with his ideas on the ubiquity of power relations, the coupling of power-knowledge, and governmentality, Foucault offers an important theoretical and empirical corrective to the more one-sided analyses of statism. But his work remains vulnerable to the charge that it tends to reduce power to a universal technique and to ignore how class and patriarchal relations shape both the state and the more general exercise of power. It also neglects the continued importance of law, constitutionalized violence, and bureaucracy in the workings of the modern state. Moreover, whatever the merits of drawing attention to the ubiquity of power, his work provided little account of the bases of resistance. And, whilst Foucault himself did later re-examine the state and statecraft, Foucauldian studies still tend to ignore the complex strategic and structural character of the state. They show little interest in the organizational conditions that make it even half-way possible for a state to engage in effective action. At the same time they show little interest in the various limitations on the capacities of even the well-endowed state.

Neera Chandboke states that the Foucauldian intervention in the debate on power has proved to be a theoretical breakthrough, but it is incomplete. In his determination to shift the terms of discourse away from the state to the micro sites of power, Foucault denied to the state the specificity as a master discourse of power. He refused to see it as a structure of domination in its own right. Foucault in his shift away from the state and its in-built coercive and structural power, failed to comprehend the central and teh key role of the state in the process of producing, codifying and constructing power. He refused to accept that the state, as the overarching power structure, provides legitimacy and overt recognition to certain structures of power and delegitimizes others. In his anxiety to shift debate away from the state, Foucault did not see how the state for strategic reasons privileges certain power situations while marginalizing others, how power upon the state in its own right.

The other problem that we can identify with the Foucauldian intervention is a normative one. Foucault's dispersed or diffused power does not allow those who

want to struggle to break the power which is oppressing the daily lives of us. If, as Foucault asserts, there is no meta-discourse of power which can be overturned; if power has neither a beginning nor an end; and if power resides merely in the will to power, then there is no conceivable way in which power structures can be broken. Individuals are caught up in a never ending grip of power, there is, consequentially no escape. There is no escape because there is no social space which is not constituted by, or penetrated by power. Above all, there is no formal site of condensed power which can be captured and transformed. This perspective is politically pessimistic because neither does it give us a vantage point from where power structure can be ruptured, nor does it give us any indication of how states can be transformed.

## 4.1.5 RECENT THEORIES ON STATE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL

As we studied, in recent theoretical debate on state, while the 'statists' overemphasize the state, Foucauldians attribute primacy to the society. If a perspective on the state by itself is incomplete and therefore inadequate, a perspective on society alone is equally incomplete and inadequate. If the statists collapse the social into the political, theorists like Foucault expand the notion of politics to such an extent that they collapse the political into the social. The statists concentrate on the state at the expense of society, and theories in the Focauldian mode concentrate on social interaction at the expense of the state. An exclusive preoccupation with either state or society implies that both are self-constituting, self-sufficient and self-reproducing. These perspectives ignore the ways in which state and society constitute and limit each other. They ignore the complex, contradictory and constitutive relationship between the state and society. Instead, we need a balanced approach that focuses on the way state and society constitute and limit each other. In other words, boundaries can be established between state and society. These boundaries are porous, mobile and elusive, but they are there.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

| NOTE: | Use the space   | given below | for your | answers. | Use separate | sheet | if space | is |
|-------|-----------------|-------------|----------|----------|--------------|-------|----------|----|
|       | not sufficient. |             |          |          |              |       |          |    |

| l. | What are the grounds on which Foucault rejects state-centric theories? |
|----|--|
|    |  |
|    |  |

|        | Foucault was concerned with the micro-physics of power, the actual practices of subjugation. How do you understand this? |
|--------|--|
| _<br>E | Briefly state the criticism on Foucauldian perspective?  |
| _      | Write some of the criticisms on Statist theory.  |

### 4.1.6 LET US SUM UP

Possibly the most important single theoretical current to have shaped the second revival of interest in the state as such was the movement (especially popular in the USA) to 'bring the state back in' as a critical explanatory variable in social analysis. But this movement did not go unchallenged. For, besides the continuing influence of Gramsci and the variable impact of other neo-Marxist currents, serious competition came from several other approaches. Among these are, first, the work of Foucault and his followers on the disciplinary organization of society, the micro-physics of power, and changing forms of governmentality – an approach that ran counter to statism in tending to remove the state from theoretical view once again. However, neither statist theories nor Foucauldian perspective with exclusive focus single dimension – either state or society – analyse the

#### 4.1.7 SOURCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

• Neera Chandhoke, *State and Civil Society: Explorations in Political Theory* (New Delhi, Thousand Oaks and London: Sage Publications, 1995).

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M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics UNIT - IV: STATE, GLOBALIZATION, EUROPEAN UNION AND CLIMATE **CHANGE** 

# 4.2 GLOBALIZATION & THE NATION-STATE **INTERFACE**

- V. Nagendra Rao

## **STRUCTURE**

- 4.2.0 Objectives
- 4.2.1 Introduction
- 4.2.2 Defining and Conceptualizing Globalization
  - 4.2.2.1 Defining Globalization
  - 4.2.2.2 Globalization: Brief Historical Sketch
- 4.2.2.3 Conceptualizing Globalization
- 4.2.3 Globalization and the State
  - 4.2.3.1 Globalization: Undermining of State Sovereignty
  - 4.2.3.2 Globalization, State and Democracy
- 4.2.4 Critique on Globalization View
- 4.2.5 Let us Sum up
- 4.2.6 Suggested Readings
- 4.2.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to:

- Know the definition, history and concept of globalization;
- Understand the impact of globalization on contemporary state system;
- Comprehend the debate between globalists and sceptics of globalization vis-avis state.

#### 4.2.1 INTRODUCTION

Historically speaking, the study of political science has largely concerned the study of states, the patterns of their interactions, and the organization of world politics. Over the last several decades worldly developments and theoretical innovations have slowly but surely eroded the gravitational pull of state-centric study of politics. Although scholars of international relations and comparative politics continue to recognize that the states retain considerable power and privileges, they increasingly highlight an international realm where the international structure is defined by material and normative elements, where states share the stage with a multitude of other actors, and where trends in global politics are shaped not only by states but also by this variety of other actors and forces. Simply put, the discipline is moving away from the study of "international relations" and toward the study of the "global society." We use this shift in the name to symbolize a series of transformations in the last twenty years in the discipline regarding what and whom we study, and how and why we study them.

## 4.2.2 DEFINING AND CONCEPTUALIZING GLOBALIZATION

Globalization ranks as one of the core concepts of social consciousness and analysis in the late twentieth century. With striking rapidity, since the 1 980s the term has become standard vocabulary for journalists, politicians, business-people, advertisers, entertainers and officials, as well as researchers across wide spectrum of academic disciplines. Advances in technology and modern communications are said to have unleashed new contacts and intercourse among peoples, social movements, transnational corporations, and governments. The result is a set of processes which have affected national and international politics in an extraordinary way.

However, like many a buzzword, 'globalization' is highly elusive and deeply contested. The controversies usually centre on questions of general definition, priodization, causation and consequences.

#### 4.2.2.1 DEFINING GLOBALIZATION

Although the noun 'globalization' appeared in a dictionary fir the first time in 1961, the idea has antecedents that stretch back at least several centuries. However, the terms 'globalize' and 'globalism' were introduced in a treatise published in 1944. However, until the last decades of the twentieth century such terminology generally resided at the margins of speech and meaning.

When a new word gains currency, it is often because it captures an important change that is taking place in the world. New vocabulary is needed to describe new conditions. In the case of globalization, the precise character of that new circumstance is much debated. Since each one defined globalization from the perspective one takes on the processes, Anthony Giddens definition somewhat widely accepted. He sees globalization as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa". Martin Albrow provides the most succinct and general definition of globalization as "all those processes by which the people of the world are incorporated into a single world society".

According to John Baylis, globalization as process that involves a great deal more than simply growing connections or interdependence between states. It can be defined as "A historical process involving a fundamental shift or transformation n the spatial scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across regions and continents". Such a definition, according to Baylis, enables us to distinguish globalization from more spatially delimited processes such as 'internationalization' and 'regionalization'. Whereas internationalization refers to growing interdependence between states, the very idea of internationalization presumes that they remain discrete national units with clearly demarcated borders. By contrast, globalization refers to a process in which the very distinction between domestic and the external breaks down.

#### 4.2.2.2 GLOBALIZATION: BRIEF HISTORICAL SKETCH

Although public references to globalization have become increasingly common over the last two decades, the concept itself can be traced back to a much earlier

period. Its origins lie in the work of many nineteenth- and early twentieth-century intellectuals, from Saint-Simon and Karl Marx to students of geopolitics such as MacKinder, who recognized how modernity was integrating the world. But it was not until the 1 960s and early 1970s that the term 'globalization' was actually used. This 'golden age' of rapidly expanding political and economic interdependence – most especially between Western states – generated much reflection on the inadequacies of orthodox approaches to thinking about politics, economics and culture which presumed a strict separation between internal and external affairs, the domestic and international arenas, and the local and the global For in a more interdependent world events abroad readily acquired impacts at home, while developments at home had consequences abroad. In the context of a debate about the growing interconnectedness of human affairs, world systems theory, theories of complex interdependence and the notion of globalization itself emerged as largely rival accounts of the processes through which the fate of states and peoples was becoming more intertwined. Following the collapse of state socialism and the consolidation of capitalism worldwide, academic and public discussion of globalization intensified dramatically. Coinciding with the rapid spread of the information revolution, these developments appeared to confirm the belief that the world was fast becoming a shared social and economic space – at least for its most affluent inhabitants.

#### 4.2.2.3 CONCEPTUALIZING GLOBALIZATION

Globalization has been variously conceived a s action at a distance (whereby the actions of social agents in one locale can come to have significant consequences for 'distant others'); time-space compression (referring to the way in which instantaneous electronic communication erodes the constraints of distance and time on social organization and interaction); accelerating interdependence (understood as the intensification of enmeshment among national economies and societies such that events in one country impact directly on others); a shrinking world (the erosion of borders and geographical barriers to socio-economic activity); and, among other concepts, global integration, the reordering of interregional power relations, consciousness of the global condition and the intensification of interregional interconnectedness. What distinguishes these definitions is the differential emphasis

given to the material, spatio-temporal and cognitive aspects of globalization. It is worth dwelling initially on this tripartite cluster of characteristics as the first stage in clarifying the concept of globalization.

Globalization has an undeniably material aspect in so far as it is possible to identify, for instance, flows of trade, capital and people across the globe. These are facilitated by different kinds of infrastructure - physical (such as transport or banking systems), normative (such as trade rules) and symbolic (such as English as a lingua franca) - which establish the preconditions for regularized and relatively enduring forms of global interconnectedness. Rather than mere random encounters, globalization refers to these entrenched and enduring patterns of worldwide interconnectedness. But the concept of globalization denotes much more than a stretching of social relations and activities across regions and frontiers. For it suggests a growing magnitude or intensity of global flows such that states and societies become increasingly enmeshed in worldwide systems and networks of interaction. As a consequence, distant occurrences and developments can come to have serious domestic impacts while local happenings can engender significant global repercussions. In other words, globalization represents a significant shift in the spatial reach of social relations and organization towards the interregional or intercontinental scale. This does not mean that the global necessarily displaces or takes precedence over local, national or regional orders of social life. Rather, the point is that the local becomes embedded within more expansive sets of interregional relations and networks of power. Thus, the constraints of social time and geographical space, vital coordinates of modern social life, no longer appear to impose insuperable barriers to many forms of social interaction or organization, as the existence of the World Wide Web and round-the-clock trading in global financial markets attests. As distance 'shrinks', the relative speed of social interaction increases too, such that crises and events in distant parts of the globe, exemplified by the events of 11 September 2001, come to have an immediate worldwide impact involving diminishing response times for decision-makers. Globalization thereby engenders a cognitive shift expressed both in a growing public awareness of the ways in which distant events can affect local fortunes (and vice versa) as well as in public perceptions of shrinking time and geographical space.

Simply put, globalization denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social interaction. It refers to a shift or transformation in the scale of human social organization that links distant communities and expands the reach of power relations across the world's major regions and continents. However, as the rise of the antiglobalization protests demonstrates, it should not be read as facilitating the emergence of a harmonious world society or as a universal process of global integration in which there is a growing convergence of cultures and civilizations. Not only does the awareness of growing interconnectedness create new animosities and conflicts, it can fuel reactionary politics and deep-seated fears. Since a significant segment of the world's population is either untouched directly by globalization or remains largely excluded from its benefits, it is arguably a deeply divisive and, consequently, vigorously contested process.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| How do        | o you define globalization?   |
|---------------|---|
|               |   |
| Briefly       | state the historical evolution of globalization?                            |
|               |   |
|               |   |
| What a world? | are the material changes that the contemporary globalization brought to the |
|               |   |
|               |   |

| 4. | Globalization denotes the expanding scale, growing magnitude, speeding up and       |
|----|---|
|    | deepening impact of interregional flows and patterns of social interaction. Explain |
|    |   |
|    |   |

### 4.2.3 GLOBALIZATION AND THE STATE

For some scholars like Susan Strange, Peter Van Ham and Graeme Gill globalization is transforming the state in many ways. The argument is that the structural changes of globalization are fundamentally changing the nature of the sovereign state. The de-territorialisation of many activities, including economic exchanges like the transfer of money, may be undermining the authority of the state. For example, multinational corporations can avoid paying taxes, move their factories from state to state and give governments demands before they invest. Susan Strange suggested that instead of states controlling market forces, market forces were now controlling states. In addition, as processes like privatization occurred in many Western states, private firms were – and are – taking over important state functions suggesting that states are giving up many of their powers. In a globalized division of labour, the state no longer primarily initiates action in, but rather reacts to, worldwide economic forces.

Such developments mean that many new actors are involved in international relations and that it is not just states that are involved in global politics. Arguably, technological innovations such as the development of the Internet have also undermined aspects of the state because it allows people to spread information and news, offer dissenting voices to a global audience, sell and buy goods, and transfer money instantly with little control by the state. A few states like North Korea, China and Iran are resisting such developments by imposing controls over internet usage and imposing censorship over websites. However, the development of new technologies is indisputably allowing individuals and groups to have greater autonomy that may be contrary to the interests of the state. State transformation may mean that the state increases its surveillance function through the introduction of biometric passports and identity cards, use of lists to identify or target specific groups in society, and to increase its monitoring of people moving from one state into another. If a state transformation

is occurring then this suggests that the state is able to adapt, change and respond to the changing global environment.

Globalization is also challenging the one-dimensionality of orthodox accounts of world politics that conceive it principally in state-centric terms of struggle for power between states. The concept of global politics, which is now talked by many social scientists, focuses our attention upon the global structure and processes of rule-making, problem-solving, the maintenance of security and order in the world system. It acknowledges the continuing centrality of states and power politics, but does not give a privilege either in understanding and explaining contemporary world affairs. For under conditions of political globalization, state are increasingly embedded in thickening and overlapping worldwide webs of: multilateral institutions and multilateral politics from NATO and the World Bank to the G20; transnational associations and networks, from the International Chamber of Commerce to the World Muslim Congress; global policy networks of officials, corporate and non-governmental actors, dealing with global issues; and those formal and informal networks of government officials dealing with shared global problems. Global politics directs our attention to the emergence of a fragile global polity within which 'interests are articulated and aggregated, decisions are made, values are allocated and policies conducted through international or transnational political processes.

## 4.2.3.1 GLOBALIZATION: UNDERMINING OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Many scholars seriously advance the proposition that the contemporary globalization process is seriously undermining one of the important attributes of the state, that is sovereignty. John Baylis in his *Globalization of World Politics* lists some of the processes of globalization that are undermining the state sovereignty:

- 1. The pace of economic transformation is so great that it has created a new world politics. States are no longer closed unites and they cannot control their economies. The world economy is more interdependent than ever, with trade and finances ever expanding.
- 2. Communications have fundamentally revolutionized the way we deal with the rest of the world. We now live in a world where events in one location

- can be immediately observed on the other side of the world. Electronic communications alter our notions of the social groups we work with and live in.
- 3. There is now, more than ever before, a global culture, so that most urban areas resemble one another. Much of the urban world shares a common culture, much of it emanating from Hollywood.
- 4. The world is becoming more homogeneous. Differences between peoples re diminishing.
- 5. Time and space seem to be collapsing. Our old idea of geographically space and of chronological time are undermined by the speed of modern communications and media.
- 6. There is emerging global polity, with transnational social and political movements and the beginning of transfer of allegiance from the state to substate, transnational, and international bodies.
- 7. A cosmopolitan culture is developing. People are beginning to 'think globally and act locally'.
- 8. A risk culture is emerging with people realizing both that the main risks that face them are global (pollution and HIV for example) and that states are unable to deal with the problems.

The globalization, according to many scholars, not only involves a diversity of actors and institutions, it is also, on the other hand, marked by a diversity of political concerns. These concerns which used to be national and expressed through various organs of the state are now becoming global. The agenda of global politics is anchored not just in traditional geopolitical concerns but also in proliferation of economic, social, cultural, and ecological questions. Pollution, drugs, human rights, and terrorism are among an increasing number of transnational policy issues that, because of globalization, transcend territorial borders and existing political jurisdictions.

Globalization also undermining the state power by unleashing historical forces, communities and groups. Just as globalization gives impetus to cultural homogenization (e.g., the diffusion of standard consumer goods throughout the world), so too does a global thrust undermine state power and unleash subterranean cultural pluralism. This

contradictory process merges with dialectic of subnationalism and supranationalism. Many polities are disrupted by substate actors and simultaneously seek advantage in global competition through regionalization. Despite the past failings of regional groupings, regional cooperation is widely regarded as a way to achieve mobility in the changing global division of labour. Thus, the state is being reformed from below by the tugs of subnationalism and from above by the pull of economic globalization.

That is the reason why many of the scholars of international relations consider that under globalization many forces are at work to undermine the defining feature of international relations for several centuries—national sovereignty. As Ian Clark explains, "According to conventional wisdom it is sovereignty which is most at risk from globalization....[Thus] if we wish to trace the impact of globalization, then it is within the realm of sovereignty that the search must properly begin". The fear is that states are gradually losing the ability to determine their own fates as the forces of globalization shift the locus of meaningful decision making to other entities. The fundamental question is whether state can still shape the policies and tame the forces that affect the lives of their citizens.

#### 4.2.3.2 GLOBALIZATION, STATE AND DEMOCRACY

It has also been argued that globalization will change the nature of public participation and democracy. The increasing interconnection between domestic and international institutions makes it more difficult for sovereign actors to function without oversight from other organizations and to hide their actions from others. The development of the International Criminal Court could be seen as an example here, where the enforcement of international laws and judicial authority opens the door to hold states and their leaders accountable for such things as human rights violations in the former Yugoslavia or in Sudan. Nongovernmental organizations can play a similarly powerful watchdog role, as such groups as Transparency International (an anticorruption NGO) already do. Globalization will thus make politics less opaque and more open to scrutiny by domestic and international communities.

In addition to this, there are organizations that are largely technological in nature also contributing to the increased democratic participation. This is not new; all earlier waves of human interconnection were themselves dependent on technological changes. Most recently, globalization has been profoundly influenced by the Internet. In recent times, the Internet has grown far past to become a means through which people exchange goods and information, much of it beyond the control of any one state or regulatory authority. Unlike MNCs, NGOs, or IGOs, the Internet has no single "location" to speak of, and so discussions of authority, sovereignty, and control become problematic.

Moreover, the deepening of international connections between people and the exchange of ideas between them will transfer the dynamics of multiculturalism from the national level to the international one, with different cultures connecting and combining more through connections that are not bound by traditional barriers of time and space. This means not only that a globalized society will draw from many sources but also that the interconnection of such institutions at the global level will create new values, identities, and culture—a "creative destruction" that will enrich all cultures. One result of this outcome could be a global cosmopolitanism—a term that comes from the Greek kosmos, or universe, and polis, or state. Cosmopolitanism is thus a universal, global, or "worldly" political order that draws its identity and values from everywhere. Historically, the cosmopolis was that physical space where such ideas usually came together, notably the city. In a globalized world, however, there is the potential for an international cosmopolitanism that binds people together irrespective of where they are.

Parallel to a global cosmopolitanism is the idea of global democracy. The argument here is that growing international connections at the societal level would generate not only a form of cosmopolitanism but also a civic identity that stretches beyond traditional barriers and borders. This global civil society—organized life not simply beyond the state but above it—can take shape in such formal organizations as NGOs but also in such informal manifestations as social movements or more basic grassroots connections between people drawn by shared interests and values. This global civil society could in turn shape politics by creating new opportunities for concerted public action and new ways of thinking about politics and participation at the domestic and international levels.

Due to these reasons, Kenichi Ohmae, in his books, *The Borderless World* and *The End of Nation State*, argues that economic and technological trends are rendering the nation-state increasingly irrelevant and impotent. This effect can be seen most vividly in the global economy: "On the political map the boundaries between countries are as clear as ever. But on the competitive map, a map showing the real flows of financial and industrial activity, those boundaries have largely disappeared". If we remove the political borders from a map and look only at the pattern of economic activity, we would no longer be able to redraw the world's political boundaries.

This disconnect between economic and political realities, however, cannot last forever. Ohmae thinks a readjustment is already well under way: "the modern nation-state itself—the artefact of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—has begun to crumble". And Anthony Giddens has joined the Nation-State's funeral chorus: "Nations have lost the sovereignty they once had, and politicians have lost their capacity to influence events…. The era of the nation-state is over".

## 4.2.4 CRITIQUE ON GLOBALIZATION VIEW

However, many scholars disagree with the view that globalization is forcing the state into background. They disagree with the notion that the sovereign state is in decline. The sovereign power and authority of national government is being transformed but by no means eroded. Locked into systems of global and regional governance, states now assert their sovereignty less in the form of a legal claim to supreme power than as a bargaining tool, in the context of transnational systems of rule-making, with other agencies and social forces. Sovereignty is bartered, shared, and divided among the agencies of public power at different levels, from the local to the global. The Westphalian conception of sovereignty as an indivisible, territorially exclusive form of public power is being displaced by a new sovereignty regime, in which sovereignty is understood as the shared exercise of public power and authority.

More severe critics of globalization question the disappearance of state thesis. Though no one questions the impact of globalization on states and communities, the issues is whether patterns of international interactions are changing in ways and to a degree so that it make sense to even begin talking about a borderless world or the end

of nation-state. For globalization skeptics, such a talk is wildly premature at best and rests on a persistent pattern of exaggeration and selective use of evidence.

No one can deny that advances in transportation and communication have helped overcome the obstacles of distance. Sceptic s caution, however, that this should not be confused with an "end" of geography. They argue that most accounts of globalization focus on companies and plants that relocate production from one country to another while ignoring those that stay in their respective countries. Still most of the industries and finances are located in Western Europe, the United States and Japan. For instance, Robert Wade notes that "today the stock of U.S. capital invested abroad represents less than 7 per cent of the U.S. GNP. Similarly, Robert Gilpin states that "Trade, investment and financial flows were actually greater in the late 1 800s, at least relative to the size of national economies and the international economy, than they are today".

The Realist school of international relations reject the view of globalization as an irreversible process that threatens states. On the contrary, they see globalization as a process promoted and enabled by the policies of states. Globalization will come to a screeching halt if the major states reverse the policies that sustain it.

Many Marxists and Critical thinkers object the globalization thesis. For them, the globalization is merely a buzz-word to denote the latest phase of capitalism.

Indeed, many criticise the exaggerated view of globalization undermining the state and its sovereignty. According to them, the struggle for national identity and nationhood has been so extensive that it can be eroded by transnational forces and, in particular, by the development of a so-called global mass culture. In fact, advocates of the primacy of national identity emphasize its enduring qualities and the deep appeal of national cultures compared to the ephemeral and ersatz qualities of the products of the transnational media corporations. Since national cultures have been centrally concerned with consolidating the relationships between political identity, self-determination and the powers of the state, they are, and will remain, formidably important sources of ethical and political direction. Moreover, the new

electronic networks of communication and information technology which now straddle the world help intensify and rekindle traditional forms and sources of national life, reinforcing their influence and impact. These networks, it has been aptly noted, make possible a denser, more intense interaction between members of communities who share common cultural characteristics, notably language; and this provides a renewed impetus to the re-emergence of ethnic communities and their nationalisms.

Moreover, how limited the actual control most states possess over their territories, they generally fiercely protect their sovereignty - their entitlement to rule - and their autonomy - their capacity to choose appropriate forms of political, economic and social development. The distinctive 'bargains' governments create with their citizens remain fundamental to their legitimacy. The choices, benefits and welfare policies of states vary dramatically according to their location in the hierarchy of states, but, in the age of nation-states, the independence bestowed by sovereignty, in principle, still matters greatly to all states. Modern nation-states are political communities which create the conditions for establishing national communities of fate; and few seem willing to give this up. Although national political choices are constrained, they still count and remain the focus of public deliberation and debate. According to the sceptics of globalization, national political traditions are still vibrant, distinctive political bargains can still be struck between governments and electorates, and states continue, given the political will, to rule. The business of national politics is as important as, if not more important than, it was during the period in which modern states were first formed.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

**NOTE:** Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| How do you define globalization? |
|----------------------------------|
|                                  |
|                                  |
|                                  |

| busun buange suggested tha                                 | Strange suggested that instead of states controlling market forces, market |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|
| forces were now controlling s                              | states. Comment.   |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| Do you agree with the proposovereignty?                    | position that globalization undermining the state                          |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| How globalization transforming                             | ng democratic participation across the globe. Explain                      |  |  |
|  |  |  |  |
| On what grounds critiques ar as undermining state sovereig | re saying that it is exaggeration to view globalization anty?              |  |  |

## 4.2.5 LET US SUM UP

Globalization can be viewed as a process by which the web of global connections becomes increasingly "thick," creating an extensive and intensive web of relationships between many people across vast distances. In the twenty-first century, people are not distantly connected by overland routes plied by traders, diplomats, and missionaries; they are directly participating in a vast and complex international network through travel, communication, business, and education. Globalization is a system in which human beings are no longer part of isolated communities that are themselves linked through narrow channels of diplomatic relations or trade. Entire societies are now directly connected to global affairs. Thus, globalization represents a change in human organization and interconnection, but these are a function of technological changes that have made it possible.

At the heart of the globalist thesis is the conviction that globalization is transforming the nature and form of political power today. Globalists argue that the right of most states to rule within circumscribed territories - their sovereignty - is on the edge of transformation, as is the practical nature of this entitlement - the actual capacity of states to rule. According to these governments and societies across the globe are having to adjust to a world in which there is no longer a clear distinction between international and domestic, external and internal affairs. Some sections of globalists argue that contemporary globalization is reconstituting the power, functions and authority of national government. In this world, national governments are relegated to little more than transmission belts for global economic change, or, at best, intermediate institutions and mechanisms sandwiched between increasingly powerful local, regional and global mechanisms of power and authority. Other globalists take a less radical view. They talk less in terms of 'the end of the state', and more in terms of a new spectrum of political developments and adjustment strategies in which the state finds itself relocated in multiple regional and global political networks.

However, the sceptics and critiques of globalization argue that the modern nation-state is the principal form of political rule across the globe, and is likely to remain so. Changes in international law, regional associations and global institutions in the last century did not alter the fundamental form and shape of this state system. For the division of the globe into nation-states, with distinctive sets of geopolitical interests, was built into institutions of regional and global governance; for instance, the veto powers granted to leading states (the US, Russia, Britain, France and China) in the Security Council of the United Nations. Furthermore, the new challenges of growing internationalism do not diminish the state-centric world. Sceptics discount the presumption that internationalization prefigures the emergence of a new, less state-centric world order. Far from considering national governments as becoming

immobilized by international imperatives, they point to their growing centrality in the active promotion and regulation of crossborder activity.

# 4.2.6 REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READINGS

- David Held and Anthony McGrew (eds), *The Global Transformations Reader:* An Introduction to the Globalization Debate, Cambridge: Polity, 2005.
- John Baylis and Steve Smith, *The Globalization of World Politics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

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M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics UNIT – IV: STATE, GLOBALIZATION, EUROPEAN UNION AND CLIMATE CHANGE

# 4.3 EUROPEAN UNION AS A NEW POLITICAL SYSTEM: BEYOND NATION STATE

- V. Nagendra Rao

## **STRUCTURE**

- 4.3.0 Objectives
- 4.3.1 Introduction
- 4.3.2 Evolution of EU as a Political System
- 4.3.3 Conceptualizing the EU as a Political System
- 4.3.4 Institutional Framework of EU as a Political System
  - 4.3.4.1 Objectives of European Political System
  - 4.3.4.2 European Parliament
  - 4.3.4.3 European Council
  - 4.3.4.4 Council of Ministers
  - 4.3.4.5 European Commission
  - 4.3.4.6 Court of Justice of European Union
- 4.3.5 The European Union as a Single Market
  - 4.3.5.1 Monetary Union of European Union
- 4.3.6 Common Foreign, Security and Defence Policy

# 4.3.7 Let us Sum up

## 4.3.8 Suggested Readings

## 4.3.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to:

- Know the evolution of European Union as a political System;
- Conceptualize European Union as a political system'
- Comprehend EU's institutional framework including parliament, council of ministers, European Commission, Court of Justice of European Union, etc.
- Understand the functioning of Europe as a single market with a single currency;
- Comprehend European Union's foreign, security and defence policies.

## 4.3.1 INTRODUCTION

Europe has seen centuries of war and human suffering. It has learned historic lessons the hard way. It experienced the two destructive world wars in the 20th century. However, ideas of peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights found fertile ground and Europe and its citizens began the historic transformation from a continent of war to a continent of peace. In the 21st century these states have united themselves as political entity giving the rise to a new political system known as European Union (EU). In this new political system, certain executive, legislative, and judicial powers are collectively pooled at the European level. Decisions and choices of national governments are heavily constrained by the rules and decisions of the EU. In the last half-century, Europe has liberalized trade, coordinated macroeconomic policies, and created a centralized set of governing institutions with significant authority in most areas of public policy. This context automatically creates a political system which is unique in comparison to all others. EU has characters which bear similarity to the political systems of federal states as well as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). Nevertheless according to David McKay, it remains one of a kind, sui generis, as a political system. The European Union is now a major player on the world stage. With a population of some 500 million people representing over 25 percent of the world's gross domestic product (GDP), providing half of all development aid and contributing to a fifth of world-wide imports and exports, the Union is an active political player, with regional and global security interests and responsibilities to match. It is a role that Europeans and non-Europeans alike want the EU to play. Thus, this chapter explains the main characteristics and functionalities of the European Union as a new political system.

## 4.3.2 EVOLUTION OF EU AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM

The EU, as a modern political phenomenon, has evolved out of the social, historical and economic context of the 20th century. It is a result of a process of voluntary economic and political integration among states in Europe. The EU was created by the Maastricht Treaty on 1st November, 1993 as a political and economic union among European countries which makes its own policies concerning the members' economies, societies, laws and to some extent security. However, it is a product of gradual integration since 1945. Even prior to this, in 1923 a Pan European Union Society formed and its formation was supported Konrad Adenauer and Georges Pompidou, leaders of Germany and France. Charles de Gaulle had called for a union in 1942. After the end of Second World War which left Europe as divided and damaged, in 1946, European Union of Federalists formed to campaign for a United States of Europe. In September 1946, Winston Churchill called for a United States of Europe based around France and Germany to increase chance of peace. In January 1948, three countries of Europe – Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands – formed the Benelux Customs Union.

In 1948, the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was created to organize the Marshall Plan. In May 1949, the Council of Europe formed to discuss closer co-operation among the European countries. In 1950 Robert Schuman, foreign minister of France proposed that the coal and steel industries of France and West Germany be coordinated under a single supranational authority. France and West Germany were soon joined by four other countries Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Italy as a result of which the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty signed among these six countries forming the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952. The European Economic Community (EEC) and Euratom were established by the Treaty of Rome in 1958. The EEC, working on a large scale to promote the convergence of national economies into a single European economy,

soon emerged as the most significant of the three treaty organizations. The Brussels Treaty (1965) provided for the merger of the organizations into what came to be known as the European Community (EC) and later the EU. Under Charles de Gaulle, France vetoed (1963) Britain's initial application for membership in the Common Market, five years after vetoing a British proposal that the Common Market be expanded into a transatlantic free-trade area. In the interim, Britain had engineered the formation (1959) of the European Free Trade Association. In 1973 the EC expanded, as Great Britain, Ireland, and Denmark joined. Greece joined in 1981, and Spain and Portugal in 1986. With German reunification in 1990, the former East Germany also was absorbed into the Community.

The Single European Act (1987) amended the EC's treaties to strengthen the organization's ability to create a single internal market. The Treaty of European Union was signed in Maastricht, the Netherlands in 1992. This treaty provided for a central banking system, a common currency – the Euro – to replace the national currencies, a legal definition of the EU and a framework for expanding the EU's political role, particularly in the area of foreign and security policy. The member countries completed their move toward a single market in 1993 and agreed to participate in a larger common market, the European Economic Area, with most of the European Fee Trade Association (EFTA) nations. In 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, all former EFTA members joined the EU. A crisis within the EU was precipitated in 1996 when sales of British beef were banned because of "mad cow disease". Britain retaliated by vowing to paralyze EU business until the ban was lifted, but that crisis eased when a British plan for eradicating the disease was approved. The ban was lifted in 1999, but French refusal to permit the sale of British beef resulted in new strains within the EU. In 1998, as a prelude to their 1999 adoption of the Euro, 11 EU nations established the European Central Bank. The Euro was introduced into circulation in 2002 by 12 EU countries. As a result of charges of corruption and mismanagement in its executive body, EU formed the European Commission (EC) in 1999. Further, the EU agreed to absorb the functions of the Western European Union, a comparatively dormant European defense alliance, thus moving toward making the EU a military power with defensive and peacekeeping capabilities. In 2003 the EU and ten non-EU European nations – Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia,

Cyprus and Malta – signed treaties that resulted in the largest expansion of the EU. In October, 2004, EU countries signed a constitution with a provision requiring a supermajority of countries to pass legislation. The EU nations signed the Lisbon Treaty in 2007. The Treaty reorganized the European Council, established an elected President of the European Council and a single EU foreign policy official, and reformed the EU's system of voting, among other changes. In July, 2013, Croatia joined the EU. At present, EU has 28 member countries.

In brief, it can be argued that EU emerged as a political system through a gradual historical process as a result of the demands of its member countries including the solution of economic problems, maintenance of peace, cooperation and security.

# 4.3.3 CONCEPTUALIZING THE EU AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM

In Europe, the gradual process of economic and political integration has produced a complex allocation of executive, legislative, and judicial policy-making powers at multiple levels of government, including the European level. Simon Hix argues that the EU is the first genuine 'supranational polity' to exist in human history. However, all political systems are to some extent unique. The US has a unique model of the separation of executive and legislative power, France has a unique semi-presidential model of government, and Germany has a unique model of interlocking federalism, and so on. What is more important from the point of view of comparative political analysis is that all political systems face a common set of issues, such as what powers are allocated to the central institutions relative to the lower institutions, and how decision-making should work in the central institutions. This was one of the insights of comparative political scientists in the 1 950s, who tried to develop a common framework for defining and analyzing the complex array of political systems that existed throughout the world. Simon Hix explains the four essential characteristics of a political system as given below:

- There is a clearly defined set of institutions for collective decision-making and set of rules governing relations between and within these institutions.
- Citizens seek to achieve their political desires through the political system, either directly or through intermediary organizations like interest groups and political parties.

- Collective decisions in the political system have an impact on the distribution
  of economic resources and the allocation of social and political values across
  the whole system.
- There is a continuous interaction between these political outputs, new demands on the system, new decisions, and so on.

In this context, Hix observes that the EU possesses all the four characteristics of a political system because of the following reasons:-

- The level of institutional development and complexity in the EU is far greater than in any other international or regional integration organization. Infact, the EU possesses the most formalized and complex set of decision-making rules of any political system in the world.
- A large number of public and private groups, from multinational corporations and global environmental groups to individual citizens are trying to influence the EU policy process continuously.
- The policy outcomes of EU are highly significant and are felt throughout the EU. The direct redistributive capacity of the EU is indeed small, since the EU budget is only about one percent of the total GDP of the EU. However, the single market, European social and environmental regulations, the single currency, justice and interior affairs policies and the myriad of other policy outputs of the EU system have an enormous indirect impact on the allocation of resources and social relationships in European society.
- The EU political system is a permanent feature of political life in Europe. The quarterly meetings of the heads of government of the member states in the European Council may be the only feature that many citizens and media outlets notice. Nevertheless, EU politics is a continuous process, within and between the EU institutions in Brussels, between national governments and Brussels, within national public administrations, between private interests and governmental officials in Brussels and at the national level, and between private groups involved in EU affairs at the national and European levels.

# 4.3.4 INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF THE EU AS A POLITICAL SYSTEM

The EU as a political system has a broader institutional set to perform its functions. The Constitution of EU explains the basic institutional structure of the EU. The constitution of EU has set the objectives of its political system to achieve in the context of domestic and foreign policy. To achieve these objective, it has established five institutions i.e. European Parliament, European Council, Council of Ministers, European Commission and Court of Justice of European Union. These institutions as per their jurisdiction are indulged in the rule making application and adjudication functions of the European political system.

#### 4.3.4.1 OBJECTIVES OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

The Constitutional frame work of the EU in its article-1 to 3 explains the objectives of this entity. The main objectives of the Union are to promote peace, the Union's values and the well-being of its peoples. These general objectives are supplemented by a list of more detailed described as below:-

- an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers;
- an internal market where competition is free and undistorted;
- sustainable development, based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment;
- the promotion of scientific and technological advance;
- the combating of social exclusion and discrimination, and the promotion of social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child;
- the promotion of economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.

Apart from this, the EU respects cultural and linguistic diversity and ensures that Europe's cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced. Paragraph 4 of article 1-3 is devoted to promotion of EU's values and interests in the rest of the world. This paragraph discusses the objectives of the EU in the context of the common foreign and security policy.

#### 4.3.4.2 EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

The European Parliament is a directly elected parliamentary institution of the EU. It performs the legislative functions of the EU along with the Council of the European Union and European Commission. The Parliament is composed of 750 seats. It represents the second largest democratic electorate in the world after the Indian Parliament. It has the largest trans-national democratic electorate in the world. The minimum number of seats per Member State is six. This has been done to make sure that, even in the least populous Member States; all the major shades of political opinion can have a chance of being represented in the European Parliament. Constitution of EU Treaty sets out the general rules concerning the Parliament. The Constitution jointly vests the Parliament and the Council of Ministers with the legislative and budgetary functions. Thus, the Parliament is put on an equal footing with the Council of Ministers. Besides, the Parliament has functions of political control and consultation such as the control of the Commission or execution of the budget. The Parliament has the power to elect the President of the Commission by a majority of its members acting on a proposal from the European Council. Since the Parliament equal legislative powers with the Council of Ministers, the European laws and framework laws are adopted by the Parliament and the Council of Ministers.

#### 4.3.4.3 EUROPEAN COUNCIL

The European Council has played a key role in European integration. The European Council was first mentioned in the Single Act but not established as an institution. The Treaty on European Union (EU Treaty) defined the European Council's role. Besides this, the EU Treaty gave the European Council specific roles in relation to the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and economic and monetary union (EMU). The European Council consists of the Heads of State

or Government of the Member States, together with its President and the President of the Commission. The Union Minister for Foreign Affairs takes part in its work. The European Council is given a stable President who holds office for two and-a-half years, which is a new institutional arrangement. The EC identifies the strategic interests and objectives of the Union. However, the practical implementation of policies is the responsibility of the other institutions such as Commission, European Parliament and Council of Ministers. At present, the European Council plays a more practical role in the common foreign and security policy. It also plays a key role as regards nominations. It proposes the President of the Commission to the European Parliament. It also appoints the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs in agreement with the President of the Commission. Decisions of the European Council are taken by consensus, except where the EU Constitution provides otherwise.

## 4.3.4.4 COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

The Council of Ministers is also known as "the Council". It is consists of representatives of Member States at ministerial level. The Council, jointly with the European Parliament, exercises legislative and budgetary functions. It also has policy-making and coordinating functions. Except where the Constitution provides otherwise, decisions of the Council are taken by "qualified majority".

#### 4.3.4.5 EUROPEAN COMMISSION

The European Commission is one of the main institutions of the European Union which represents and upholds the interests of the EU as a whole. It drafts proposals for new European laws. It manages the day-to-day business of implementing EU policies and spending EU funds. The 28 Commissioners, one from each EU country, provide the Commission's political leadership during their five year term. Each Commissioner is assigned responsibility for specific policy areas by the President. The President is nominated by the European Council. The Council also appoints the other Commissioners in agreement with the nominated President. The appointment of all Commissioners including the President is subject to the approval of the European Parliament. Commissioners remain accountable to Parliament, which has sole power to dismiss the Commission. The day-to-day running of the Commission is taken care

of by the Commission's staff – administrators, lawyers, economists, translators, interpreters, secretarial staff, etc. organized in departments known as Directorates-General (DGs). Commission oversees and implements EU policies by proposing new laws to Parliament and the Council; managing the EU's budget and allocating funding; enforcing EU law together with the Court of Justice and; representing the EU internationally by negotiating agreements between the EU and other countries.

## 4.3.4.6 COURT OF JUSTICE OF EUROPEAN UNION

The Court of Justice of European Union (CJEU) is the institution of the European Union (EU) that encompasses the whole judiciary. It is located in Luxembourg. It consists of two major courts and a specialized court which includes:

- The Court of Justice, also known as "European Court of Justice" is the highest court in the EU legal system;
- The General Court was created in 1988;
- The Civil Service Tribunal, a specialized court created in 2004.

Originally established in 1952 as the Court of Justice of the European Coal and Steel Communities to ensure observance of the law "in the interpretation and application" of the EU treaties, CJEU currently holds jurisdiction to review the legality of institutional actions by the European Union; ensure that Member States comply with their obligations under EU law; and interpret European Union law at the request of the national courts and tribunals. The ECJ, together with national courts, provides a powerful check on the EU's executive and legislative institutions. The ECJ played a significant role in the development of the legal basis of the EU political system, in particular by developing the doctrines of the direct-effect and supremacy of EU law. The ECJ is independent from the governments in the Council, and national courts often support the ECJ against their own governments. For example, on several occasions the ECJ has struck down legislation adopted by the Council and Parliament on the grounds that the treaties did not give the EU the right to adopt legislation in a particular area. Nevertheless, like all supreme courts, the ECJ is not completely isolated from external pressures, since it knows that if it strays too far from the meaning of the treaties, the governments can act collectively to rein in its powers. The ECJ is also aware that national courts, particularly the German Constitutional Court, are protective of their right to interpret whether EU law is in breach of fundamental human rights as set out in national constitutions. The EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights is an attempt to provide a set of basic rights for the ECJ to apply, although until the EU Constitution is implemented the Charter is not binding.

## 4.3.5 THE EUROPEAN UNION AS SINGLE MARKET

The EU has established a single market across the territory of all its members. Out of 28 member countries, 19 member states have also joined a monetary union known as the Eurozone, which uses the Euro as a single currency. Thus, EU is considered as the most successful common market in the world. Of the top 500 largest corporations measured by revenue, 161 have their headquarters in the EU. This has been achieved by the removal of barriers to trade such as tariffs as well as other economic initiatives such as regulation concerning competition To a certain extent, the progress towards making a Single European Market over the last fifty years has been similar to the initial economic unification of federal states such as Germany in the 19th Century; standards are established and tolls and tariffs are reduced or removed completely. This creation of standards is similar to Europe today: with the European Union regulating all products produced within each member state to a certain level so as to fully implement the Single Market initiative. The Single European Market initiative, specifically the Cohesion policy, reflects a federal system further in that it provides financial assistance to the EU's less economically developed states. This distribution of resources reflects a centralized system that is typical of federal political systems. Introduction of a single currency across the majority of countries in the Eurozone highlights further the extent to which economic unity is present in the EU. Hence, this level of economic integration in the absence of the same level of the aforementioned political integration highlights the extent to which the EU is a unique political system.

## 4.3.5.1 MONETARY UNION OF EUROPEAN UNION

The creation of a European single currency became an official objective of the European Economic Community in 1969. In 1992, after having negotiated the structure and procedures of a currency union, the member states signed the Maastricht Treaty

and were legally bound to fulfill the agreed-on rules including the convergence criteria if they wanted to join the monetary union. The states wanting to participate had first to join the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. In 1999 the currency union started, first as an accounting currency with eleven member states joining. In 2002, the currency was fully put into place, when euro notes and coins were issued and national currencies began to phase out in the Eurozone, which by then consisted of 12 member states. The Eurozone has since grown to 19 countries, the most recent being Lithuania which joined on 1 January 2015. Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Sweden have not joined the Eurozone.

Since its launch the Euro has become the second reserve currency in the world with a quarter of foreign exchanges reserves being in Euro.

The Euro and the monetary policies of those who have adopted it in agreement with the EU are under the control of the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB is the central bank for the Eurozone, and thus controls monetary policy in that area with an agenda to maintain price stability. It is at the centre of the European System of Central Banks, which comprehends all EU national central banks and is controlled by its General Council, consisting of the President of the ECB, who is appointed by the European Council, the Vice-President of the ECB, and the governors of the national central banks of all 28 EU member states. The European System of Financial Supervision is an institutional architecture of the EU's framework of financial supervision composed by three authorities: the European Banking Authority, the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority and the European Securities and Markets Authority. To complement this framework, there is also a European Systemic Risk Board under the responsibility of the ECB. The aim of this financial control system is to ensure the economic stability of the EU.

To prevent the joining states from getting into financial crisis after entering the monetary union, they were obliged in the Maastricht treaty to fulfill important financial obligations and procedures, especially to show budgetary discipline and a high degree of sustainable economic convergence, as well as to avoid excessive government deficits and limit the government debt to a sustainable level. Some states joined the euro but violated these rules and contracts to an extent that they slid into a debt crisis and had

to be financially supported with emergency rescue funds. These states were Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Cyprus and Spain. Even though the Maastricht treaty forbids Eurozone states to assume the debts of other states, various emergency rescue funds had been created by the members to support the debt crisis states to meet their financial obligations and buy time for reforms that those states can gain back their competitiveness.

## 4.3.6 COMMON FOREIGN, SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY

Besides economic and political unity, the EU is unified to a degree in foreign and security policy through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). However, despite these measures, the EU has exploited more in the economic sphere than in the political and security spheres. This is demonstrated by the fact that the EU, whilst capable of responding coherently to less sensitive issues such as support of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, is typically unable to deliver a coherent response to issues that directly affect EU foreign policy and security, such as the crises in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990's. This demonstrates the EU's similarity to an IGO such as the United Nations (UN). However, unlike the member states of the UN, EU members are obliged to follow directives that relate directly to security policy. For example, member states are obliged to ensure that all communications providers maintain records of all emails and calls over the past two years as part of the effort to combat terrorism. Thus, despite the fact that the EU is typified by a lack of concerted measures to respond to international events and crises, it is still distinguished from IGOs by its capacity to introduce measures similar to those made by a federal government. This demonstrates further that the EU is a unique political system.

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), as document titled, "Promoting Peace and Prosperity: The European Union in the World" explains, was introduced under the Amsterdam Treaty, as the operational arm of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the field of crisis management, covering all questions relating to the EU's security and with the potential for later creating a common defence structure, should the European Council so decide. Under the ESDP, the Union now has permanent political and military structures and civilian and military

capabilities, as well as a set of crisis management concepts and procedures. The Cologne European Council in June 1999 placed crisis-management tasks at the heart of the process of strengthening the CFSP. These tasks include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace keeping tasks and tasks of combat-force in crisis management, including peace-making. The Cologne European Council also decided that the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. The Union has concluded arrangements for the consultation and participation of third countries in crisis management. It has also defined with NATO the framework for relations between the two organizations, including arrangements allowing the Union to have recourse to NATO's assets and capabilities. The EU has the means to address the crises confronting it on its doorstep, as well as in other parts of the world. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) is the highest military body within the Council. It is composed of the Chiefs of Defence Staff of the Member States or their representatives and it provides the PSC with advice and recommendations on all aspects of military crisis management. The European Union Military Staff (EUMS), the EU's only permanent integrated military structure. The EUMS is composed of military and civilian experts seconded to the Council Secretariat by the Member States. It includes a civilian-military cell and an EU Operations Centre. The Council Secretariat also includes a Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) in charge of planning and running civilian missions under the ESDP. Since 2003 when the first missions were launched, the Union has conducted 17 military and civilian crisis-management operations. It currently has eleven ESDP operations under way. They span three continents and range from military operations to security sector reform, institution-building and police and rule of law missions. Some are autonomous missions and some assist other international organizations such as the UN or the African Union. From Kabul to Kinshasa, from Chad to Sarajevo, from Ramallah to Kosovo, the EU has proved as the key factor for peace and stability.

## 4.3.7 LET US SUM UP

To sum up, the European Union is a sui generis political system. It is a product of gradual process and continues to developing until it develops into either a federal

state or an intergovernmental organisation. However, it is a unique political system. The EU has executive power in that the bodies that make up its decision making process, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and the European Parliament, legislate laws and measures that significantly influence all member states. These measures cover economic and environmental matters, as well as those of foreign policy, defence and security policy. The EU's collective decisions have a wide and significant impact on the member states and their citizens. This has created a large number of interest groups making demands of the system. In a political system, its internal and external demands are channeled through political institutions. Furthermore, this is often done by means of intermediary organizations such as interest groups or political parties. Thus, the EU represents the interests of its citizens and interests in the same way that a federal state would. The EU is characterized by a very diverse culture, imbued with a diverse set of languages and cultural beliefs. As far as cultural cohesion is concerned, the EU does share many characteristics with a federal political system that represents a nation and the culture thereof. This highlights the uniqueness of the EU's political system. The EU was named recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012.

# 4.3.8 SUGGESTED READINGS

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M.A. Political Science, Semester II, Course No. 204, Comparative Politics UNIT - IV: STATE, GLOBALIZATION, EUROPEAN UNION AND CLIMATE **CHANGE** 

# 4.4 CLIMATE CHANGE: A PERSPECTIVE OF **DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING NATIONS**

- V. Nagendra Rao

## **STRUCTURE**

- 4.4.0 Objectives
- 4.4.1 Introduction
- 4.4.2 Climate Change
  - 4.4.2.1 Increasing Levels of Global Warming
  - 4.4.2.2 Climate Change: Consequences
  - 4.4.2.3 Climate Change: Economic Impact
- 4.4.3 World Response to Climate Change
- 4.4.4 Developed vs Developing Countries
- **4.4.5** Perspective of Developing Countries
  - 4.4.5.1 Cumulative Emissions
  - 4.4.5.2 Emission Reduction Attempts
  - 4.4.5.3 Financial Support
- 4.3.6 Developed Countries Perspective
- 4.3.7 Climate Change: Critical Appraisal

## 4.3.8 Let us Sum up

## 4.3.9 Suggested Readings

## 4.4.0 OBJECTIVES

After going through this lesson, you should be able to:

- Know what is climate change and its consequences;
- Conceptualize international community's response to climate change
- Understand the contradictory perspectives of developed and developing countries.

## 4.4.1 INTRODUCTION

Climate change represents one of the most serious and far-reaching challenges facing humankind in the twenty-first Century. The international consensus of scientific opinion, led by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, is agreed that global temperature is increasing and that the main cause is the accumulation of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases in the atmosphere as a result of human activities Scientific opinion is also agreed that the threat posed will become more severe over coming decades. The cost of failing to mobilise in the face of this threat is likely to be extremely high. The economic costs alone will be very large: as extreme weather events such as droughts and floods become more destructive and frequent; communities, cities, and island nations are damaged or inundated as sea level rises; and agricultural output is disrupted. The social and human costs are likely to be even greater, encompassing mass loss of life, the spread or exacerbation of diseases, dislocation of populations, geopolitical instability, and a pronounced decrease in the quality of life. Impacts on ecosystems and biodiversity are also likely to be devastating. Preventing dangerous climate change, therefore, must be seen as a precondition for prosperity and a public good.

Governments have already begun to work together to address the threat of climate change under the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol, which enters into legal force in February 2005.

While the need to reduce worldwide emissions of Greenhouse gases (GHGs) is well recognised by almost all of the countries, sharing of the responsibility for these

reductions between countries remains a contentious issue. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) acknowledges that the response of individual countries has to be in accordance with their "common but differentiated responsibility" but that still leaves considerable uncertainty about how the responsibilities will be divided. The developed and developing countries are not finding a common ground with regard to responsibilities each of them have to bear to reduce the dangers that the world is facing due to climate change. This lesson will address some of these contentious issues.

## 4.4.2 CLIMATE CHANGE

Most of the sunlight and other invisible solar radiation reaching the earth passes through its atmosphere to reach the earth's surface. A significant part of the solar radiation is reflected back to space, especially from light-coloured surfaces. The rest is absorbed by the surface, which is heated. The earth's surface in turn radiates heat through the atmosphere in the form of infrared radiation.

The greenhouse effect is a natural atmospheric process caused by the presence of certain gases in the atmosphere that prevent the infrared radiation emitted from escaping from the earth's surface to space. As a result, the temperature of the atmosphere increases, until a new equilibrium between ingoing solar radiation and outgoing infrared radiation is reached. The process is analogous to the way in which a greenhouse increases the temperature inside. The gases that absorb outgoing infrared radiation are called greenhouse gases (GHGs).

Some GHGs that exist naturally are: carbon dioxide (CO2) and small quantities of methane (CH4). Thus, the greenhouse effect has always been with us. In its absence, the earth's mean temperature would be 30°C lower than it is, which would mean the end of life on the planet, an ice covered place.

The progressive gradual rise of the earth's average surface temperature, thought to be caused in part by increased concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, is called "global warming", which is commonly described as *climate change*, although global warming is only one of the changes that affect the global climate.

## 4.4.2.1 INCREASING LEVELS OF GLOBAL WARMING

Since the industrial revolution there has been a considerable increase in the emissions of GHGs resulting in considerable increase in their concentrations in the earth's atmosphere. The natural balance of the greenhouse effect is currently lost. Emissions of GHGs through 'human activities' are sometimes called *anthropogenic* emissions. These emissions also include certain GHGs that do not exist in nature. The main anthropogenic emissions of concern are three natural GHGs (carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide) and several "man-made" gases including chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).

The concentration of these gases in the atmosphere has been increasing because of a variety of reasons. Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is increasing as a result of the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and, to a lesser extent, natural gas. Another source of carbon dioxide is deforestation, e.g., from the conversion of forests to farmland, since trees absorb carbon dioxide through photosynthesis. Methane is emitted from solid waste, wastewater, and from certain agricultural activities such as rice cultivation. Certain industrial processes as well as from agriculture and solid waste also emit nitrous oxide. The remaining principal GHGs are emitted by industrial processes and from products that contain these gases. For instance, CFCs and HFCs are used in refrigerators and air conditioners, and these gases leak out over time, especially when the equipment is discarded.

#### 4.4.2.2 CLIMATE CHANGE: CONSEQUENCES

The serious nature of climate change and its consequences were widely recognised in 1988, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was set up the same year. IPCC has been studying different aspects of climate change. The IPCC includes three working groups: (i) Working Group 1 (WG 1) assesses the scientific aspects of the climate system and climate change; (ii) Working Group 2 (WG 2) assesses the vulnerability of socio-economic and natural systems to climate change, negative and positive consequences of climate change, and options for adapting to it; (iii) Working Group 3 (WG 3) assesses options for limiting GHG emissions and otherwise mitigating climate change.

Every few years, each working group publishes an Assessment Report. Some of the key findings of these working are groups are:

- (i) Global atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human activities since 1750 and now far exceed pre-industrial values determined from ice cores spanning many thousands of years. The global increases in carbon dioxide concentration are due primarily to fossil fuel use and land-use change, while those of methane and nitrous oxide are primarily due to agriculture.
- (ii) Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, as is now evident from observations of increases in global average air and ocean temperatures, widespread melting of snow and ice, and rising global mean sea level.
- (iii) At continental, regional, and ocean basin scales, numerous long-term changes in climate have been observed. These include changes in arctic temperatures and ice, widespread changes in precipitation amounts, ocean salinity, wind patterns and aspects of extreme weather including droughts, heavy precipitation, heat waves and the intensity of tropical cyclones.
- (iv) Paleoclimate information supports the interpretation that the warmth of the last half century is unusual in at least the previous 1,300 years. The last time the polar regions were significantly warmer than present for an extended period (about 1,25,000 years ago), reductions in polar ice volume led to 4 to 6 metres of sea level rise.
- Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures v) since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations. Discernible human influences now extend to other aspects of climate, including ocean warming, continental-average temperatures, temperature extremes and wind patterns.

- (vi) For the next two decades a warming of about 0.2°C per decade is projected for a range of emission scenarios. Even if the concentrations of all GHGs and aerosols had been kept constant at year 2000 levels, a further warming of about 0.1°C per decade would be expected.
- (vii) Anthropogenic warming and sea level rise would continue for centuries due to the timescales associated with climate processes and feedbacks, even if GHG concentrations were to be stabilised.

Changes, which earlier took millions of years, are now taking place in decades without allowing ecosystems sufficient time to adapt. As a result, many species of flora and fauna could become extinct.

#### 4.4.2.3 CLIMATE CHANGE: ECONOMIC IMPACT

Governments in many countries have, over the years, made statements that though they are aware of the climate change, yet economic growth is more important to reduce poverty, create employment, etc. Statements of this type involve the implicit assumption that climate change is a nuisance, that it has little or no economic costs, while doing something about climate change would have a serious negative impact on the economy.

A report brought out by Nicholas Stern, head of the United Kingdom's Government Economics Service in 2006 seriously contradicts the above mentioned assumption. The Stern Report estimates that

"if we don't act, the overall costs and risks of climate change will be equivalent to losing at least 5 per cent of global gross domestic product (GDP) each year, now and forever. If a wider range of risks and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20 per cent of GDP or more.

"In contrast, the costs of action – reducing GHG emissions to avoid the worst impacts of climate change – can be limited to around 1 per cent of global GDP each year".

These conclusions are in sharp contrast to the implicit assumptions in public statements on climate change. The Stern Report finds that climate change is not just a

nuisance, but can significantly reduce economic growth. And that mitigating climate change is not all that expensive. The Stern Report concludes: "the benefits of strong, early action considerably outweigh the costs".

The economics of climate change can be formulated as three questions: (1) What are the economic costs of the impact of climate change? (2) What are the costs of adapting to the consequences of climate change? (3) What are the costs of mitigating climate change?

The conclusions from the Stern Report address the first and third questions at a global or world level. The key conclusions of the Stern Report are: (i) "The scientific evidence points to increasing risks of serious, irreversible impacts from climate change associated with business-as-usual (BAU) paths for emissions"; (ii) "Climate change threatens the basic elements of life for people around the world – access to water, food production, health, and use of land and the environment"; (iii) "The damages from climate change will accelerate as the world gets warmer". Such changes could include "sudden shifts in regional weather patterns such as the monsoon rains in south Asia..." Moreover, sea level rise from "melting or collapse of ice sheets would eventually threaten land which today is home to 1 in every 20 people"; (iv) "The impacts of climate change are not evenly distributed – the poorest countries and people will suffer earliest and most. And if and when the damages appear it will be too late to reverse the process. Thus we are forced to look a long way ahead." This is because our countries have less resources to counter the impact of climate change and also because developing countries are often "heavily dependent on agriculture, the most climate-sensitive of economic sectors..."

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 1**

|    | Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient. |  |  |  |
|----|--|--|--|--|
| 1. | Write a brief note on climate change?  |  |  |  |
|    |  |  |  |  |

| How climate | change will have negative econo | omic impact? |
|-------------|---------------------------------|--------------|
|             |                                 |              |

## 4.4.3 WORLD RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate change first gained significant attention in 1988. Not long afterwards, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted by various government representatives in May 1992, and came into force in 1994. Today, the UNFCCC is one of the most widely supported international environmental agreements ratified by 188 states and the European Community (EC).

The ultimate objective of the UNFCCC is to achieve stabilisation of GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.

## **4.4.3.1 K**YOTO **PROTOCOL**

The Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty, which extends the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that commits State Parties to reduce greenhouse gases emissions, based on the premise that (a) global warming exists and (b) man-made CO2 emissions have caused it. The Kyoto Protocol was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, on 11 December 1997 and entered into force on 16

February 2005. There are currently 192 Parties to the Protocol. The Kyoto Protocol implemented the objective of the UNFCCC to fight global warming by reducing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to 'a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system'. The Protocol is based on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities". Recognizing that developed countries are principally responsible for the current high levels of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as a result of more than 150 years of industrial activity, the Protocol places a heavier burden on developed nations.

Under this protocol countries that are parties to the UNFCCC are classified into two categories, giving rise to a third category including those countries that do not belong to the first two categories. They have different commitments imposed on them. These three categories are defined as: 1) the industrialised countries that were members of the OECD in 1992 and the countries with Economies in Transition (EIT); 2) The countries consist of the OECD members excluding the EIT parties. They are required to provide financial resources to developing countries to undertake emission reduction activities as also develop and transfer environment-friendly technologies to the developing countries as well as EIT parties. Many countries that were not listed are mostly developing countries, including India. Some of the countries that are least developed and especially vulnerable to the effects of climate change are given special consideration under the UNFCCC.

According to the Kyoto Protocol, first category countries agreed to control the emissions of the following six sets of GHGs, not controlled by the Montreal Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).

In 2009, the United Nations climate change conference was held in Copenhagen, Denmark. There was a widespread hope to the world community about the conference that it would bring a significant policy and commitment to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases. But, the conference couldn't make a consensus decision and thus the accord of the conference was not passed unanimously.

## 4.4.4 DEVELOPED VERSUS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

The Kyoto Protocol has also become a debate between developed and developing countries. According to some scholars (mainly from developing countries), there are a few concerns related to the direction the global climate regime is taking, which can be categorized into three sections:

- Although the principle of equity was central to the discussions of global climate change and even until the adoption of the UNFCCC, it has not been part of most the discussions ever since, and more specifically since the Kyoto agreement.
- The focus of the regime is heavily weighted on minimizing the burden of implementation of Kyoto reductions on polluting countries (industries), rather than on the vulnerabilities of the communities and countries at greater risk and disadvantage because of climate change.
- The limelight is now the on the global carbon trade and how to manage it, rather than on the reduction of GHGs (which is the main objective of Kyoto Protocol).

Although the United States was a leader in drafting and implementing the Montreal Protocol, such is not the case with the Kyoto Protocol. For key countries, including the United States, the payoff structure is fundamentally different for the two agreements. For most of the key countries,

## 4.4.5 PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Developing countries, taken as a group, have contributed much less in terms of historical emissions, including greenhouse gases (GHGs), than developed countries. Since the beginning of the debate on global climate change and global warming and necessary actions to reduce emissions to limit the rise in temperature, developing countries have argued their case on the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR). Under the principle of equity, developing nations argue that each person in the world has equal rights in the atmosphere, which is a global commons. Hence, they argue that the developed nations, which have contributed

most in terms of emissions, with lesser populations, should reduce their emissions before asking developing nations to reduce theirs. Invoking the principle of CBDR, developing nations argue that as the developed nations have more capacity and capability to undertake the task of reducing emissions, they should contribute more to that task and also help developing nations in terms of financial assistance, technology transfer, and capacity building. Thus, developing nations argue that they will undertake measures to cut emissions, but not at the cost of their socioeconomic development.

#### 4.4.5.1 CUMULATIVE EMISSIONS

Developing countries argue that while discussing climate change and emissions of GHGs, it is important to distinguish between the stock (accumulated emissions) and flow of emissions (current emissions). It is the stock of emissions that determines the extent of climate change; however, only flows can be reduced to limit climate change in the future.

To understand this more one must look at the contribution of different countries to the stock of emissions. The cumulative emissions per capita of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries is many times that of the developing countries. In comparison with India the OECD contribution per capita is about 32 times, and the contribution of the United States (US), the United Kingdom (UK) and Germany is 40 to 50 times that of India. Even in absolute numbers, India's contribution to the stock of emissions is only about 2% of the entire world's contribution, and about 8% of the US contribution.

Sometimes this massive difference in the contributions to the stock of emissions is ignored as the discussion focuses on current and future emissions. Although the incremental emissions from China and India are expected to be large compared to wealthier nations, even in a business-as-usual case, their contribution to the cumulative emissions (stock) per capita will remain below that of the wealthier nations.

#### 4.4.5.2 Emission Reduction Attempts

Even though the emissions of the OECD countries have been increasing, there are some countries particularly in Europe that have started reducing their emissions.

In addition, the developed countries are making various proposals about the extent to which they would reduce emissions.

But all these proposals, in reality, just compensate the developed countries for their emissions level in 2008. In effect, even if one ignores the huge contribution to the stock of emissions not just until 1990, but until 2008, the OECD countries are not promising much. The targets proposed to reduce the flow of emissions in future suggest that (1) they would not do anything more than what they agreed in Kyoto until 2024, (2) they would repudiate other components agreed to in Kyoto, such as a penalty for non-compliance and further reductions during the second commitment period starting in 2012.

## 4.4.5.3 FINANCIAL SUPPORT

In addition to reducing their own emissions, the developed countries were expected to provide financial support to developing countries to adapt to, and mitigate climate change. Thus an essential feature of a global emissions reduction regime is an effective mechanism to provide adequate and predictable funds by the developed countries to the developing countries for adaptation and mitigation. Various policy statements also acknowledge the need for such a financing mechanism.

Assuming that a very significant amount of the reductions in emissions will have to be done by the developing countries, a proportionate amount of the fund required would have to be transferred to the developing countries. The current level of transfer of funds by industrialised countries is woefully inadequate.

Adaptation to climate change is also an issue about which there has been little or no action or attention except by a few countries that have shown sensitivity to this issue. As a result, countries like Bangladesh, Myanmar and Senegal, which have made almost no contribution to the problem of climate change are among the worst sufferers.

Hence, the response of the developed countries in fulfilling their responsibility to reduce the threat of climate change has been tepid on both fronts: emissions reductions and financial transfers. Recent proposals for emission

reductions being made by the wealthier nations, which prima facie seem dramatic, on closer examination are not so. In fact, these proposals essentially seek a deferral of the commitments under the Kyoto Protocol for 10 to 15 years in the case of the OECD countries and for 15 to 25 years in the case of the US. In addition, the focus on current and future emissions may lead to a discounting of the massive difference in the additions to the stock of emissions by developed countries not only until 1990 but up to 2008. Furthermore, these proposals would nullify the penalty clause of the Kyoto Protocol. The record on financial transfers has been just as disappointing with actual financial transfers to developing countries being a very tiny fraction of what is required.

The crux of argument made by the developing nations is that carbon emission standards should be based on population. In other words, if one country has say, around 250 million people and another has 1 billion, then the country with 1 billion would be permitted to produce 4 times the carbon emissions as the country with 250 million. There are plenty of statistics out there that show how drastically different the per capita carbon footprint is between developed and developing nations. In this technological and energy hungry age, the per capita carbon footprint of a nation is closely linked to the quality of life of its citizens. Developing nations argue that every person in the world has an equal right to engage in activities which result in carbon emissions and benefit from the industries which produce them.

The developed economies grew on the backs of coal and oil unimpeded by any carbon emission considerations. They steamed ahead, growing exponentially throughout the 21st century and releasing their carbon emissions indiscriminately into the atmosphere. Today's developing countries would argue that they deserve the same opportunity to traverse their industrial revolution with uninhibited use of their own coal and oil resources.

#### 4.4.6 DEVELOPED COUNTRIES PERSPECTIVE

The group representing the developed nations argues that a carbon emission reduction approach based on the GDP of a given country. In other words, carbon emissions would be tied to the "coin" each country's economy pumped out; a

certain amount of carbon emission allowed per million "coins" of national productivity. They argued this accurately reflected the carbon efficiency of a nation's economy. If economic stability is to be preserved, the degree to which carbon is reduced should be tied to economic output, representing a carbon tax proportional to the amount contributed to the global economic stage.

It was argued that developing economies rely on the strength of developed nations' economies to purchase those goods which can't be consumed internally. Any carbon tax disproportionately affecting developed countries' economies would upset this balance and cause economic instability. If developed economies stumble or stall due to heavy taxation, then demand will fade for goods from developing nations, resulting in a drag on their economies and thus the domino spiral into global recession ensues.

The developed countries also argue that the north–south divide of the 1990s still persists, but the global economic scenario has undergone a change. Because of its rapid economic growth, China has emerged as the world's largest carbon dioxide (CO2) emitter, and has become the second largest economy in the world. Some developing countries have had significant economic growth between 1990 and 2011, and the overall emissions from developing nations have increased. In fact, it is expected that a significant portion of the world's future emissions will come from developing countries.

While industrialised countries are responsible for 75% of the historical GHG emissions, and therefore the current concentrations of GHG in the atmosphere, developing countries are now responsible for over 50% of emissions now being added to the atmosphere. The responsibility (total historical emissions) is shifting towards developing countries as the years go by. Thus, developing countries need to take a more explicit role in limiting GHG emissions, and not leave it exclusively as a responsibility of the industrialised countries.

The developed world takes the position that developing nations—at least, fast-growing developing nations—cannot refuse to reduce the increase in their emissions and limit their emissions within a specified time period.

Seriously expressing reservations with the cushion provided to the developing countries, the United States, although a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol, has neither ratified nor withdrawn from the protocol. In 1997, the US Senate voted unanimously under the Byrd–Hagel Resolution that it was not the sense of the Senate that the United States should be a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. In 2001, former National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, stated that the Protocol is not acceptable to the Administration or Congress.

In March 2001, the Bush Administration announced that it would not implement the Kyoto Protocol as the treaty would create economic set backs in the U.S. and does not put enough pressure to limit emissions from developing nations.

#### 4.4.7 CLIMATE CHANGE: CRITICAL APPRAISAL

The climate change and reducing the emission of gases in the most contentious issue between developed and developing countries, though everyone recognises the dangers the world is going to face if meaningful measures are not taken. Developing countries are concerned that the Developed world which contributing maximum to the global warming is reluctant to equally reduce emissions while demanding the same from the developing countries.

Developing countries such as China and India, although significant in terms of the size of their economies, have millions living in poverty and require huge investments in infrastructure and social development. The challenge before these and other developing countries is how to meet the twin, apparently conflicting goals of rapid economic development and decreasing carbon emissions. In order for the transition to a low carbon society to be quick and effective, developing countries have claimed that they need help from developed countries in terms of technology transfer, financial assistance, and capacity building. At the same time, some developing countries have better capabilities for innovation, and are also investing heavily in science and innovations such as the frontier technologies of nanotechnology and biotechnology, in addition to expanding access to higher education and strengthening their national innovation systems. As a result, there is more scope and relevance for developed and developing country cooperation in

adaptation, mitigation, and technology transfer - whether it involves integrating climate change policies with sustainable development policies, enacting new laws and establishing new institutions, or mobilizing financial resources, developing countries must make decisions.

In the context of global negotiations, the big question is what would happen in the absence of a binding agreement or with only a weak agreement and no renewal of the Kyoto Protocol. Developing countries are in an unenviable position, because developed countries can push for measurable, reportable, and verifiable measures and link that with assistance, although officially developing countries might not be bound to cut emissions or might be given more time to start the cuts in emissions. Developing countries must decide if they will resist this and still face the prospect of the absence of a global deal with countries voluntarily committing to specified emissions reductions, or instead, cooperate and agree for a regime that is not based on CBDR principles or on the fair and equitable distribution of the reductions in GHG. In sum, developing nations are likely to be affected more by climate change than developed countries. A global deal based on CBDR and fair and equitable sharing of the cuts in emissions is in their best interests. Otherwise, the "global divide" in climate change may deepen, which is not in the interests of any country.

#### **CHECK YOUR PROGRESS EXERCISE 2**

NOTE: Use the space given below for your answers. Use separate sheet if space is not sufficient.

| 1. | The Kyoto Protocol is based on the principle of "common but differentiated |
|----|--|
|    | responsibilities". Explain.  |
|    |  |
|    |  |
|    |  |
|    |  |

| Critically analyse the contentions of developing countries vis-a-vis reducing globa |
|---|
| warming.  |
|   |
|   |
|   |
| What is the developed countries perspective on climate change?                      |
|   |
|   |
|   |

## 4.4.8 LET US SUM UP

The effects of climate change have already been observed around the planet and are expected to become more severe as global temperatures increase. Ice sheets and glaciers are rapidly melting as sea levels continue to rise, forcing the relocation of low-lying populations and threatening water supplies for millions of people. Though every country in the world agrees with the gravity of the situation, however, there is a conflict of interests between Developed and developing countries with regard to measures required to be taken by each of the group to mitigate the negative consequences of global warming.

The seeds of the debate seem to be sown in Kyoto protocol in which principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" has been initiated. According to this principle developed and industrialised countries which led the industrial revolution are responsible for most of the greenhouse gases and therefore should bear a greater responsibility for combating climate change. Developing countries want rich countries to take bold action to cut their greenhouse emission but developed countries like USA are seemed to be reluctant as it would affect their economy. Furthermore, the developed nations want the same level of commitment and action from high emitting developing nations like China and India

but the developing nations led by China and India still oppose taking on mandatory obligations to reduce their emissions. This debate of 'who is responsible and who should take action' distracting the attention from the real issues on which everyone must pay attention, that is serious consequences of global warming on each of us.

## 4.4.9 SUGGESTED READINGS

- Daljit Singh, Girish Sant, Ashok Sreenivas, "Climate Change: Separating the Wheat from the Chaff", Economic and Political Weekly, January 31, 2009.
- Gautam Dutt, Fabian Gaioli, "Coping with Climate Change", Economic and Political Weekly, October 20, 2007.

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